Introduction: Representation, recognition and respect in world politics

Representations help us to make sense of our world by giving meaning to events and experiences and the actions of others. These representations are not stagnant, however, and we are not the only ones who use them to understand ourselves and things external to us. Our Others also use representations in the same way. Each of us feels differently about the representations ascribed to us, particularly when they consist of an image of ourselves that we do not like. When we are represented and recognised in a way we disagree with, it is sometimes experienced as disrespect and is framed in an emotional context of insult, humiliation, anger and betrayal. We might then act in a particular way that seeks to undo this form of recognition, or misrecognition, in order to regain a level of respect that we feel we deserve.

Representation plays a central role in the intersubjective dynamics of identity politics. When we think about who we are, we think about ourselves in a particular way. We think about other people in a similar fashion. We use representations – the production of meaning through language, symbols or signs, a conveyance of something – to imagine who we are and how we want to be recognised. These issues matter not just to individuals but to states as well: representation occurs at both the level of the individual and the state. States use representation to understand not only themselves and others but also to respond to externally constructed images of who they are.

The main objective of my book is to demonstrate how representation and recognition influence foreign policy. In order to do so, I explore the connection between representations and recognition and how these are informed by feelings of respect or disrespect that instigate the projection or protection of state identity.

The key argument of my book is that representations are important because they shape both the identity of a state and how it is recognised by others. Representational schemas are key to producing images of state Self and Other that act to reinforce or reimagine frameworks of national identity. Recognition

plays a crucial role in the process because inadequate or failed recognition is tantamount to what quickly becomes perceived as disrespect. Disrespect acts as a trigger for foreign policy that is in itself an emotional reaction or response to particular representations. Emotions are linked to the constitution of a collective identity, which in turn has implications for the forms and types of representations that are used to talk about the Self and the Other. Such emotional division is part of a broader process of boundary-making that informs interstate engagement.

I advance my argument through an investigation of the relationship between Iran and the United States. The case study is indicative of how representation is not only evident within state-to-state communication but also plays a significant role in recognition and identity development. Both the US and Iran utilise particular representations to understand themselves, each other and their behaviour. These have had an impact on each state's foreign policy that further destabilises the relationship between Iran and the US.

This book further proposes that states respond or react to externally constructed representations of who they are. Being recognised in a way that is counter to how a state desires to be recognised produces an emotional response that frames a particular shift in, or continued maintenance of foreign policymaking through the 'struggle for recognition'. However, the struggle for recognition largely remains an examination mostly undertaken only at the domestic level in terms of the distribution of social goods. The emotional context that arises through the struggle for recognition on the international stage is underdeveloped, primarily because it is considered to be apolitical or irrational and therefore not part of standard state decision-making capacity.

The contribution of my book to the study of global politics thus emerges through the observation that how states represent and recognise one another has implications for how states behave. Being recognised in a way that is counter to how a state desires to be recognised produces an emotional response that frames foreign policy through the struggle for recognition. Failed recognition produces disrespect, which is an emotional response to being represented in a certain way. Emotions are intricately related to the practices of power. Perceptions of identity of Self and Other, security and threat, status and treatment are founded within an emotional context that frames how states deal with these issues.

I empirically investigate the issue at stake through Iran–US engagement over Iran's rights under Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and what it allows. I analyse Iran–US engagement during the twentieth century, and then examine how this influences the post-2002 interactions and negotiations between Iran and the US (via the negotiating team of the United Nations Security Council and Germany [P5+1]) surrounding Iran's nuclear program. Feelings of disrespect relating to failed

recognition can lead to serious policy crises, as exemplified by Iran–US nuclear tensions.

I was motivated to write this book at this time for two reasons: firstly, it is clear that representations are becoming increasingly acute in foreign policy. This has resulted in a number of complex crises that can be best explained and perhaps mediated through an acknowledgement that representation, recognition and emotions are key influences on interstate dynamics. For instance, the China–Japan territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands continue to exacerbate nationalist sentiments in each state, which in turn are key to the instigation and prolongation of the disputes themselves. How China and Japan are represented and recognised by each other has clear implications for how they will engage with each other in attempting to ameliorate, or perhaps exacerbate, these crises.

The Greek debt crisis threw representations of Greek and European identity into sharp relief, with Greece slowly emerging as Europe's significant Other in comparison to the oft-represented Turkey. The emotional frameworks that constitute a common European identity were challenged by how Greece desires recognition, which played out at an interstate level through unsuccessful attempts to resolve the debt emergency.

Australia and Indonesia have continued to experience diplomatic issues following revelations of phone tapping by Australian authorities and the execution of two Australian drug smugglers. Diplomatic skirmishes often unfold in the public arena, with pejorative representations of both states imaged through cartoons, social media and attempts to boycott various products, in the latter case by both Australian and Indonesian lobby groups.

Secondly, Iran and the P5+1 – the US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany – reached a historic deal regarding Iran's nuclear program in July 2015. In exchange for relief from sanctions, Iran agreed to reduce its stockpile of centrifuges and enriched uranium, and significantly increase the levels of transparency surrounding its nuclear program by allowing greater access to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. This deal has been the culmination of a series of official proposals presented by both Iran and members of the international community since 2003, and Iran and the P5+1 since 2006.

However, concerns remain. While the Security Council and Germany want to phase out certain sanctions only with evidence of Iranian fulfilment of the new protocols, Iran wants these sanctions lifted regardless of its compliance with the deal. Although January 2016 saw the reduction of certain sanctions there are still concerns with Iranian hardliners and sections of the Iranian public, who may see the slow progress as another example of US and Western interference with and pressure against Iran. The inauguration of the Trump administration in 2017 has also led to increasing concerns about the viability

of the nuclear deal, particularly as Trump publicly claimed on Twitter that Iran should 'thank' the US for the 'bad deal'. After many months disparaging the deal, Trump officially withdrew the US from the agreement in May 2018 to international condemnation. Questions arise, then, regarding why this deal took so long to come to fruition, and whether it will continue to hold without the US. Given the strategic interests on the parts of Iran and the US to implement a successful nuclear deal, a key issue is how this deal was prevented for nearly fifteen years. A secondary issue is what may arise to prevent fulfilment of the agreement over time.

My book will provide insight into state reactions to externally constructed representations of themselves. In exploring the struggle for recognition through an examination of representation, it becomes clear that states act to defend representations of an identity, rather than accepting or rethinking alternative identity representations. Ensuing insights allow for the generation of understanding about how one state represents and recognises another has implications for how states engage with one another. Thus, my book provides scope for a greater understanding of the complexities that feed into foreign policy decision-making, contributing to a deeper comprehension of the difficult and multifaceted crises that continue to arise in interstate engagement.

The remainder of the introduction is structured as follows: firstly, I outline the puzzle driving this book. Secondly, I then advance my conceptual framework and methodology. We understand how representations inform state identity, and establish how the intersubjective nature of identity creation is not solely reliant on how we see ourselves but also on how others perceive us. In other words, how others represent us matters. Thirdly, I provide a brief overview of existing IR approaches to representation, recognition and the Iran–US relationship. I then outline the plan of the book before finally providing a summary of the history of the Iranian nuclear program and negotiations with the P5+1.

The argument

Visualising the puzzle

Visual representations provide a simple opening to the puzzle driving this book. Films, for example, are a common popular culture medium through which we encounter political identity and difference. Consider the film *A Mighty Heart* (2007), directed by Michael Winterbottom. The film is based on a memoir by Marianne Pearl and deals with the abduction and killing of her husband, Daniel, in Pakistan in 2002. The film is considered to be both a 'precision-tooled Hollywood machine … meant to entertain as much as to instruct and enlighten' and a 'surprising, insistently political work of commercial art'.[1] Yet where it really excels is in its reproduction of the schemas of cultural

representations. The images of Karachi – of bustling marketplaces, the meandering streets and the people – are presented as part of a 'disorientating, alien and often frightening world' where it is unthinkable to find 'one man in all of *this*'.[2] Coupled with the trailer tagline of 'an event that shocked the world', the imagery speaks to the imagined dialectic of the enlightened West/Self and the subordinate non-West/Other.

Representations of life in the non-West are visualised via such Hollywood films very differently to that of the West – the latter is positioned as knowable, organised and accessible in comparison to the portrayal of the former on screen as unknowable, disorienting and unreachable. This disjuncture has evolved over time, which in turn suggests particular patterns of interstate engagement between West and non-West.

Using film as a starting point, it becomes clear that viewers across the realm of high and low politics share and understand representations of race, gender and culture made visual on screen. The visual application of representations of dominant West/subordinate non-West project a power discourse that reinforces the 'rightness' of particular interstate engagements, as explored within certain films. Film provides a space within which the motivating factors of particular actions are played out in a way that is normalised as a logical sequence of events. Foreign policy and the decision-making processes linked to it are examples of such actions that become simplified and accepted as part of a common-sense narrative of events as they unfold over time. In the West the visualisation of foreign policy unfolds within the process of 'Hollywoodization'. A number of scholars have acknowledged that in Hollywood filmmaking there is a projection of a hegemonic power discourse of the progressive West/Self and inferior non-West/Other.[3] However, Hollywood is by no means the only site of film, as non-Western filmmaking also visualises representations of a Self/non-West Other/West binary. The accepted representations of issues/events in film are therefore still subject to different interpretations depending on the framework of identity at hand.

Consider the 2012 Ben Affleck-directed film *Argo* as a notable illustration of the 'Hollywoodization' of the hegemonic power discourse of dominant West/subordinate non-West. Billed as a historical thriller, *Argo* depicts the 'true' story of the 1980 rescue of six US diplomats from the Canadian embassy in Tehran in the wake of the Hostage Crisis. Despite being considered a gripping, suspenseful film, the movie has been critiqued because of its inversion of who has the greater responsibility for the successful rescue: former Canadian Ambassador to Iran Kenneth Taylor and his embassy staff, or the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The movie represents the CIA as the driving force behind the safe return of the US diplomats, which led Taylor to comment that 'the amusing side is the script writer in Hollywood had no idea what he's talking about'.[4]

However, Iran is also producing its own film of the same crisis, *The General Staff*. The film focuses on the story of the twenty American hostages released by the Iranian revolutionaries to the US. By creating the film in response to the US version of events during the Hostage Crisis, Iran demonstrates that 'we are not what Hollywood says we are'.[5] Iran has labelled *Argo* as anti-Iranian and yet another film in a long list in which Iran believes it is represented in negative terms that includes *Not Without My Daughter* (1981), *300* (2007), *Prince of Persia: The Sands of Time* (2010) and *Unthinkable* (2010). While Iran also believes that *Argo* has torn open the wound of the Hostage Crisis, the film is viewed in the broader context of the current international hostility towards the Iranian nuclear program.

Significant regarding Iran's response to *Argo* is that Iran actively attempts to counter US representations about what Iran is, or how it should be viewed as a state. Iranian films such as *Persepolis* (2007), *My Tehran for Sale* (2009), *A Separation* (2011), *Circumstance* (2011), *A Respectable Family* (2012) and *Tehran Taxi* (2015) are part of a broader attempt to explore and promote an Iranian sense of what it means to be Iranian that also challenges the dominant representations the US attributes to Iran. As Asghar Farhadi, the director of *A Separation*, maintained in his acceptance speech upon winning the 2012 Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film:

> Iranians all over the world are watching us and I imagine them to be very happy … because at the time when talk of war, intimidation, and aggression is exchanged between politicians, the name of their country, Iran, is spoken here through her glorious culture, a rich and ancient culture that has been hidden under the heavy dust of politics … a people who respect all cultures and civilisations and despise hostility and resentment.[6]

Iran's desire to be recognised in a particular way that contradicts US images of the state speaks to the intersubjective interplay of representation and identity. Iran and the US explain the contested interpretations of past events relating to the Hostage Crisis through different sets of representations, reflecting the particular identity frameworks employed by both states. These films and the images they project are also clearly representative of an underlying emotional context of disrespect that frames engagement between the US and Iran.

There is a puzzle here: how do representations of one state by another influence foreign policymaking behaviour? What is the emotional context of these representations, and how do they advance and possibly constitute strategic interests? This book addresses these questions by examining the relationship between representation, recognition and respect. In doing so I provide a conceptual framework for understanding how representations of one state by another influence foreign policymaking. As we shall see in the next section, which details this conceptual framework, analysing the emotional context of

the struggle for recognition allows for an understanding of how feelings of disrespect more broadly, and humiliation and anger more specifically, influence state behaviour.

Conceptual framework

I have suggested that being represented in certain ways affects or acts to manipulate the behaviour and foreign policy choices of the Other. Intersubjective state relations, or, more specifically, how a state imagines itself and represents its Others, are important for understanding changes in foreign policy conduct. This particular concept requires definition before we go any further. Intersubjectivity refers to the construction of meaning produced by the interaction of different actors and spaces that exist within the social world. Interactions between actors are central to the practice of intersubjectivity, as the interpretations each actor has of the events and actions that constitute the social world influence how actors understand and behave towards multiple others and subjects.[7]

Recognition of the Other, and the identity of the Other state, is structured around intersubjective systems of representation that affect how foreign policy is made. The pursuit of such doctrines is merely another extension of the struggle for recognition within the international sphere. Although similar demands for recognition found at the individual level also occur at the interstate level, specifically within the foreign policy realm, recognition continues to be unexamined in its entirety. The entities of Self and Other evolve through the struggle for identity recognition. The West and non-West are engaged in a continuing cultural dialogue, and 'are not merely interconnected, rather than separate and exclusive, but are intimately entwined'.[8] Both West and non-West are not monolithic entities; rather, they are interweaving imaginaries that engage in the reductive practice of representation (West/orientalism, non-West/occidentalism) to make sense of their experiences.

When scholars explore these intersubjective dynamics, however, the West is most often positioned as the dominant Self in considerations of power dynamics, and the non-West inhabits the role of subordinate Other. Recognition of difference between the West and its Others is structured in unmoving stereotypical terms. The process acts to create a boundary, a constant demarcation that acts as a reference point for every interaction. Representation is important because it is constitutive of and constituted by relationships of power in the social world. However, while we may disregard the Other and see ourselves as better or more powerful by comparison, how the Other sees us matters in terms of how our identity is formed.

As a result, the concept of identity (who I am, who you are, are you/can you be a friend/foe) plays a central role in foreign policy. That is not to suggest that states do not have material interests, or that these are entirely absent from

any foreign policy consideration; rather, these interests are informed by the identity a state has, and as such guide the state in its foreign policymaking in terms of which interests are more important to consider at any given time. Once a state identity is constructed, particular practices and foreign policy decisions are made possible. How a state recognises itself and others is the key to understanding interactions between states within the international system.

Methodology

Having outlined my core conceptual framework and the overall argument, a brief note on methodology is necessary before I canvass existing approaches to representation, recognition and foreign policy in terms of the Iran–US relationship. I utilise a three-step method: Part I provides a map for the project; Part II constructs a framework for state identity; and Part III generates an analysis of the research gathered.

The mapping process in Part I involves examining the connections between representation and foreign policy (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 creates a conceptual framework linking representation with recognition, exploring the emotional context of the struggle for recognition. The second step, Part II, generates a structure for understanding the elements that feed into national identity, using US state identity as an illustrative case (Chapter 3). It also involves an in-depth case study of Iranian state identities (Chapter 4). Part III then studies representational schemas evident in Iran–US discourse, firstly from a US perspective and then from an Iranian perspective (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, respectively). The data for these research findings consists of semi-structured interviews, archival documents and interviews, public speeches and addresses, policy documents and statements, and news articles. These are followed by an examination of the emotional and recognitive processes inherent within the discourse and how these interact with state behaviour (Chapter 7).

I employ discourse analysis as my central research method. Discourse analysis refers to the examination of language and text undertaken to discover social and political phenomena that extend beyond the individual. I understand discourse to be constitutive of and constituted by the language that we use to communicate. Meanings and understandings generated by discourse emerge within historical, social, political and cultural contexts that change over time. The literal and figurative expressions that emerge within broader representative schemas are indicative of particular collective views shared across the private/public and low/high politics divides. Linguistic patterns can be illuminated through discourse analysis to discover these collective views and what they suggest about understandings of particular elements in the social world. Discourse analysis explores the connection between language and power. In doing so, discourse analysis allows for an understanding of the identity framework

shared by the collectivity, namely the state, and how it might influence its behaviour towards others.

I use discourse analysis to discover how reality is socially performed on the part of Iran and the United States. In doing so, I pinpoint key representations that emerge from talk and text. The representations discovered in the discourse analysis (outlined in chapters 6 and 7) are key to understanding the connection between language and power in Iran–US relations. Representations have an inclusive and exclusive capacity in that they clearly demarcate who we are and who our Others are. Focusing on representations allows a linguistic space to emerge wherein the meanings behind these expressions, and the experiences they are related to, are made clear. In turn, representation provides a scope for comprehending how intersubjective interactions between Iran and the US, and vice versa, have been experienced by one another and understood. The examination of representations also illuminates which narrative(s) Iran and the US accept and draw on to justify particular foreign policy responses. Such acceptance legitimises actions through a belief that they are part of a natural sequence of events.

The data for the discourse analysis was drawn from a combination of semi-structured interviews, Iranian and American policy documents and statements, news articles, public speeches and interviews made by members of the Islamic Republic of Iran's government and various US administrations. In addition, I examined a number of oral history archives from the US within the Iranian-American Oral History Project at Columbia University, Harvard University and the Library of Congress in Washington. For the final chapter, I analysed Iranian and US tweets about the nuclear negotiations between 2013 and 2015.

Interviews are a suitable way to understand representational processes because they allow for an awareness of the interpretative frameworks employed by individuals to understand the social. Interviews provide the interviewer with a greater comprehension of the emotional context of particular issues through meaning-in-use, rather than through a single analysis of linguistic forms that may not reveal the entirety of the feelings connected to these issues. Forty-five individual in-depth semi-structured interviews comprise my interview data.[9] I personally conducted these interviews in Australia and the US, and by telephone and Skype to the US, the UK and Lebanon between October 2011 and April 2012. To make sure I canvassed a wide variety of views, I conducted interviews with Iranian and American policymakers, official spokespersons, individuals within the security and defence apparatus, academics in the areas of linguistics, anthropology, history and political science, scientists and technology experts, entrepreneurs, human rights advocates, lawyers, postdoctoral students and two non-academic individuals.[10]

Listening to interviewees allowed for a deeper understanding of the feelings that arose about particular issues relating to identity, representation and foreign

policy. I used these interviews to discover the discourses evoked within Iran–US relations rather than the individual subjectivity of the interviewees themselves. I also applied the method to discern what forms of representations were evident outside of the official, publicised state discourse. When interviewees spoke about their experiences of certain foreign policy decisions, I noticed particular discursive frameworks emerging that provided a much greater scope for discovering representational schemas, which would otherwise have remained largely hidden. In doing so, a number of discursive frameworks emerged regarding how Iranians and Americans thought about themselves, their state and each other that transcended the normative boundaries of profession, education, family history and their experience of the Other state.

I use quotes from interviews, archival material, public policy statements and debates to provide an illustration of the type of representational schemas evident within the general discourse. The quotes used are illustrative of the larger representational trends through which the issues at stake have been discussed in the literature, within the public domain and in my interviews. This helps to avoid what Brent Steele has termed a politics of 'interiority', which arises through persuasion rather than demonstration of 'something we cannot see or observe but still intuit or divine is behind the phenomenon we are trying to explain'.[11] While official statements by members of the state apparatus are widely reported, the voices of others – those that make up civil society – are too often neglected in accounts of the Iran–US relationship. This is particularly the case with representations of Iran in the Western media and academic canons. For instance, statements by Ayatollah Khamenei or Iranian presidents such as Ahmadinejad or Rouhani are presumed to be indicative of state views alone, and not shared by civil society. As part of my ethical clearance requirements for the project, I provide only a basic description of my interview participants, including their specialisations and the date and general location of our interview. All interviewees were attributed a code to protect participant identity. However, the political environment at the time – which has since worsened – raised serious security concerns for a number of my interviewees, such that I do not provide their specialisation or position, specific date of the interview or where it took place.

I conducted the fieldwork during a turbulent time in the Iran–US relationship. Iran had been accused of plotting via its proxies to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the US in Washington DC. The US was in an election cycle that saw candidates focus quite heavily on its role in the non-proliferation regime of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, possibly through military intervention. The US had also started slowly to withdraw from Iraq amid claims of Iranian meddling in the stability of both Iraq and Afghanistan. Iranian nuclear scientists were being assassinated, and the popular uprisings in the Middle East had drawn further attention to Iran's support of authoritarian

regimes such as Syria. As a result, there were real concerns on the part of both Iranian and American interviewees that the US and Israel, if not planning to attack Iran with full force, were looking to intervene in some sense that could produce a counter-response that would be devastating for the Middle East region. The cycle of events meant that feelings about how each state was represented were easily evoked, and interviewees were frequently able to connect how they believed their state was viewed to the political implications of such representations in their own words. Whether it was an interview with a policymaker, an academic expert in their field, a member of a think-tank, a scientist, a postdoctoral student or a non-academic interviewee, these individuals appeared to draw on the same pool of cognitive resources to explain or talk about the issues covered in my research. Categories of representation are clearly mobilised in everyday language: a threat is constituted as real through dynamics of representation that tell us how ourselves and others are valued or respected.

How international relations looks at representation, recognition and the Iran–US relationship

My book offers both a conceptual and an empirical contribution to the field of international relations (IR), particularly in the areas of representation, recognition theory and the Iran–US relationship. Theoretically, the book explores a gap in the literature regarding discourses of representation and how state actors have employed these discourses in the construction of foreign policy. There has been limited engagement with the issue of representation and its influence on foreign policy. Roxanne Lynn Doty argues in her text *Imperial Encounters* that mainstream IR has consistently ignored the importance of representation, to the point where a 'politics of refusal' has evolved that denies the existence of an 'infinity of traces that have been deposited in "us" and have served to constitute "us" vis-à-vis "them"'.[12] Such refusal serves to generate a superficial understanding of the concepts of power and agency in world politics because representational practices inform how state identity is created and have a direct effect on the engagement with and performance of agency. Power is therefore intricately related to representational practices that construct superior Self and inferior Other, particularly in terms of historical constructions of North and South, West and East.[13]

David Campbell also engages with these issues in his study *Writing Security*, arguing that how difference is configured has direct implications for the creation of state identity. If difference is constituted, or represented, as otherness, it gives rise to a particular conception of danger, whereby in 'telling us what to fear, [we] have been able to fix who "we" are'.[14] The conception of a feared 'them' and a safe 'us' is built up through these discourses of danger. The performative nature of identity thus means the discourse of danger is continually required to help inform and (re)articulate the boundaries of state identity.

Although both these texts offer compelling analyses of the politics of representation and its importance in considerations of foreign policy, there has been a narrow consideration since their time of writing with representational practices at the international level and the implication these have for identity creation and recognition. When IR scholars engage with the subject of representation and identity, it is not generally examined in terms of foreign policy, nor is it examined from a position outside of Western-centric frameworks. By accepting the dichotomous power relations of North and South/West and non-West as the norm and North/West as dominant, such research neglects to contend with South/non-West agency. It also overlooks how the South/non-West represents North/West and how this influences its identity framework. The full capacity of intersubjective relations of power exemplified through representation is discounted.

Another dimension that requires further examination is consideration of how emotional practices of representation influence perceptions of state identity. Emotions play an important role in framing action: politics and political participation are continually informed by experiences that draw strongly on emotions. Emotions are linked to the constitution of a collective identity, which in turn has implications for the forms and types of representations that are used to talk about the Self and the Other. The intersubjective division that is produced by emotions is part of a broader process of boundary-making that is important for understanding why people, and states, behave in certain ways – to deny the importance of the emotional context is to potentially overlook particular triggers for action. This is important because emotions have become more widely recognised as having an important role in global politics, as the turn to emotions in IR indicates.

My book contributes to a deeper comprehension of how the emotional practices of representation and recognition evolve within the context of a non-Western state. There is an overwhelming focus on the US as the core case for any study of identity and foreign policy creation. While recognition scholars such as Erik Ringmar and Yana Zuo have explored the alternative cases of Sweden, Russia and Taiwan, cases outside of the framework of West/North/European relations have also had very little engagement.[15] How states such as Iran are represented by the US, how Iran represents itself and how these representations influence Iran's perception of danger are all questions requiring further investigation. My book provides answers to these questions, helping to overcome the limited investigations into the non-Western position on recognition.

While theoretical work on various aspects of recognition in IR is growing, these investigations have largely focused on groups or individuals within states rather than using the state itself as the analytical object. The struggle for recognition offers a research framework that attempts to wrestle with the motivation

of state actions, which has not been fully explored in terms of foreign policy. One of the core reasons for using insights relating to the struggle for recognition within IR is to distinguish how the desire for recognition influences the implementation of foreign policy, how recognition is effectively sought and how the denial of recognition has instigated particular conflicts. My book adds critical purchase to security studies and IR more broadly through its focus on the interstate relationship between Iran and the US, by exploring the foreign policy issue of Iran's nuclear program in order to ascertain how the struggle for recognition has evolved within the Iran–US context.

In exploring the struggle for recognition through an examination of representation, it becomes clear that states act to defend representations of an identity, rather than accepting or rethinking alternative identity representations. Ensuing insights allow for the generation of understanding about how one state represents and recognises another, which has implications for how states engage with one another. The conceptual framework that my book generates works as a tool that can be transposed to other situations and circumstances and to alternative case studies. It provides scope for greater understanding of the complexities that feed into state-to-state relationships and foreign policy decision-making.

Existing approaches to understanding the Iran–US relationship focus heavily on the nuclear issue as the key foreign policy concern for both states.[16] Analyses of the Iran–US relationship tend to examine strategic culture and security from realist or state-centric perspectives. Of most concern in such examinations are issues of Middle East instability caused by a shifting balance of power. Such instability is viewed as a result of the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraq War and the Arab Spring, Iran's support for terrorism and the alteration of power dynamics in the international system that would occur if Iran achieved nuclear weapons status.

The perception that states exist in an anarchical international system and are driven by self-interest and a desire for power above all else is limiting. Realist explanations fail to grasp other factors that drive state behaviour besides anarchy and self-preservation. For example, these analyses neglect to comprehend fully why Iran continues to build its nuclear program despite the increasingly restrictive sanctions that are undermining state development and the ever-present threat of military action by Israel and the US.

Other popular conceptualisations of Iranian behaviour emerge from institutionalist or liberal democratic theory. These perspectives generally frame the Iran–US relationship and the nuclear dispute in terms of religious resistance to democracy through Shi'a Muslim versus secular Enlightenment principles. What results is a belief that once Iran is a truly democratic state, accepting of Western values such as human rights, a division between religion and state and the transparency of political institutions, the animosity between both states

will dissipate. However, such institutionalist or liberal analyses are also unable to adequately explain why there is still ongoing domestic support for the Iranian nuclear program. Such support exists despite the apparent condemnation of the international community and growing reformism within the regime, including the 2013 election of a more moderate president, the cleric Hassan Rouhani. Such explanations also overlook the level of domestic support Iran's nuclear program has on all sides of the political spectrum.

In comparison to the above rationalist approaches, constructivist analyses attempt to overcome the limitations of examinations of power dynamics and practices. Constructivist approaches consider instead the influence of state identity and the constitutive effects it has on both Iranian and US views of their respective geopolitical and geostrategic interests. Constructivists also consider the normative foundations of the nuclear issue within the domestic and international context, engaging with the symbolism of nuclear weapons themselves. While offering a deeper understanding of the framework of both the Iran–US relationship and the nuclear issue, these analyses do not completely connect with the underlying emotional context. Nor do they fully account for possibilities of change or explain why, because of identities and normative understandings, Iran and the US behave in particular ways that reinscribe feelings of animosity, despite various acknowledgements about past historical grievances and the impact these have had on their engagement with each other.

My book addresses the shortcomings of realist, liberal and constructivist approaches by using the connections between representation, recognition and respect to help better understand the complexities and nuances that exist within the Iran–US relationship. The animosity between these two states has not been resolved despite various attempts at rapprochement since the end of the Hostage Crisis in 1981. I demonstrate how dominant Western/US systems of representation evolve to help understand the non-Western/Iranian Other, and how these also occur vice versa. Examining representational dynamics from both a US and Iranian perspective allows for greater comprehension of how representations evolve intersubjectively and influence foreign policymaking.

Plan of the book

The book is divided into three parts. In Part I, which includes Chapters 1 and 2, I establish my conceptualisation of the relationship between representation, recognition and identity. Chapter 1 examines literature on representation and foreign policy. The chapter argues that representation and foreign policy are linked, but how states respond to these representations is not fully examined. Chapter 2 examines the role of recognition in foreign policy. The chapter argues that the powerful links between recognition and representation can best be appreciated through a focus on emotions.

In Part II, containing chapters 3 and 4, I examine the construction of state identity and foreign policy in both Iran and the US. Chapter 3 examines domestic factors that produce state identity and influence foreign policy. I use the US as a case example to explore the dynamics of culture, history and national mission and their influence on state identity. I argue that US identity evokes a state that is exceptional, a world leader and a force for good. Chapter 4 focuses on developing an understanding of Iranian state identity. The chapter argues that Iranian identity evokes a unique and powerful state that deserves respect.

In Part III I analyse the reciprocal representations of state identity in Iran and the US and how these play a part in instigating a particular foreign policy. Chapter 5 explores US representations of Iran and its nuclear program. The chapter argues that US representations of itself (good, rational, leader of the international community) and Iran (dangerous, irrational, aggressive and undeveloped) produce a particular discursive framework through which it understands Iran and its nuclear program. Chapter 6 explores the converse of the previous chapter, examining Iranian representations of the US and Iran's nuclear program. The chapter argues that Iranian representations of itself (Shi'a, progressive, triumphing over adversity) and the US (bullying, deceitful, meddling, threatening) produce a particular discursive framework through which it understands the US and its response to Iran's nuclear program. Chapter 7 establishes the emotional context of the struggle for recognition between Iran and the US. The chapter argues that representations trigger emotions that drive the struggle for recognition and respect.

The conclusion revisits my argument and establishes a connection between my book and its contribution to the study of global politics.

The Iranian nuclear program and negotiations with the P5+1

Iran has pursued nuclear energy since the 1950s, initially with the support of the US and UK. The nuclear program initiated under the Shah received support from the US, particularly under President Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' program in 1957.[17] This 'civil nuclear cooperation agreement' was founded largely to allow the US to profit from research into peaceful nuclear technology for use in industries such as healthcare.[18] The Shah was one of the first signatories to the NPT in 1968, which came into force on 5 March 1970.[19] By the 1970s Iran had generated a vast amount of nuclear technological infrastructure and indigenous scientific expertise that was supplemented by support from German and French entities.[20] However, the US became concerned about the potential for the Shah to engage in some form of weaponisation program, with some in the Western intelligence community suspecting the military applications of Iran's nuclear research. As a result, US assistance declined significantly from 1974, but German firms continued work on the nuclear reactors.[21]

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, production halted on Iran's nuclear program. Ayatollah Khomeini viewed nuclear technology as *haram*, or religiously impermissible.[22] The US severing of diplomatic ties in 1980 and subsequent imposition of sanctions also frustrated any attempts at technological development.[23] During the Iran–Iraq War between 1980 and 1988 a number of important nuclear sites and power reactors, such as the two plants at Bushehr, were significantly damaged, setting Iran's nuclear infrastructure back heavily.[24] However, Iran revisited its nuclear program in the latter part of the 1980s and early 1990s, enlisting the help of Russia, China and Pakistan, including specific technical aid from the A. Q. Khan network, to create a widely dispersed, well-protected nuclear infrastructure.[25]

The about-turn on the nuclear program was possibly due to the devastation suffered during the Iran–Iraq War, exacerbated by Iraqi chemical weapons attacks against Iran that were largely ignored by the West. Iran felt extremely 'isolated, aggrieved and betrayed by the West', which exacerbated the already tense relations with the West and the US in particular.[26] This tension intensified following the imposition of sanctions by the US against Iran in 1995, effectively banning US trade and investment with Iran with specific previsions against investment in the energy sector.[27]

Since a member of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) revealed in 2002 that Iran was undertaking clandestine work on its nuclear facilities in Nantaz and Arak, Iran has been negotiating with the IAEA and various members of the P5+1. In 2003, shortly after this revelation, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa that forbade the production and use of any kind of weapon of mass destruction and reaffirmed the understanding that

> Islamic tradition prohibits weapons that are indiscriminate in their efforts and therefore likely to kill women, children and the elderly … There is a difference between nuclear technology and a nuclear weapon … we do not have the motivation to pursue nuclear weapons. We have not and will not go after them. We do not need a nuclear bomb. If we defeated our enemy so far, it was not with nuclear bombs.[28]

Khamenei also attempted to separate the nuclear weapons issue from peaceful nuclear energy in terms of Iranian identity, maintaining that it was not in the nature of Iranians to desire the construction of weapons. Khamenei argued that the use of such weapons 'to destroy other nations is an American behaviour … Islam does not allow us [to produce the atomic bomb]'.[29] Despite these pronouncements, the IAEA adopted a resolution in 2005 that referred Iran to the UN Security Council (UNSC) because of the concerns about the implementation of safeguards relating to enrichment activities.[30] Ayatollah Khamenei issued another fatwa in late 2011 stipulating that while nuclear power was beneficial,

nuclear weapons themselves went directly against Islam and could not be tolerated. His statement rearticulated the long-held position of the Islamic Republic that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only – technological and medical advancements – not for weaponisation. Iran's belief that acquiring nuclear technology for the purpose of peaceful nuclear energy is its 'inalienable right' and allowed under the auspices of the NPT has been central to continued nuclear development.[31]

The core disagreement between Iran and the US extends from each state's perception of Article IV of the NPT and what it allows. The 'third pillar' of the NPT gives signatories the right to pursue peaceful nuclear energy. As a signatory, Iran believes that it has a legal right to enrich uranium under the NPT agreement. Iran is not the only state that reads Article IV in this way. NPT signatories such as the Netherlands, Germany and Japan, among others, also carry out enrichment activities using the same interpretation of Article IV.[32] The US, on the other hand, disagrees with this interpretation of the Article and contends that Iran has no legitimate right to enrich uranium. It believes that Iran will use such technology to weaponise its nuclear program. As former Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman articulates: 'It has always been the US position that Article IV … does not speak about the right of enrichment at all … it simply says that you have the right to research and development.'[33] These readings have continually hampered negotiations between Iran, the IAEA and the P5+1, the point of which are to give Iran sanctions relief in exchange for halting its uranium enrichment activities.

Since 2006 the dual-track strategy of P5+1 incentives combined with UNSC sanctions had yet to produce a proposal that all parties were satisfied with. However, the Lausanne framework agreement of April 2015 signalled greater potential for both parties to reach a nuclear deal. Key points of the Lausanne framework include Iran's reduction of its low-enriched uranium stockpile and greater monitoring and surveillance by the IAEA of Iran's research and development infrastructure, for longer periods of time. Combined, this gives the P5+1 one year's advanced knowledge of a nuclear weapon breakout.[34] In exchange, some sanctions against Iran will be suspended, and Iran will have a limited capacity to enrich uranium at levels for nuclear power. Nevertheless, concerns have continued to focus on how to contain Iran at a sufficiently low level of latency, minimising hedging risks and regional proliferation.[35]

Key to the Lausanne discourse is how the deal is understood by each state: for the US, the deal prevents Iran developing nuclear weapons, whereas for Iran, it allows access to peaceful nuclear energy. These positions extend from a binary logic that continues to pervade the Iran–US relationship. While the 2013 Obama–Rouhani telephone conversation appeared to be a step towards

better relations, representations of Self–Other and historical narrative are still influential in Iran–US engagement.

I argue that representations of Self and Other, and historical narrative inform the identity narratives of each state and the extent to which they are recognised. Overall, US representations of itself imagine the state as a world leader and a force for good, while Iran is represented as dangerous and irrational. Comparatively, Iranian representations of itself produce an image of a strong, progressive Shi'a state, whereas it represents the US as a bully focused on undermining Iran. Despite the positive implementation of the nuclear deal, these representations are still evident within Iranian and US discourse about themselves and their state, meaning even perceived intransigence on the Iran or US side could have significant consequences for the longevity of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). For instance, while the P5+1 agreement phases out certain sanctions only with evidence of Iranian fulfilment of the new protocols, Iran has been pushing for these sanctions to be lifted regardless of its compliance with the deal. Initial assessments suggested Iran would likely take much longer to comply with the initial agreement conditions.[36] Any delay in the rolling lifting of sanctions could create problems with Iranian hardliners or the Iranian public, who may see the lack of progress as another example of US and Western interference with and pressure against Iran.

Table 1: Chronology of representations of Iran (Shi'a, progressive, triumphing over adversity) and the US (Good, rational, leader of the international community)

Date	Representations	Source, context and policy
1850–1950	Iran as exotic; Requiring help US as helpful partner	First Iranian embassy in the US – 1856; First US embassy in Iran – 1883. Interactions between the two states occurred initially through the US providing instructions on finances. Generally positive bilateral relationship.
1951	Iran as weak; Unstable US as helpful partner; Sympathetic to Iran	US saw Mossadegh government's moves to nationalise Iranian industries and resources as part of a growing communist threat in the region. Iran petitions US for support against the British to settle the growing oil dispute. Deterioration of Iran–US relations begins in earnest, coupled with development of US political plans to circumvent Soviet infiltration into Iran.

Table 1: Chronology of representations of Iran and the US (continued)

Date	Representations	Source, context and policy
1953	Iran as irresponsible; Communist threat; Anti-Western	The Eisenhower administration believed the Mossadegh government incapable of holding off the USSR threat. Continued moves by Mossadegh to nationalise Iranian oil caused increased concern that Iran would eventually fall to the Soviets. US supported joint UK coup to overthrow Iranian government.
1953–1979	Iran as 'island of stability'; Exotic; Backward US as partner; Friend of Iran	Following the overthrow of Mossadegh, Iran was a key pillar in US defence against communism in Middle East. US provided significant aid for economic, social and military development and CIA training of Iranian secret police force SAVAK. The Shah enjoyed good relations with various US presidents.
1978	Iran as irrational; Dangerous; Medieval; Fanatical US as hypocrite; Meddler; Great Satan	The Iranian Revolution and ousting of the Shah caused great concern to the US, particularly fears Iran could fall to communism. The return of Ayatollah Khomeini saw a surge in representations of the US as a destabilising force working against Iran.
1979–1998	Iran as irrational; Religious fanatics; Threat US as Great Satan; Wounded snake; US embassy as 'Den of Espionage'	Following the Iranian Revolution, Khomeini popularised these representations signifying the deceitful nature of the US. Iranian students overran the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979, holding 52 hostages for 444 days. In the first days of the Hostage Crisis the Carter administration froze Iranian assets and expelled Iranians from the US. The Carter administration formally broke ties with Iran in January 1980, introducing sanctions on nearly all Iranian goods. Following the 1983 bombing of the US embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, US introduces arms embargo against Iran. In 1984 the US lists Iran as a major state sponsor of terrorism.

Table 1: Chronology of representations of Iran and the US (continued)

Date	Representations	Source, context and policy
1998–2000	Iran as fiercely proud US as good; Good name; National prestige	Iranian President Khatami calls for a 'dialogue of civilizations' at UNGA. Pivotal moment in Iran–US relations that led to Clinton administration/Secretary of State Madeleine Albright acknowledgement of 1953 coup and lifting of certain sanctions against Iran, including sending US wrestling team to Tehran in 1998.
2002	Iran as rogue state; 'Axis of evil' US as Great Satan	President Bush labels Iran part of the 'axis of evil', a direct threat to the US and international peace. Iran released Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in February 2002 – signifies great decline in tactical assistance in Afghanistan.
2011	US as meddler; Colonial power; Hypocrite	Iranian President Ahmadinejad speaks to UNGA about the 'diabolic goals' of the US, resulting in mass walk-out.
2013–2016	Both states expressing mutual respect	Rouhani and Obama speak on the phone in 2013, first high-level contact of its kind since diplomatic ties severed in 1980. In 2015 P5+1 and Iran reach a historic nuclear deal.
2017–	Iran as trouble-maker; Irrational; Deceitful	Trump labels Iran deal 'terrible'; despite waiving sanctions in January 2018 as part of the nuclear deal agreement, Trump withdraws the US from the deal in May 2018 and starts moves towards more sanctions. In July 2018 Trump threatens Iran on Twitter, stating the US will 'no longer stand for demented words of violence and death', only to publicly announce he would meet with Iran a few weeks later.

Notes

1 Manohla Dargis, 'Using the light of a star to illuminate ugly truths', *New York Times* (22 June 2007). Accessed 10 August 2009, www.nytimes.com/2007/06/22/movies/22migh.html?8dpc&_r=0.
2 Dargis, 'Using the light'.
3 See Simon Philpott and David Mutimer, 'The United States of amnesia: US foreign policy and the recurrence of innocence', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 22 (2009), pp. 301–317; Jutta Weldes, 'Going cultural: Star Trek, state action, and popular culture', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 28 (1999), pp. 117–134.
4 'Argo is full of fabricated scenes', *Iranian Diplomacy*, website (17 February 2013). Accessed 25 February 2013, www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/page/1912913/Argo++is+Full+of+Fabricated+Scenes+.html.
5 Thomas Erdbrink, 'Stung by "Argo", Iran backs conference denouncing "Hollywoodism"', *New York Times* (18 February 2013). Accessed 25 February 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/world/middleeast/stung-by-argo-iran-backs-conference-decrying-hollywoodism.html?_r=0.
6 Pouya Alimagham, 'Ben Affleck's *Argo* and the problem with viewing Iran through a narrow lens', *Huffington Post* (16 October 2012). Accessed 25 February 2013, www.huffingtonpost.com/pouya-alimagham/ben-afflecks-argo-and-the_b_1971744.html.
7 Karin M. Fierke, 'Links across the abyss: Language and logic in international relations', *International Studies Quarterly* 46 (2002), pp. 331–354; Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'Aporia: Critical exploration of the agent-structure problematique in international relations theory', *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (1997), p. 367.
8 John M. Hobson, 'Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western imperialism? Beyond Westphilian towards a post-racist critical IR', *Review of International Studies* 33 (2007), p. 115.
9 For credibility and to ensure appropriate data saturation I needed to conduct between twelve and sixty interviews. I reached this target not only through the combined interviews – forty-five – but also in terms of the number of US (twenty) and Iranian (twenty-five) interviews.
10 Rosalind Edwards and Janet Holland, *What is Qualitative Interviewing?* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 6.
11 Brent Steele, 'Recognizing non-recognition: A reply to Lindemann', *Global Discourse* 4 (2014), pp. 497–498.
12 Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 164.
13 Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, pp. 168–170.
14 David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 169–170.

15 Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Erik Ringmar, 'The recognition game: Soviet Russia against the West', *Cooperation and Conflict* 37 (2002), pp. 115–136; Erik Ringmar, 'Performing international systems: Two East-Asian alternatives to Westphalian order', *International Organization* 66 (2012), pp. 1–25; Yana Zuo, 'Self-identification, recognition and conflicts: The evolution of Taiwan's identity, 1949–2008', in *The International Politics of Recognition*, ed. T. Lindemann and E. Ringmar (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2012).

16 It is important to note here that the idea of 'Iran', and even 'the US', is highly contested. Within the construction of state identity there are always battles fought around the precise idea of who or what we say we are as a state. The identity narrative that is employed to represent a state in the international arena is often complicit in the silencing of other national and sub-national stories. I am not referring to essential traits of either 'Iran' or the 'US' in this book, but rather to the identity narratives employed in interstate relations by the successive governments of both states.

17 Gawdat Bahgat, 'Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran', *International Studies Perspectives* 7 (2010), p. 308; Greg Bruno, 'Iran's nuclear program', Council on Foreign Relations, website (last updated 10 March 2010). Accessed 14 July 2018, www.cfr.org/iran/irans-nuclear-program/p16811.

18 Bahgat, 'Nuclear proliferation', p. 309; Bruno, 'Iran's nuclear program'.

19 The NPT was created for the sole purpose of preventing nuclear weapons and weapons technology proliferation. While its ultimate goal is disarmament, it does allow for the peaceful manufacture of nuclear technology for civilian purposes. Signatory states are guaranteed access to the technology through third-party sharing, but only the states that acquired nuclear weapons prior to 1970 are able have them, namely the US, Russia, China, France and Great Britain.

20 Bahgat, 'Nuclear proliferation', p. 309; Mustafa Kibaroglu, 'Good for the Shah, banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's quest for nuclear power', *Middle East Journal* 60 (2006), p. 208.

21 Bahgat, 'Nuclear proliferation', p. 309; Kibaroglu, 'Good for the Shah, banned for the Mullahs', p. 208; Adam Tarock, 'Iran's nuclear program and the West', *Third World Quarterly* 27 (2006), pp. 645–664.

22 Michael Eisenstadt and Mehdi Khalaji, 'Nuclear fatwa: Religion and politics in Iran's proliferation strategy', *Policy Focus* 115 (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2011).

23 Donette Murray, *US Foreign Policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations since the Islamic Revolution* (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 14.

24 Mohammad Mohaddessin, *Enemies of the Ayatollahs: The Iranian Opposition's War on Islamic Fundamentalism* (London: Zed Books, 2004), p. 26.

25 Bahgat, 'Nuclear proliferation', p. 309; Kibaroglu, 'Good for the Shah, banned for the Mullahs', p. 208.

26 Tarock, 'Iran's nuclear program and the West', p. 653; Bahgat, 'Nuclear proliferation', p. 310; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 298.
27 Kenneth Katzman, 'Iran: US concerns and policy responses', *CRS: Report for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006).
28 Khamenei, cited in Eisenstadt and Khalaji, 'Nuclear fatwa', pp. ix, 14.
29 Khamenei, cited in Eisenstadt and Khalaji, 'Nuclear fatwa', pp. ix, 14.
30 Bahgat, 'Nuclear proliferation', p. 310; Kibaroglu, 'Good for the Shah, banned for the Mullahs', p. 211.
31 Amin Saikal, 'The Iran nuclear dispute', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60 (2006), p. 194.
32 William O. Beeman, 'Does Iran have the right to enrich uranium? The answer is yes', *Huffington Post* (31 October 2015). Accessed 14 July 2018, www.huffingtonpost.com/william-o-beeman/does-iranhave-the-right-_b_4181347.html.
33 Sherman, cited in Beeman, 'Does Iran have the right to enrich uranium?'.
34 C. Morello, 'Iran agrees to nuclear restrictions in framework deal with world powers', *Washington Post* (2 April 2015). Accessed 14 July 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/world/negotiatorshold-marathon-all-night-session-in-last-ditch-effort-for-agreement/2015/04/02/68334c88-d8b2–11e4-bfob-f648b95a6488_story.html.
35 Wyn Bowen and Matthew Moran, 'Living with nuclear hedging: The implications of Iran's nuclear strategy', *International Affairs* 91 (2015), pp. 687–707.
36 D. E. Sanger and M. R. Gordon, 'Crucial questions remain as Iran nuclear talks approach deadline', *New York Times* (28 June 2015). Accessed 14 July 2018, www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/world/middleeast/iran-nuclearnegotiations.html?_r=0.