

Introduction: ‘This is your hour’

Then Jesus said unto the chief priests, and captains of the temple, and the elders, which were come to him, Be ye come out, as against a thief, with swords and staves? When I was daily with you in the temple, ye stretched forth no hands against me: but this is your hour, and the power of darkness.

Luke 22:52–3

In the foreboding political atmosphere of late 1930s Europe, several Christian activists and thinkers came together in a British-based, internationally connected circle to try to understand – and resist – the apparent cultural disintegration of western society and the rise of totalitarianism. Throughout the Second World War and its aftermath the group’s members analysed the world’s ills and offered guidelines for post-war ‘reconstruction’. Convinced that the crises of the age resulted from Christianity’s decline, they sought its ‘revolutionary’ restoration to dominance in British, European and western culture: in short, a ‘Christian society’. While there was no contemporary label for their efforts as a whole, some of which remained out of the public eye, I call them ‘the Oldham group’, after their organiser, the missionary and ecumenist Joseph H. Oldham.

Active between 1937 and 1949, the Oldham group grew out of the inter-war ecumenical movement and consisted of church-affiliated organisations, an informal discussion group (‘the Moot’) and publication projects, notably the *Christian News-Letter*. It was substantially Anglican with significant free church (i.e. non-Anglican Protestant) membership; denominational perspectives, however, remained secondary in a search for shared, ‘Christian’ principles. Participants included prominent figures from the worlds of academic theology and philosophy (such as John Baillie, Alec Vidler and H. A. Hodges), literature and literary criticism (T. S. Eliot and John Middleton Murry) and education (Sir Walter Moberly and Sir Fred Clarke), as well as missionary work and Christian activism (Eric Fenn, Daniel Jenkins, Eleanora Iredale and Kathleen Bliss). Continental refugee scholars Karl Mannheim, Adolf Löwe and Michael Polanyi also took part

and played important roles (Löwe Anglicised his name and was often referred to as 'Adolph Lowe'; however, he was almost always referred to within the Oldham group by his original name, and I retain this spelling). Few Roman Catholics were members (only Polanyi and the historian Christopher Dawson), but Catholic ideas influenced the group. Among its contacts and supporters were the leading Christians of the day, whether clergy such as the archbishops Cosmo Lang and William Temple or Bishop George Bell, popular writers such as Dorothy L. Sayers and C. S. Lewis, or theologians and philosophers including Reinhold Niebuhr and Jacques Maritain. In this book, I explore the Oldham group's intellectual influences, show how they mixed, describe the resulting syntheses, trace the group's efforts to impact politics and opinion, evaluate the reception of its ideas, and place its thought in the context of its time. Chapter conclusions contextualise specific topics; the general conclusion, Chapter 8, also draws out the group members' connections to other Christian networks and activities. Explaining my goals for this book means outlining its relationship to intellectual history, defining the Oldham group's main characteristics, summarising the sources used and explaining how the following chapters are structured.

Ideas, agents and contexts

I have written this book primarily as an intellectual rather than, strictly speaking, a religious history, not least to emphasise the mixture of Christian and 'secular' thought within the Oldham group and in British culture at this time more broadly. Intellectual history is marked by 'elusive boundaries' and divergent national historiographical traditions.¹ Nonetheless, recent decades have seen a significant convergence upon a few key points. Ideas – in the sense of 'interpretive systems,' 'styles of thought' and 'imagined formations' of the social order² – do not *exist* as trans-historical *things* but emerge through interventions in specific arguments at certain times in response to particular events by people with distinct motivations and aims. The claims (and counter-claims) made in such contexts are part of ongoing discussions with particular purposes, institutional frameworks, disciplinary assumptions and, crucially, languages, which both provide *means* of thought and communication and pose *limits* upon legitimate expression.³ Any use of particular concepts relies upon their accumulated meanings; however, even 'traditional,' or purportedly 'eternal,' concepts allow for innovation, rethinking and synthesis; at times, new meanings may even depart thoroughly from old ones.⁴ But while context matters, no past context was 'a closed province of meaning,' separate from other contemporary contexts or the impact of developments over the *longue durée*.⁵ Contexts

alone, moreover, do not generate meaning: this requires the intentions and efforts of particular actors to create, develop and exchange ideas. Actors are both autonomous agents and constrained by social, institutional and cultural factors, such as, not least, the traditions in which they work. The influence of unconscious (or unintended) influences, self-deception and misunderstandings must also be considered.⁶ Finally, intellectual history need not confine itself to the lofty heights of political philosophy but may centre on what Jan-Werner Müller has called the ‘in-between figures’: ‘statesmen-philosophers, public lawyers, constitutional advisors, the curious and at first sight contradictory phenomenon of “bureaucrats with visions”, philosophers close to political parties and movements, as well as what Friedrich von Hayek once referred to as “second-hand dealers in ideas”’.⁷

Such methods have been usefully applied to the history of religion, demonstrating its variable, contested and evolving nature and the ubiquitous tensions between claims of orthodox timelessness and the countless varieties of ‘lived belief’ or ‘discursive Christianity’.⁸ Any faith or worldview is defined solely by its adherents’ varied and often fragmented beliefs, though more (or less) ‘orthodox’ forms can be identified in particular times and places. In my analysis, I am always discussing the group’s *claims about* Christianity rather than judging the ‘accuracy’ of such claims. I take into account key tensions and ambiguities: between agency and context, tradition and innovation, and intellectual and popular milieux. The relevant contexts for understanding the Oldham group include its participants’ individual experiences and backgrounds, the cultural and religious traditions that inspired them, the organisational structures in which they acted, and the exchanges and discussions in which they engaged. These occurred in still wider contexts: first, the national intellectual public sphere defined mainly by journals, the press, books, pamphlets and radio broadcasts; second, the Christian thought developed in both the emerging, Geneva-based World Council of Churches (WCC, founded in 1948) and in ad hoc exchanges between thinkers in Britain and continental Europe or the United States.

The Oldham group coalesced after a 1937 ecumenical conference in Oxford; by 1949 most of the bodies that defined it had been dissolved (though related activities continued). While strictly theological concerns influenced the group’s views, they pursued those issues that seemed most urgent to their society and the world generally. Indeed, the history of the Oldham group illustrates Adrian Hastings’s observation that, when it came to religious thought, ‘the world set the agenda and could therefore change it.’⁹ The period 1937–49 covers three phases of activity – before, during and after the Second World War – and key events in each phase altered

the group's evaluation of the need for, and route to, a more Christian social order: the Munich Crisis of 1938, the outbreak of war in 1939, the Dunkirk evacuation and the defeat of France in summer 1940, the entry of the Soviet Union and the United States into the war in 1941, the Allied victory in 1945, the birth of the atomic age, the Labour Party's electoral victory, efforts to rebuild Europe, the formation of the United Nations (UN), and the early stages in the Cold War.

British – Christian – intellectuals

In analysing the Oldham group's responses to totalitarianism, war and post-war reconstruction, I see its members as *British Christian intellectuals*. Each term locates the group in a key sphere: a *national* (British) context featuring specific identities and assumptions (though open to foreign influences); a *religious* (Christian) context shaped by various (not exclusively British) traditions and defined against 'secularism'; and a *public* (intellectual) context marked by certain forms of action and authority.

British

Histories of ecumenical thought have often focused on its *transnational* elements. This approach can be enlightening; however, it is important to attend to the specificities of the *national* contexts in which most Christian groups and individuals lived the far greater parts of their lives and formed their worldviews. Rather than analysing ecumenism as it looked from Geneva (which became the headquarters of the WCC in 1948 and had served more informally as such during the period of its formation), this study takes a primarily national perspective, seeking to draw out a detailed picture of the complexities of Christian social thought in one country: Great Britain. Despite its international scope and transnational connections, the Oldham group's Britishness will become apparent in the chapters that follow. Anglican and free church traditions of socially active Christianity, 'civil society' and 'community' were central to its thinking.¹⁰ Nearly all its participants were British citizens who had – at least mostly – been raised and educated in Britain, inculcating particular outlooks and habits of thought. Participants also included a New Zealander – Scottish-born Presbyterian minister Alexander 'Lex' Miller – and, perhaps more surprisingly, three continental refugee scholars with Jewish backgrounds: Karl Mannheim, Adolf Löwe and Michael Polanyi. However, all three of the latter became naturalised Britons, and they fed the group's conviction that distinct *national* traditions offered valuable resources for cultural renewal. The Oldham group contributed to debates about national social reconstruction,

asserted a strong (even patriotic) attachment to the nation and perceived a providential British ‘mission’ to bring a new order to a disintegrating world.

However, this Britishness was both self-critical and open to influences from abroad and from beyond British Protestantism. As Chapter 2 discusses, these included the ‘Christian realism’ of American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr; the ‘personalist democracy’ of French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain and the ‘I–Thou’ approach of Austrian-born Jewish philosopher Martin Buber. References to leading theologians and Christian philosophers – such as Ernst Troeltsch, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Eberhard Grisebach, Paul Tillich and Friedrich von Hügel – peppered the group’s discussions. Links to the German churches were kept alive during the war, and contacts with American Protestantism were extensive. ‘Intercultural transfer’ thus played a key role, and members selectively appropriated (and rejected) a range of ideas, adapting them to their own needs, aims and understandings.¹¹

Christian

Categorising the Oldham group as religious may seem obvious, but ‘religion’ has many meanings. This has proved especially true in the scholarly study of religion. Indeed, it may be that ‘everybody except scholars of religion appears to know what “religion” means.’¹² It can, for example, be used to respond to ‘*immanent* contexts, events and experiences’ and assert group identities that have little to do with, strictly speaking, ‘religious’ concerns.¹³ However, the Oldham group can be seen as ‘Christian’ in terms of its participants’ worldviews, identity, ideas and language. Apart from Mannheim and Löwe – who were agnostic but still saw Christianity as *functionally* useful to social renewal – all its members were personally Christian. Most had been (or remained) active in the missionary, ecumenical or student Christian movements. All the bodies and projects in the group had Christian aims (and often the word ‘Christian’ in their names), and most were affiliated with the Protestant churches. Concepts such as the Kingdom of Heaven, *agape*, the Incarnation and natural law recurred. But the group’s version of Christianity was distinct: it was strongly intellectual, ecumenical and socially oriented. It was connected to official religion (i.e. ‘specific ecclesiastical structures’) but saw itself as an unofficial, *lay* network and was open to quasi-religious elements.¹⁴ While claiming to speak for a universal Christianity and interested in cross-denominational influences, it was, however, predominantly Protestant.

Intellectuals

While intellectual history is not limited to people defined as ‘intellectuals’, I aim to place the Oldham group in the intellectual culture of their time.

I am not the first to describe them as intellectuals, but it should be noted that most members would probably not have applied the label to themselves.¹⁵ ‘Intellectual’ was an ambivalent term in the Britain of the 1930s and 1940s, especially for Christians. In 1938, the *Church Times* saw intellectuals as a clearly secular – and ineffectual – class.¹⁶ The *Christian World* in 1942 depicted the ‘left-wing intelligentsia’ as leading attacks on Christian views of marriage and family.¹⁷ But in 1938 T. S. Eliot suggested that if an ‘intellectual’ meant ‘a person of philosophical mind philosophically trained, who thinks things out for himself’, Christians were as entitled to the label as anyone else.¹⁸

The group was well educated (most were Oxford or Cambridge graduates) and of a philosophical bent, but rather than taking the term to mean a particular class or profession, I apply Stefan Collini’s view of intellectuals as defined by a specific ‘structure of relations.’ The four relevant ‘elements’ are, first, ‘the attainment of a level of achievement in an activity which is esteemed for the non-instrumental, creative, analytical or scholarly capacities it involves’; second, ‘the availability of media or channels of expression which reach publics other than that at which the initial “qualifying” activity itself is aimed’; third, ‘the expression of views, themes or topics which successfully articulate or engage with some of the general concerns of those publics’; and fourth, ‘the establishment of a reputation for being likely to have important and interesting things of this type to say and for having the willingness and capacities to say them effectively through the appropriate media.’¹⁹ This definition is neither positively nor negatively connoted but describes a *type* of activity; moreover, its applicability to particular individuals varies – being a matter of ‘degree not kind’ – and the ‘public’ addressed may be a smaller fraction of the general public.²⁰ The result is what Collini calls ‘cultural authority’, which grants its bearers a degree of (at least perceived) social influence.²¹ This definition applied more to some group participants than to others; still, it succinctly describes the Oldham group as a whole.

Larger themes

Why, though, should we concern ourselves with the confrontation by a small circle of relatively elite Christians with what may seem historically distant problems: totalitarianism, a crisis of liberal democracy and global war? I suggest that the Oldham group tells us much about a period when Christianity was intricately interwoven in British intellectual and cultural life.²² Understanding British responses to the inter-war crises, the Second World War and the post-war world thus requires attending to religion. There was a specifically Christian, and widely influential, view

of the meaning of the war. Happily, this study can build upon and contribute to a growing historiography of Christian social thought, the Second World War, intellectual responses to modernity and the confrontation of Christians with 'secularisation'.

Relating faith to society

Faith's relevance to society is a matter on which historians have differed. It is clear, though, that many 'building blocks of Western modernity' – 'states and bureaucracies, revolution and reform, voluntary associations and social movements, human and civil rights, corporations and welfare states' – have partly 'religious genealogies'.²³ Far more attention has been given to Christianity's influence on *nineteenth*-century social thought than to the century that followed.²⁴ However, despite secularising trends, religious actors, institutions and ideas were relevant across twentieth-century Europe. There have been many biographical or institutional studies of key figures and movements, but broader thematic analyses have sometimes been limited to theological or inner-church contexts.²⁵ There are exceptions, and Christianity's role in British national (and imperial) identity through the mid twentieth century has been recognised.²⁶ There is, moreover, growing interest in the interactions among European churches, Christian concepts of order and twentieth-century modernity, with continental Christian Democratic parties and religious influences on European unification having become active research topics.²⁷ For Britain, the inter-war social views of the Church of England, the free churches and Roman Catholics have been explored, and Christian contributions to pacifism thoroughly studied.²⁸ Christian influences on post-1945 domestic policy, moral debates and international relations have recently been emphasised.²⁹ Understanding the Oldham group's perspectives can contribute to existing interest in inter-war and war-time political culture, and Christianity's responses to and influence on political decision-making in the twentieth century remain a vital topic.³⁰ The Oldham group's efforts to increase the cultural authority of Christian belief and practice – to gain (or regain) what has been called 'cultural sovereignty' for the faith in what seemed a deeply secular age – was part of a larger story of Christianity in the mid twentieth century.³¹ The transformative experiences of the 1930s and 1940s are a context in which these issues can be fruitfully explored.

Christianity, war and social reconstruction

As terrible as the war that began in 1939 was, many Britons thought it might – should the Allies win – bring a better world, inspiring an explosion

of programmatic visions of new political, economic and social orders. In 1940, prominent British Marxist John Strachey quipped that ‘making plans for the world’ had become a national ‘industry’.³² ‘Almost daily,’ proclaimed a leader in the *New Statesman and Nation* in March 1941, ‘we are told about the Millennium that is to come – after the war.’³³ In 1939, Oldham wrote of ‘a babel of voices advocating every variety of blue-print for a new world order.’³⁴ A writer in the *Catholic Herald* observed: “Blue-prints,” “new orders” and “shapes of things to come” flutter down on us in a veritable leaflet raid.³⁵ Indeed, the term ‘New Order’ became ubiquitous among Christians and non-Christians alike, though its meaning remained unclear. Evoking the need for a Christian-inspired democracy, an essay in the *Spectator* in March 1940 saw the possibility that: ‘If bridges are thrown over social gulfs, parade and privilege swept away by voluntary surrender, need met by willing sacrifice as well as by renunciation imposed by drastic but necessary laws, then in this country and in others a new society may yet be built, of architecture both human and divine.’³⁶ Noting the ‘constant phrase’ of ‘the New Order,’ a leading Methodist in 1943 commented that ‘amidst the confusion and horrors of war,’ a vision of a better future was emerging: ‘Even the smoke over burning cities,’ he wrote, ‘seems to shape itself into a picture of what might and what ought to be.’³⁷

The war brought not only social, political and cultural transformations but also a language to describe them, from Britain’s ‘finest hour,’ the ‘Dunkirk spirit’ and a nation ‘standing alone,’ to claims that a ‘people’s war’ drove a ‘consensus’ for ‘social reconstruction’ and the ‘welfare state.’³⁸ Complacent versions of such myths have been critiqued – and claims of the welfare state as a specifically Christian project refuted³⁹ – but they continue to shape memories of the war. Revisionism has itself often been narrowly framed: despite attention to the contemporary rhetoric of a war for ‘Christian civilisation,’ specifically *religious* understandings of the momentous events of the 1930s and 1940s have often been ignored or subsumed within broader, and distinctly secular, narratives (although this has in recent years been changing).⁴⁰ Getting behind the accretions of later decades and reconstructing the concepts and languages through which the war and its aftermath were described *at the time* remains an important task.⁴¹

Committed Christians, of course, shared many of the same responses to the war as their non-Christian (or at least less devout) fellow citizens; however, they also offered distinctive arguments about its causes, conduct and consequences. There were many opinions (among Christians too) about how – and even whether – the churches should engage in public discussions of social policy. Some Christian contributions proved popular, such as Bishop George Bell’s *Christianity and World Order*

(1940) and Archbishop William Temple's *Christianity and Social Order* (1942). Articles about the churches and the emerging 'New Order' were pervasive in the Christian press, and the topic also featured in radio broadcasts. 'Religion and Life Weeks' – organised by the churches and combining worship and lectures on social issues – grew substantially in both frequency and attendance through the war.⁴² A letter on peace aims and post-war reconstruction published in *The Times* in December 1940 that had been jointly signed by Anglican, Catholic and free church leaders received much attention.⁴³ The same was true of Archbishop Temple's conference on Christian (in this case Anglican) social doctrine held at Malvern in 1941. But heated controversy might result if clergy went too far in social advocacy: a substantial part of Christian opinion opposed such interventions.⁴⁴ 'There is no room,' proclaimed a front-page article in the *Church of England Newspaper*, 'for "Christian" social programmes or a "Christian" sociology'; two years later Labour peer Lord Elton made a similar argument, stressing that Christianity was mainly concerned with personal behaviour rather than any particular '-ism': 'There can be no better Britain,' he asserted, 'without better Britons.'⁴⁵ However, as it has been recently observed, social policy 'necessarily involves the union of large principles and small facts,' and Oldham and his companions aimed to facilitate just such a combination of 'ultimate' values and the minutiae of empirical sociology in guiding post-war social reconstruction, as did other clergy and Christian laypeople.⁴⁶ The *Spectator* in 1940 noted a revived interest in the aim of 'Christian politics in a Christian polity,' suggesting it was associated with 'Christian laymen of the type of J. H. Oldham, T. S. Eliot, Middleton Murry and Christopher Dawson' (all of whom were Oldham group members).⁴⁷ But this was only one episode in a wider discussion of faith and 'modernity'.

The crisis of modernity

Debate rages about how to define 'modernity' as a distinctive stage in history.⁴⁸ Clearly, though, many people in early- and mid-twentieth-century Europe *believed* their societies were being revolutionised by secularisation, industrialisation, globalisation, urbanisation, individualisation and rationalisation. The fear that modern society had suffered a catastrophic loss of a stable mental and moral framework for interpreting the world was widespread.⁴⁹ What should one believe and how should one act if, as it seemed, traditional certainties had crumbled? Claims of modernity's spiritual emptiness had grown since the turn of the century. The Great War, the wrenching dislocations of the inter-war 'morbid age' and the outbreak

of an even larger global conflict made the sense of modern crisis pervasive, even if it was variously coloured by divergent political allegiances and worldviews.⁵⁰ Religiously inspired writers such as G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc made popular arguments against cultural fragmentation, political 'progressivism' and the rising power of the 'servile state'.⁵¹ 'Mass' society inspired widespread unease, particularly among those who looked down at the masses from a more lofty perspective.⁵² Psychologists diagnosed new feelings of isolation and helplessness and a vulnerability to increasingly sophisticated forms of political and commercial propaganda.⁵³ By the 1930s and 1940s, social theorists – such as Karl Polanyi, Karl Mannheim, Joseph Schumpeter and Peter Drucker – influentially saw (in Polanyi's terms) a 'great transformation' away from *laissez-faire* liberalism and towards 'integrated' and 'planned' societies.⁵⁴ Some welcomed such trends as a potential boon to 'social justice'; others saw them as threats to freedom.⁵⁵ Christians were among the earliest commentators to develop a critique of the 'totalitarian state' and to formulate systematic responses to the new secular 'faiths', both left and right.⁵⁶ Even after the Allied victory in 1945, the outlook remained grim: the birth of the atomic age, revelations of the Holocaust, a physically and morally devastated European continent, persistent economic disruption and the emergent superpower rivalry caused many to think that civilised culture had disintegrated without a clear sense of the way forward. In 1950, Hannah Arendt expressed the post-war atmosphere as 'the calm that settles after all hopes have died'.⁵⁷

In the 1930s and 1940s, Christians were on all sides in the debates about what should be done, their attitudes fed by both distinctly religious traditions and wider intellectual tendencies. The 'sheer anarchy' of Christian responses to the events of the period has been noted,⁵⁸ nevertheless, there were also clear patterns rooted in denominational belonging, political allegiance and national identity. Unsurprisingly, church leaders and Christian thinkers stressed 'spiritual' aspects of world problems and expressed their views via pulpit, newspaper, book and broadcast. For many (whether in the churches or not), faith provided a familiar and useful language to discuss worldly topics. Across Europe, it was a resource for the construction of a broad spectrum of politics, from a 'cult of authority' to social protest.⁵⁹ Christians often presented their aims as offering a 'moral regeneration of the community', a 'moral critique of the anomie of secular modernity' and 'an alternative vision of 'modernity' to that of secular liberals, socialists and nationalists'.⁶⁰ Here, Christian thought met a broader trend, as many thinkers, artists and activists – whether Christian or not – developed a 'romantic' sensibility, insisting on a 'transcendent' level of reality beyond empirical science and philosophical materialism, and aiming to rebuild 'community' against the dominance of large institutions and a perceived social atomisation.⁶¹ 'Mythic thinking' played a role in British responses to modernity, 'a new mode of making meaning that

appealed to the imagination by making the claim that myths communicate timeless truths that cannot be apprehended through reason and science.' Rather than *avoiding* modernity, such arguments 'took place within, depended upon, and existed in fruitful tension with fundamental institutions, features and tenets of modernity'.⁶² They also provided an opening for Christians. The Oldham group emphasised Christianity's supernatural aspects while stressing its 'realism' and acknowledging the worth of modern, secular knowledge. This, in itself, raises a thorny historiographical debate.

Secularisation

The concept of a 'secularisation process' – a decline in the relevance of religion with modernisation – has, in recent decades, faced vehement attack,⁶³ attempted revision,⁶⁴ and vigorous reassertion.⁶⁵ Few would deny that the cultural place of Christianity changed in the twentieth century, but it has been claimed that other concepts better describe what happened, such as diversification, individualisation or deinstitutionalisation. Rather than decline, shifts in the 'religious landscape' or growth in 'believing without belonging' have been stressed.⁶⁶ Still, the 1960s have been seen as a turning point in British and European Christianity, marking even the 'death of Christian Britain' or of 'Christendom'.⁶⁷ These views see a rapid collapse rather than a gradual subsidence, not only in institutional Christianity but also in the relevance of Christian narratives to individual life. But such arguments stress faith's power *prior* to the 1960s, especially with regard to morality and identity, or what has been called 'discursive' or 'diffusive' Christianity.⁶⁸ Inter-war tensions between religion and secularity were 'profound' and 'unresolved'; there was 'a grey area between active worship and active disbelief where the majority were probably to be found'.⁶⁹ Faith remained, however, part of most Britons' 'mentality and habits of thought'.⁷⁰

I am less concerned with what *was* happening than with what a group of intellectuals *thought* was happening. Secularisation might be an objectively verifiable phenomenon, but I focus on the motivations, viewpoints and efforts of specific historical actors, seeing secularisation as 'a contingent and active set of strategies' and counter-strategies.⁷¹ Different understandings of religion developed, came into contact (and conflict) and were mutually altered.⁷² Signs of what I call 'subjective secularisation' – the *perception* of Christianity's marginalisation by secular movements or by indifference – were legion in intellectual circles. A small but growing and vocal coterie of atheists (or 'rationalists' or 'humanists', as they tended to be known then) welcomed this development; Christians, naturally, did not.

In 1931, T. S. Eliot expressed what would become a common Christian view as the world situation darkened across the next decade: the attempt

to build 'a civilised but non-Christian mentality' was doomed, he wrote, and he suggested his fellow believers should prepare for the coming social 'collapse', using their faith 'to renew and rebuild civilisation, and save the World from suicide.'⁷³ Such sentiments were common. In 1938 popular Roman Catholic historian (and Moot member) Christopher Dawson predicted 'not merely the passing of the Liberal-capitalist order of the nineteenth century' but also 'the End of the Age' and a 'turning point in world history': 'from the emptiness of modern civilization and progress to the vision of spiritual reality which stands all the time looking down on our ephemeral activities like the snow mountains above the jazz and gigolos of a jerry-built hotel.'⁷⁴ A review of Arnold J. Toynbee's *Christianity and Civilisation* (1940) found it 'encouraging' that 'if our secular Western civilisation perishes Christianity may be expected not only to endure but to grow in wisdom and stature as the result of a fresh experience of secular catastrophe.' A 'secular calamity', the review concluded, 'may sow the seeds of the spiritual opportunity of a new age.'⁷⁵ Even some critics of Christianity could not simply cheer its demise. George Orwell thought the decline in Christian notions of the 'soul' – while 'absolutely necessary' – had driven the rise of totalitarian alternatives. Quasi-sacred (if secular) alternatives were needed: 'We have got to be the children of God', he concluded, 'even though the God of the Prayer Book no longer exists.'⁷⁶ Kingsley Martin, editor of the *New Statesman and Nation*, similarly argued that it would be 'useless' to try 'to reimpose a belief in a theology which no longer agrees with knowledge', and he critiqued Christian traditionalists; nonetheless, while he hoped 'the religion of humanism' would someday appeal to 'the mass of mankind', he feared it might not.⁷⁷ Martin here was reviewing Harold J. Laski's *Faith, Reason and Civilisation* (1944), which also made the argument that it was necessary to find 'a new system of values' after the decline of religious belief.⁷⁸ Such comments suggested that *something* had disappeared from western culture and posed the question of what might replace it. Linking religious decline to the rise of 'political religions' has featured in recent scholarship, but it was a view already then shared by many who saw religion-like qualities in Communism, Fascism and Nazism (and even, some Christians argued, in the 'faith' in scientific progress).⁷⁹

Christian commentators in the 1930s and 1940s despaired of the state of British religion, noting declining church attendance and widespread ignorance about Christian dogma. It is not necessary to argue that they were right to see that their perceptions motivated historically relevant responses. I am thus interested in secularisation as a changing argumentative and motivational context for social, political and cultural claims: secularisation was important because the people in whom I am interested *believed* it was and acted accordingly.⁸⁰ Recently, even tendencies towards

'self-secularisation' have been seen in mid-century British Christianity, deriving from new theological currents and some Christian organisations' turn to social activism.⁸¹ The topic of secularisation in these senses – as a subjective viewpoint or conscious strategy – can also be studied through an examination of the Oldham group.

Sources and methods

Many sources give insight into the Oldham group's ideas, efforts, reception and context. As the group was partly formed of bodies affiliated with the Church of England (and free churches), relevant correspondence, memoranda, mission statements, strategy papers and reports are available at the Church of England Record Centre and in the archbishops' papers at Lambeth Palace (both in London). I have also consulted the papers of people active in the group: Oldham himself (New College Library, Edinburgh), John Baillie (University of Edinburgh), Fred Clarke (Institute of Education, London), O. S. Tomkins (University of Leeds) and W. G. Symons (University of Birmingham).⁸² Annotated minutes of Moot meetings between 1938 and 1944 have been recently published, and nearly all the papers on which they were based are preserved in the institutional or personal archives noted above.

Public expressions of the group's ideas include individual members' publications – mostly as articles and books – and radio broadcasts published in the BBC's *Listener*. As key group members were editors of journals – such as *Theology* (Alec Vidler) and the *Adelphi* (John Middleton Murry) – they have also been consulted. The public face for the Oldham group, the *Christian News-Letter* (1939–49), has been systematically analysed, and forms – along with Moot discussions and papers – the main source for understanding the shared aspects of the group's ideas. Aiming to gauge public reception of these ideas and contextualise them *vis-à-vis* broader currents in Christian and secular thought, I have examined a range of periodical literature and newspapers. Christian responses and related perspectives have been considered via systematic searches through the Anglo-Catholic periodical *Christendom: A Journal of Christian Sociology*; Anglican newspapers of an Anglo-Catholic orientation (*Church Times* and the *Guardian*) and of a more evangelical bent (the *Church of England Newspaper*); as well as the cross-denominational free church press (*British Weekly* and *Christian World*); and the war-time weekly *Spiritual Issues of the War*, published by the Ministry of Information.⁸³ I have also consulted the *Catholic Herald* for the years during the war. To get a sense of the group's reception and location in non-explicitly Christian sources, I have read through relevant years of the (left-liberal) *New Statesman and Nation*,

conducted digital searches in newspapers and periodicals (*The Times*, *Times Literary Supplement*, *Manchester Guardian*, *Daily Mail*, *Scotsman*, *Irish Times*, *Spectator* and *Picture Post*) and consulted the British Newspaper Archive to cover the provincial press.

These sources have enabled me to analyse the Oldham group's ideas; the sources for them; the internal discussions, debates and disagreements that accompanied their development; the group's efforts to exert influence on politics and public; and the public reception of the thought emerging from the group. They reveal, as subsequent chapters show, an intensive and wide-ranging effort by the group to grapple with numerous topics against the background of a rapidly and dramatically shifting world situation. It would be impossible to present these discussions in their entirety or to account completely for their complexity and diversity. I have thus selected the topics to be considered in accordance with their centrality to the group's concerns and structured my analysis of them via a crucial and recurring intellectual strategy: the search for diverse, but related, 'middle ways'.

Seeking 'middle ways' in an age of extremes

Rather than assembling individual profiles of Oldham group participants, I have sought to stress the collective shape of their ideas: their distinctive style of thought, its changing registers and its place in the war-time public sphere. Reassembling the group's views, however, is a complex issue. Its protagonists shared convictions, worldviews and aims. Yet, they never arrived at a comprehensive, unanimous and detailed vision of a Christian society. No manifesto emerged, and disagreements continued. Still, key texts expressed significant points of agreement, and there was a strong sense of common purpose and identity among participants. Oldham helped build consensus, not only by organising the group's main bodies (and selecting, in some cases, their participants) but also by summarising and synthesising their discussions. The Moot sought to unite diverse opinions (if not *too* diverse); other parts of the group, however, aimed to reach firm – if provisional – conclusions expressed in memoranda or published reports. Producing the *Christian News-Letter* compelled its editors – Oldham and then Kathleen Bliss – to develop a consistent line on many issues, but they also gave space to contrary opinions and frequently acknowledged ambiguities in even the most definitive statements of belief. Group participants, at times, expressed mixed feelings on certain issues. Some changed their minds. To capture this mixture of agreement and dissension, I have pursued three aims in each chapter: first, outlining elements of a significant (if at times unstable) *consensus*; second, accounting for




Figure 1 Joseph H. Oldham, 1937

departures from that consensus; and, third, giving a sense of *change over time* in both consensus and dissent.

Each chapter reveals a recurring dynamic in the group: the search for what I call ‘middle ways’ through the political and ideological extremes of the age. These might involve taking a *moderate position* between two (or more) perceived extremes; alternatively, the term ‘middle way’ meant constructing a *synthesis* of two different – possibly contradictory – elements. In some cases, the ‘middle way’ referred to the intellectual *content* of their ideas, in others to *strategies* for implementing them, both of which are important to understanding Christian efforts to remould European democracy in the mid twentieth century.⁸⁴ These middle ways seemed to resolve tensions inherent in the problems the group faced and became typical of the group’s approach. Various kinds of ‘betweenness’ were involved: paths were sought between Protestantism and Catholicism,

between faith and secularity, between *laissez-faire* capitalism and collectivist socialism, between rootless internationalism and aggressive nationalism, between the United States and Russia, between freedom and order, and between egalitarianism and elitism. While I use the notion primarily as an analytical term, it also appeared at times in the sources. The vocabulary of the ‘middle way’ – and the belief that national traditions (such as the Anglican *via media*) made Britain uniquely qualified to find it – was common in the 1930s and 1940s.⁸⁵ In 1938, for example, Conservative MP (and future prime minister) Harold Macmillan published a book with that title, arguing for a centrist economic policy that avoided either *laissez-faire* or totalitarian collectivism; his book was positively received in the Christian press.⁸⁶ The newsletter *Reality* saw an alternative to either the ‘Hitler New Order’ or the ‘Roosevelt New Order’: there was a ‘middle way’, a ‘straight road to complete individual liberty’, neither ‘tyranny by force’ nor ‘tyranny by money.’⁸⁷ However, some, often with Communist sympathies, argued against the possibility of a middle way. Kenneth Ingram, for instance, gained much attention by claiming that the only choice, particularly for Christians, was between Fascism and Communism, strongly urging the latter.⁸⁸ (There was also a small circle of pro-Fascist clerics arguing for more radical solutions from a different direction.⁸⁹) Oldham group member John Middleton Murry admitted that, ‘being British, one dreams of a middle way’; however, he was ‘reluctantly’ forced to conclude ‘that there is no middle way’ and advocated a clearly socialist solution.⁹⁰ Murry here departed from the group’s consensus, which clung to the possibility of a moderate – yet still somehow ‘revolutionary’ – way forward. While the ideal (and language) of the ‘middle way’ was common to the period, it meant different things to different people, requiring attention to the subtleties and ambiguities of its use in the chapters that follow.

Chapter 1 lays out the Oldham group’s main participants, structures, aims and strategies, providing an organisational overview on which later thematic chapters build. Despite aiming for ‘revolutionary’ social change, the group eschewed the options of forming a Christian political party or seeking to foment popular revolt. Instead, it suggested that a ‘revolution from above’ in the main institutions of the political and economic establishment should be brought about by a Christian ‘Order’ working through private networks of influence as well as a broader effort to use media and established Christian networks to create a cultural (Christian) ‘leaven.’ Little came of the ‘Order’, but the group nevertheless sought political influence through personal relationships while the *Christian News-Letter* addressed the public and inspired new informal networks.

Chapters 2 and 3 focus on related aspects of one of the key concepts guiding the group’s search for middle ways: what Oldham referred to as the

'frontier' between faith and social life. Chapter 2 examines how the group defined a socially relevant faith amid dramatically different Christian positions on that matter. The group saw an emerging 'convergence' in Christian demands to reshape dominant ideas, cultural norms and social practices in accordance with Christian understandings of human nature and the purposes of social life. It sought 'middle axioms' that could connect eternal, universal Christian principles and the complexities of historically and culturally specific societies. In this effort, certain streams of religious thinking were adopted while others were rejected.

Chapter 3 considers one of the Oldham group's defining aims: bringing Christian principles and secular knowledge into creative relationship. The group's view of secularity combined positive, negative and neutral perspectives. Urging Christians to be more open to scientific knowledge, its members also condemned what they saw as extreme forms of secular 'materialism'. The group idealised a *modus vivendi* that would enable Christianity to influence the 'common life'; however, religion and secularity were conceived as distinct, each with its legitimate role to play. As the group saw Britain as a 'secular' society and likely to remain so, establishing a constructive relationship between Christians and non-Christians was a key goal.

Chapter 4 turns to the role of the State, centring on the ubiquitous 1930s and 1940s discussion about 'planning'. The Oldham group criticised the waste, inequality, greed and chaos of *laissez-faire* capitalism, seen to be at odds with Christian views on human life. Some members valued aspects of Marxist thought, but Marxism was rejected as a utopian ideology and Soviet Communism as a nightmare of totalitarian violence and repression. Karl Mannheim's concept of 'planning for freedom' seemed to offer a middle way (Mannheim called it a 'third way') towards encouraging Christian-inspired norms while leaving room for individual liberty and local initiative. 'Planning for freedom' provoked some dissent in the group and left it with mixed feelings about the emerging post-war welfare state: while welcoming moves towards 'social justice', it was concerned about oppressive statism.

Chapter 5 considers a key tension in the Oldham group's views on national identity. Its participants saw no problem in a close identification with one's national community; indeed, this was thought preferable to an unmoored, rootless 'internationalism'. However, nationalism was viewed negatively as an excessive, even idolatrous extreme. Fascism and National Socialism showed the dangers of nationalism, but similar tendencies threatened the democracies. At the same time, supposedly distinctive British traditions were seen as routes to a better world. What emerged was a 'Christian patriotism' combining a positive image of national characteristics with

an emphasis on Christian universalism, national humility, self-criticism and an 'ethic of service' towards other nations. There were also efforts to embed British identity in larger imagined polities, such as 'Christendom', 'Federal Union' and 'the West'.

Chapter 6 considers the group's view of a widely used but variously understood term: 'freedom'. Its members sought to avoid either what they saw as the empty, superficial individualism of liberal capitalism or a violent, totalitarian *Gleichschaltung*. Against both, they sought a 'true' freedom based upon a holistic, organic and community-oriented 'personalism'. While there have been claims that the group's social vision, reflecting a broader Anglo-American Protestant tendency, implied some form of 'Christian totalitarianism', I show how it considered and then rejected this option at an early stage in its consultations. Crucially, already established civil rights and parliamentary government were not questioned. But while their vision of freedom was based upon ideals of political decentralisation and active citizenship, it also assumed democracy would have to take a more constrained form – a view that, however, was not untypical in post-war Europe.

Chapter 7 turns to the issue of social inequality. Here, the group's thinking was shaped by a fundamental tension between two contrasting motives. Participants were nearly unanimous in their opposition to class inequality and their advocacy of a more egalitarian society. Educational reform, in terms of both extending secondary schooling and increasing access to universities, was central to this aim. However, their vision of an ideal education was modelled on the elite variety that most members themselves had experienced. Their aim amounted to a 'democratisation of the aristocracy' rather than its abolition. Also, while committed to democracy and imbued with British libertarian traditions, the Oldham group remained suspicious of the 'masses'. This led them to the conclusion that a Christian (or at least Christian-inspired) elite, possibly in the form of a 'clerisy', was necessary to steer society in the right direction.

Conclusion

The Oldham group sought 'middle ways' through an age of extremes, part of a wider effort by British intellectuals – Christian or not – to reconsider the meaning of democracy and the legitimacy of the liberal, capitalist social order in the years around the Second World War.⁹¹ While parts of the group, particularly the Moot, have received attention, it has been largely ignored in broader studies of British Christian thought or intellectual culture.⁹² The group is sometimes mentioned in passing,⁹³ or it is examined with regard to only individual aspects of its thinking, such as

education⁹⁴ or the need for a Christian 'elite'.⁹⁵ It has been referred to in biographical studies of its key protagonists, particularly those of Oldham himself, T. S. Eliot and Karl Mannheim, but also those of John Baillie and John Middleton Murry.⁹⁶ This biographical focus has given a valuable but often partial view determined by the person considered.⁹⁷ Figures in the group or related to it have appeared in studies of the ecumenical movement and 'Europe', but little attention has been given to its British context or to themes beyond European integration.⁹⁸ Oldham's role in shaping post-war Christian views of the atom bomb has been addressed, but with little attention to his broader vision.⁹⁹

This book offers a more integrated, far-reaching and contextualising perspective on what I call the Oldham group. First, I examine its various component bodies and projects as an interlocking whole. I think it is crucial to take into account the collaborative nature and, in a sense, 'groupness' of the group. Second, more than previous studies, I stress the group's efforts towards influencing public opinion, particularly through the *Christian News-Letter*. While its thinking was often abstract and intellectual, the group – even in its private discussions – aimed at wider relevance and impact. Third, I offer the first broadly thematic study of the interrelated topics with which the group was preoccupied: Christianity's social relevance, the relationship between faith and secularity, the role of the State, the place of national identity, the true meaning of freedom, and ways of balancing egalitarian aims with elitist assumptions. Fourth, this book breaks new ground by considering how the group's ideas were related to and received within British intellectual culture generally.

A close examination of the Oldham group will enable me to contribute to understanding twentieth-century Christian social thought, the Second World War, responses to modernity and perceptions of (and reactions to) 'secularisation'. While it was too small (and elite) to be representative of religious belief and practice in Britain more generally, the Oldham group reveals some dominant trends in Christian thought. Moreover, it was prominent and well connected, and its members' views and publications received substantial attention in both Christian and secular contexts. While they had an ambivalent, often critical, attitude towards ecclesiastical hierarchies, orthodox theology and institutionalised faith, they also benefited from a close relationship to the churches, their most popular leaders (above all Anglican archbishops Lang and Temple) and the foremost theologians and religious philosophers of the age. As an internationally connected group working within the institutions of the ecumenical movement and aiming to synthesise religious thinking beyond denominational boundaries (including even secular thought in the natural and social sciences),

the Oldham group is a particularly valuable site for reconstructing the complex and subtle interactions between various intellectual styles of thought in the 1930s and 1940s. As a group self-consciously operating in the misty borderlands between secular and religious worldviews, Oldham and his companions offer insights into both the subjective sense of secularisation and possible tendencies towards 'self-secularisation'.

Seeing the war as a socially and culturally transformative moment, the group sought to ensure that Christian principles could contribute to the 'social reconstruction' to follow. Keeping this hope alive was far from easy but could be expressed in a traditionally Christian language. Commenting on the mounting threat to Britain early in the war, Oldham told *Christian News-Letter* readers that 'Satanic forces' had broken loose in Europe, recalling Jesus' comments to those who arrested him in Gethsemane. 'We are experiencing on a world scale,' he wrote, 'what Jesus knew and felt when He said: "This is your hour and the power of darkness."¹⁰⁰ That moment, leading to the crucifixion, was a pivotal moment in the canonical gospels; however, it was followed, of course, by Jesus' resurrection and thus the inauguration (from a Christian perspective) of a new world. The antidote to destruction, fear and despair, Oldham claimed in drawing upon this text, was 'to fortify our minds with the truth that the Light has shone, and is shining, in the darkness; to remind ourselves every morning that *God is Light*'. The emphasis within Oldham's circle on the war as ushering in a renewal – even 'resurrection' – of Christian cultural, social and political influence (and therefore a reinforcement of liberal democracy) offers a specific example of a wider phenomenon. Metaphorically, Oldham's biblical reference was apt in light of recent research that has highlighted how the engagement with totalitarianism in the mid twentieth century led to a significant reshaping of European democracy, definitions of 'liberalism' and conceptions of 'human rights'.¹⁰¹ Roger Griffin has stressed the 'palinogenetic' promise of social rebirth at the heart of totalitarian movements; however, there were in this era also democratic and pacific visions of constructive social transformation, even if (as in the case of the Oldham group) they believed some lessons might be learned from the successes of their totalitarian opponents.¹⁰² Understanding the Oldham group means accounting for its amphibious nature, both as distinctively British and internationally open; as resolutely Christian but committed to melding faith with useful elements of 'secular' knowledge; and as distinctly intellectual but seeking to address broader publics, whether Christian or not. The Oldham group, as I hope the following chapters show, makes visible many of the key tensions in the contestations around reconceptualising and renewing a democratic social order that took place in the crucible of war and post-war rebuilding.¹⁰³

Notes

- 1 Riccardo Bavaj, 'Intellectual History', version: 1.0, *Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte* (13 September 2010), http://docupedia.de/zg/Intellectual_History (accessed 3 November 2018).
- 2 Lutz Raphael, "'Ideen als gesellschaftliche Gestaltungskraft im Europa der Neuzeit": Bemerkungen zur Bilanz eines DFG-Schwerpunktprogramms', and 'Ausschreibungstext', in Lutz Raphael and Heinz-Elmar Tenorth (eds.), *Ideen als gesellschaftliche Gestaltungskraft im Europa der Neuzeit* (Munich: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2006), pp. 11–27, 525–31 (pp. 11, 526). Original terms: *Deutungssysteme, Denkstile* and *gedachte Ordnungen*.
- 3 See Richard Whatmore, 'Intellectual History and the History of Political Thought', in Richard Whatmore and Brian Young (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in Intellectual History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 109–29; Richard Whatmore, *What Is Intellectual History?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2016); Q. R. D. Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', *History and Theory*, 8:1 (1969), 3–53; J. G. A. Pocock, 'The Reconstruction of Discourse: Towards the Historiography of Political Thought', *MLN*, 96:5 (1981), 959–80; J. G. A. Pocock, 'Quentin Skinner: The History of Politics and the Politics of History', *Common Knowledge*, 10 (2004), 532–50; Elías José Palti, 'From Ideas to Concepts to Metaphors: The German Tradition of Intellectual History and the Complex Fabric of Language', *History and Theory*, 49 (2010), 194–211.
- 4 Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 183–9.
- 5 Peter E. Gordon, 'Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas', in Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds.), *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 32–55 (p. 48).
- 6 Mark Bevir, 'Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Power: A Response to Critics', *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice*, 4:3 (2000), 341–50 (p. 344).
- 7 Jan-Werner Müller, 'European Intellectual History as Contemporary History', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 46:3 (2011), 574–90 (p. 588).
- 8 Thomas Grossbölting, 'Religionsgeschichte als Problemgeschichte der Gegenwart: Ein Vorschlag zu künftigen Perspektiven der Katholizismusforschung', in Wilhelm Damborg and Karl-Joseph Hummel (eds.), *Katholizismus in Deutschland: Zeitgeschichte und Gegenwart* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2015), pp. 169–85 (pp. 180–1); and Andreas Holzem, 'Die Geschichte des "geglauten Gottes"', in Andreas Leinhäupl-Wilke (ed.), *Katholische Theologie studieren: Themenfelder und Disziplinen* (Münster: LIT, 2000), pp. 73–103. See also Callum Brown's notion of 'discursive Christianity' in *The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation 1800–2000*, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2009 [2001]); and Alana Harris, *Faith in the Family: A Lived Religious History of English Catholicism, 1945–82* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).
- 9 Adrian Hastings, 'The British Churches in the War and Post-War Reconstruction', in Andrew R. Morton (ed.), *God's Will in a Time of Crisis: A Colloquium Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the Baillie Commission* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 4–13 (p. 4).

- 10 Matthew Grimley, 'Civil Society and the Clerisy: Christian Elites and National Culture, c. 1930–1950', in Jose Harris (ed.), *Civil Society in British History: Ideas, Identities, Institutions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 231–47.
- 11 Thomas Adam, *Intercultural Transfers and the Making of the Modern World, 1800–2000* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Johannes Paulmann, 'Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien: Einführung in ein Forschungskonzept', in Rudolf Muhs, Johannes Paulmann and Willibald Steinmetz (eds.), *Aneignung und Abwehr: Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert* (Bodenheim: Philo, 1998), pp. 21–43.
- 12 Graham Harvey, 'Defining Religion', in John Wolffe and Gavin Moorhead, 'Religion, Security and Global Uncertainties: Report from a Global Uncertainties Leadership Fellowship' (Milton Keynes: Open University, 2014), pp. 7–8, www.open.ac.uk/arts/research/religion-martyrdom-global-uncertainties/sites/www.open.ac.uk.arts.research.religion-martyrdom-global-uncertainties/files/files/ecms/arts-rmgu-pr/web-content/blackburn-programme-may.pdf [sic] (accessed 5 December 2014), pp. 7–8.
- 13 Samantha May, Erin K. Wilson, Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Faiz Sheikh, 'The Religious as Political and the Political as Religious: Globalisation, Post-Secularism and the Shifting Boundaries of the Sacred', *Politics, Religion and Ideology*, 15 (2014), 331–46 (p. 339). Emphasis added.
- 14 John Wolffe, *God and Greater Britain: Religion and National Life in Britain and Ireland 1843–1943* (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 5–19.
- 15 Keith Clements (ed.), *The Moot Papers: Faith, Freedom and Society 1938–1944* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2010), p. 1 (hereafter *Moot Papers*); William Taylor and Marjorie Reeves, 'Intellectuals in Debate: The Moot', in Marjorie Reeves (ed.), *Christian Thinking and Social Order: Conviction Politics from the 1930s to the Present Day* (London: Cassell, 1999), pp. 24–48.
- 16 *Church Times*, 2 September 1938, p. 223.
- 17 *Christian World*, 28 May 1942, p. 5.
- 18 Shun'ichi Takayanagi, 'T. S. Eliot, the *Action française* and Neo-Scholasticism', in Benjamin G. Lockerd (ed.), *T. S. Eliot and Christian Tradition* (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2014), pp. 89–97 (p. 95).
- 19 Stefan Collini, *Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 52.
- 20 *Ibid.*, pp. 52–9.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 57.
- 22 Matthew Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England: Liberal Anglican Theories of the State between the Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 10–13; Tom Lawson, *The Church of England and the Holocaust: Christianity, Memory and Nazism* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2006), pp. 10–14.
- 23 Philip S. Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, 'The Post-Secular in Question', in Philip S. Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (eds.), *The Post-Secular in*

- Question: Religion in Contemporary Society* (New York: New York University Press, 2012), pp. 1–22 (p. 5). See, e.g., Philip S. Gorski, *The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Sigrun Kahl, 'The Religious Roots of Modern Poverty Policy: Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed Protestant Traditions Compared', *European Journal of Sociology*, 46 (2005), 91–126; Philip Manow, *Religion und Sozialstaat: Die konfessionellen Grundlagen europäischer Wohlfahrtsregime* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2008); Peter Stamatov, 'Activist Religion, Empire, and the Emergence of Modern Long-Distance Advocacy Networks', *American Sociological Review*, 75 (2010), 607–28.
- 24 Exceptions include general works such as John Oliver, *The Church and Social Order: Social Thought in the Church of England, 1918–1939* (London: A. R. Mowbray, 1968); Adrian Hastings, *A History of English Christianity 1920–1990* (London: SCM, 1991); G. I. T. Machin, *Churches and Social Issues in Twentieth-Century Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); and those cited subsequently.
- 25 E.g. Eleanor M. Jackson, *Red Tape and the Gospel: A Study of the Significance of the Ecumenical Missionary Struggle of William Paton 1886–1943* (Birmingham: Phlogiston, 1980); Christina Scott, *A Historian and His World: A Life of Christopher Dawson, 1889–1970* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1984); John Kent, *William Temple: Church, State and Society in Britain, 1880–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Andrew Chandler (ed.), *Brethren in Adversity: George Bell, the Church of England and the Crisis of German Protestantism, 1933–1939* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1997); Diane Kirby, *Church, State and Propaganda. The Archbishop of York and International Relations: A Study of Cyril Foster Garbett 1942–1955* (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1999); Adrian Hastings, *Oliver Tomkins: The Ecumenical Enterprise, 1908–1992* (London: SPCK, 2001); Robert Beaken, *Cosmo Lang: Archbishop in War and Crisis* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012).
- 26 Wolffe, *God and Greater Britain*; Grimley, *Citizenship*; Keith Robbins, *Great Britain: Identities, Institutions, and the Idea of Britishness* (London: Longman, 1998); S. C. Williams, *Religious Belief and Popular Culture in Southwark c. 1880–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Hastings, *A History*; Stephen Parker, *Faith on the Home Front: Aspects of Church Life and Popular Religion in Birmingham, 1939–1945* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2005).
- 27 Emiel Lamberts (ed.), *Christian Democracy in the European Union (1945–1995)* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997); Patrick Pasture, 'Religion in Contemporary Europe: Contrasting Perceptions and Dynamics', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 49 (2009), 319–50; Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007); Heinz Duchhardt and Małgorzata Morawiec (eds.), *Die europäische Integration und die Kirchen: Akteure und Rezipienten* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010); Patrick Pasture, *Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Patrick Pasture, 'Between a Christian Fatherland and Euro-Christendom', in John Carter Wood (ed.), *Christianity*

- and *National Identity in Twentieth-Century Europe: Conflict, Community, and the Social Order* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), pp. 169–87.
- 28 Oliver, *Church and Social Order*; Grimley, *Citizenship*; Bruce Wollenberg, *Christian Social Thought in Great Britain between the Wars* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997); Peter Catterall, 'Morality and Politics: The Free Churches and the Labour Party between the Wars', *Historical Journal*, 36:3 (1993), 667–85; Peter Catterall, *Labour and the Free Churches, 1918–1939: Radicalism, Righteousness, and Religion* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016); Tom Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism: Religious Identity and Political Extremism between the Wars* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Alan Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform? War, Peace and the English Churches 1900–1945* (London: SCM, 1986); Martin Ceadel, *Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1845–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Richard Overy, 'Pacifism and the Blitz, 1940–1941', *Past and Present*, 219 (2013), 201–36.
- 29 Diane Kirby (ed.), *Religion and the Cold War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003); Philip M. Coupland, *Britannia, Europa and Christendom: British Christians and European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Peter Itzen, *Streitbare Kirche: Die Church of England vor den Herausforderungen des Wandels 1945–1990* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012); Paul T. Phillips, *Contesting the Moral High Ground: Popular Moralists in Twentieth-Century Britain* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2013); Jonathan Gorry, *Cold War Christians and the Spectre of Nuclear Deterrence, 1945–1959* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Sam Brewitt-Taylor, 'The Invention of a "Secular Society"? Christianity and the Sudden Appearance of Secularisation Discourses in the British National Media, 1961–64', *Twentieth Century British History*, 24:3 (2013), 327–50; Sam Brewitt-Taylor, 'From Religion to Revolution: Theologies of Secularisation in the British Student Christian Movement, 1963–73', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 66:4 (2015), 792–811; Mark T. Edwards, '"God's Totalitarianism": Ecumenical Protestant Discourse during the Good War, 1941–45', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 10 (2009), 285–302; Mark T. Edwards, *The Right of the Protestant Left: God's Totalitarianism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Michael G. Thompson, *For God and Globe: Christian Internationalism in the United States between the Great War and the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).
- 30 Helen McCarthy, 'Whose Democracy? Histories of British Political Culture between the Wars', *Historical Journal*, 55:1 (2012), 221–38.
- 31 Gregor Feindt, Bernhard Gißibl, and Johannes Paulmann (eds.), *Kulturelle Souveränität: Politische Deutungs- und Handlungsmacht jenseits des Staates im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016).
- 32 Quoted in Coupland, *Britannia, Europa and Christendom*, p. 18.
- 33 *New Statesman and Nation*, 8 March 1941, p. 230.
- 34 *Christian News-Letter (CNL)* 5S, 29 November 1939, J. H. Oldham, 'Preliminaries to the Consideration of Peace Aims', p. 3. (References from *CNL* include issue number, date and a notation (L or S) indicating the 'letter')

(written by the editor or guest editor) or ‘supplement’ (by the editor or an invited author). Author names (when known) and titles of supplements are given. Pagination varied and was often absent entirely. I provide page numbers, when present, as they originally appeared; otherwise, they are counted separately for letters and supplements.)

- 35 *Catholic Herald*, 1 August 1941, p. 6.
- 36 *Spectator*, 22 March 1940, pp. 400–1.
- 37 Speech by Dr Leslie F. Church, President of the Methodist Conference, in *Christian World*, 15 July 1943, p. 4.
- 38 David Edgerton, ‘Becoming a Nation: Nationalism, “Alone”, and “People’s War” in British History and Historiography since 1940’, unpublished essay, 2016.
- 39 Correlli Barnett, *The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation* (London: Macmillan, 1986). See a critique in Jose Harris, ‘Enterprise and Welfare States: A Comparative Perspective’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 40 (1990), 175–95.
- 40 Keith Robbins, ‘Britain, 1940 and “Christian Civilisation”’, in Keith Robbins (ed.), *History, Religion and Identity in Modern Britain* (London: Hambledon, 1993), pp. 195–214; Philip Williamson, ‘Christian Conservatives and the Totalitarian Challenge, 1933–1940’, *English Historical Review*, 115:462 (2000), 607–42. Sonya Rose’s *Which People’s War* largely ignores religion, except with regard to pacifism: Sonya O. Rose, *Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Britain, 1939–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Exceptions include Lawson, *Church of England and the Holocaust*; Parker, *Faith on the Home Front*; Michael Hughes, *Conscience and Conflict: Methodism, Peace and War in the Twentieth Century* (Peterborough: Epworth, 2008); Stephen G. Parker and Tom Lawson (eds.) *God and War: The Church of England and Armed Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012); and Alan Jacobs, *The Year of Our Lord 1943: Christian Humanism in an Age of Crisis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
- 41 Edgerton, ‘Becoming a Nation’.
- 42 ‘Religion and Life Weeks’ were sponsored by the Commission of the Churches for International Friendship and Social Responsibility (about which more is said in Chapter 1). See *Spiritual Issues of the War*, no. 225, 24 February 1944, pp. 1–2 for a description of a typical ‘Religion and Life Week’; and *ibid.*, no. 235, 4 May 1944, p. 1 for the growing frequency of the events (1940: 1; 1941: 5; 1942: 21; 1943: 60; 1944: 51). Oldham group members took part in such events.
- 43 *The Times*, 21 December 1940, p. 5. See commentary in *Spectator*, 27 December 1940, pp. 690–1, and 10 January 1941, p. 37; *British Weekly*, 6 February 1941, p. 191; *Spiritual Issues of the War*, no. 80, 15 May 1941.
- 44 *Church Times*, 31 January 1941, p. 27; *Church Times*, 16 January 1942, p. 35; *Church of England Newspaper*, 17 January 1941, pp. 4–5; *Christian World*, 8 October 1942, p. 6; *Christian World*, 12 November 1942, p. 1.
- 45 *Church of England Newspaper*, 22 August 1941, p. 1.
- 46 Stefan Collini, ‘Saint or Snake’, *London Review of Books*, 8 October 2015, pp. 29–33 (p. 29).

- 47 *Spectator*, 23 February 1940, pp. 241–2.
- 48 A useful summary is offered by Joris van Eijnatten, Ed Jonker, Willemijn Ruberg and Joes Segal, ‘Shaping the Discourse on Modernity’, *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*, 1 (2013), 3–20.
- 49 See, e.g., Itzen on *Sinnstiftung* (meaning-making) and religion: *Streitbare Kirche*, pp. 11–18.
- 50 Richard Overy, *The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilisation, 1919–1939* (London: Penguin, 2010); Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform?*, pp. 193–231.
- 51 Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism*, pp. 76–83.
- 52 D. L. LeMahieu, *A Culture for Democracy: Mass Communication and the Cultivated Mind in Britain between the Wars* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
- 53 See a review of Erich Fromm’s *The Fear of Freedom* in *British Weekly*, 7 January 1943, p. 183.
- 54 Gareth Dale, *Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), pp. 45–6.
- 55 See, generally, Julia Stapleton, ‘Resisting the Centre at the Extremes: “English” Liberalism in the Political Thought of Interwar Britain’, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 1:3 (1999), 270–92.
- 56 Markus Huttner, *Totalitarismus und säkulare Religionen* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), esp. pp. 265–322.
- 57 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 3rd edn (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1967 [1950]), p. xxix (preface to the 1st edn).
- 58 Samuel Moyn, *Christian Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), p. 21.
- 59 Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, ‘Euro-Gott im starken Plural? Einige Fragestellungen für eine europäische Religionsgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts’, *Journal of Modern European History*, 3 (2005), 231–56 (pp. 241–2).
- 60 John Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism* (London: Fontana, 1994), pp. 41, 65, 66.
- 61 Meredith Veldman, *Fantasy, the Bomb, and the Greening of Britain: Romantic Protest, 1945–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 1–3.
- 62 Matthew Sterenberg, *Mythic Thinking in Twentieth-Century Britain: Meaning for Modernity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 1, 3–4.
- 63 Rodney Stark, ‘Secularisation R. I. P.’, *Sociology of Religion*, 60:3 (1999), 249–73; David Nash, ‘Reconnecting Religion with Social and Cultural History: Secularization’s Failure as a Master Narrative’, *Cultural and Social History*, 1 (2004), 302–25; David Nash, *Christian Ideals in British Culture: Stories of Belief in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
- 64 See José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
- 65 Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce, ‘Secularization: The Orthodox Model’, in Steve Bruce (ed.), *Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 8–30; Steve Bruce, ‘Secularisation in the UK and the USA’, in Callum G. Brown and Michael Snape (eds.), *Secularisation in the Christian World* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 205–18; Steve Bruce, *Secularization: In Defence of an Unfashionable*

- Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Detlef Pollack and Gergely Rosta, *Religion in der Moderne: Ein internationaler Vergleich* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2015).
- 66 Gladys Ganiel, 'Secularization, Ecumenism and Identity on the Island of Ireland', in Wood, *Christianity and National Identity*, pp. 73–89; Patrick Pasture, 'Dechristianization and the Changing Religious Landscape in Europe and North America since 1950: Comparative, Transatlantic, and Global Perspectives', in Nancy Christie and Michael Gauvreau (eds.), *The Sixties and Beyond: Dechristianization in North America and Western Europe, 1945–2000* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), pp. 367–402. On individualisation, see also Grossbölting, 'Religionsgeschichte als Problemgeschichte der Gegenwart', pp. 180–4; and Grace Davie, *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
- 67 Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*; Hugh McLeod, 'Introduction', in Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf (eds.), *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1–26; Pollack and Rosta, *Religion in der Moderne*, p. 464.
- 68 Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*, pp. 12–13; Parker, *Faith on the Home Front*, pp. 15–17.
- 69 Ross McKibbin, *Classes and Cultures: England, 1918–1951* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 272, 289.
- 70 *Ibid.*, pp. 276, 294.
- 71 Jonathan Sheehan, 'Enlightenment, Religion, and the Enigma of Secularization: A Review Essay', *American Historical Review*, 108:4 (2003), 1061–80 (pp. 1079–80).
- 72 Russell T. McCutcheon, "'They licked the platter clean": On the Co-Dependency of the Religious and the Secular', *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion*, 19 (2007), 173–99; Timothy Fitzgerald, *Discourse on Civility and Barbarity: A Critical History of Religion and Related Categories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 24; Markus Dressler and Arvind-Pal S. Mandair, *Secularism and Religion-Making* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 21; Marion Eggert and Lucian Hölscher (eds.), *Religion and Secularity: Transformations and Transfers of Religious Discourses in Europe and Asia* (Leiden: Brill, 2013). See also James Chappel, 'Beyond Tocqueville: A Plea to Stop "Taking Religion Seriously"', *Modern Intellectual History*, 10:3 (2013), 697–708.
- 73 T. S. Eliot, 'Thoughts after Lambeth' (1931), in *Selected Essays, 1917–1932* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932), pp. 310–32 (p. 332). Eliot expressed similar sentiments in verse in 1934: 'Choruses from "The Rock"', in T. S. Eliot, *The Poems of T. S. Eliot*, Vol. I: *Collected and Uncollected Poems*, ed. Christopher Ricks and Jim McCue (London: Faber and Faber, 2015), pp. 169–70.
- 74 Christopher Dawson, *Religion and the Modern State* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1938 [1935]), p. 153.
- 75 *British Weekly*, 19 September 1940, p. 279.
- 76 George Orwell, 'Notes on the Way', in George Orwell, *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*, Vol. II: *My Country Right or Left*

- 1940–1943, ed. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (London: Penguin, 1970 [1958]), pp. 30–3.
- 77 See Kingsley Martin’s review of Harold J. Laski’s *Faith, Reason and Civilisation* in *New Statesman and Nation*, 18 March 1944, p. 192.
- 78 Harold J. Laski, *Faith, Reason, and Civilisation: An Essay in Historical Analysis* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1944), pp. 54–5.
- 79 See, e.g., Emilio Gentile, ‘Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion: Definitions and Critical Reflections on Criticism of an Interpretation,’ *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 5:3 (2004), 326–75.
- 80 ‘Säkularisierung war existent, weil sie von den Akteuren erfahren und reflektiert wurde und sie ihr Handeln danach ausrichteten; Itzen, *Streitbare Kirche*, p. 13.
- 81 Brewitt-Taylor, ‘Invention of a “Secular Society”?’; and ‘From Religion to Revolution.’
- 82 The following archives have been consulted: the J. H. Oldham Papers, New College Library, Edinburgh (the ‘Oldham Archive’ (OA)); Fred Clarke Papers, Institute of Education, University of London (IOE); Church of England Record Office (CERC); Lambeth Palace Library (LPL); John Baillie Collection, University of Edinburgh (BC); Moot Papers, Brotherton Library, University of Leeds (UL); W. G. Symons Papers, University of Birmingham (WGS). Papers belonging to W. G. Symons – who was on the *Christian News-Letter*’s editorial board – were also generously given to me by his son, Martin (references to sources from that collection will be prefaced ‘MSC’).
- 83 On the *British Weekly* and *Christian World* see Catterall, *Labour and the Free Churches*, p. 9.
- 84 Jan-Werner Müller, ‘Towards a New History of Christian Democracy,’ *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 18:2 (2013), 243–55, esp. pp. 246–51.
- 85 Joanne Pemberton, ‘The Middle Way: The Discourse of Planning in Britain, Australia, and at the League in the Interwar Years,’ *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 52:1 (2006), 48–63. *British Weekly*, 17 October 1940, pp. 23, 26; 2 October 1947, p. 349; 13 May 1948, p. 4; and 15 July 1948, p. 6. *Guardian*, 17 March 1939, p. 166. *Catholic Herald*, 8 September 1944, p. 4. *CNL* 274S, 27 November 1946, J. Middleton Murry, ‘Can Democracy Survive?’, p. 15.
- 86 *Church Times*, 1 July 1938, p. 19; *Guardian*, 24 June 1938, p. 406.
- 87 B. R., ‘The Middle Way,’ *Reality*, no. 185, Vol. 4, no. 35, 13 November 1942, pp. 3–4.
- 88 Review of *The Christian Challenge to Communists*, *Church Times*, 12 August 1938, p. 157. See also Kenneth Ingram, *Christianity: Right or Left?* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937).
- 89 Thomas Linehan, ‘“On the Side of Christ”: Fascist Clerics in 1930s Britain,’ *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 8:2 (2007), 287–301.
- 90 OA 14/5/48 [J. M. Murry], ‘The Way to Beat Hitler’ [n.d.], p. 2.
- 91 This was part of a broader European pattern: Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).

- 92 Oliver, *Church and Social Order*; David Lyon, 'The Idea of a Christian Sociology: Some Historical Precedents and Current Concerns', *Sociological Analysis*, 44 (1983), 227–42. Maurice Cowling discusses Temple but not the Oldham group: *Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England*, Vol. III: *Accommodations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Jonas Kurlberg, 'Resisting Totalitarianism: The Moot and a New Christendom', *Religion Compass*, 7 (2013), 517–31 provides a thorough overview of existing research on 'the Moot'. See also Jonas Kurlberg, 'The Moot, the End of Civilisation and the Re-Birth of Christendom', in Erik Tønning, Matthew Feldman and David Addyman (eds.), *Modernism, Christianity and Apocalypse* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp. 222–35.
- 93 Robbins, 'Christian Civilisation', esp. pp. 206–9; Stephen G. Parker, 'Reinvigorating Christian Britain: The Spiritual Issues of the War, National Identity, and the Hope of Religious Education', in Parker and Lawson, *God and War*, pp. 61–79 (p. 67).
- 94 Tom Steele and Richard Kenneth Taylor, 'Oldham's Moot (1938–1947), the Universities and the Adult Citizen', *History of Education*, 39 (2010), 183–97.
- 95 Grimley, 'Civil Society and the Clerisy'; Phil Mullins and Struan Jacobs, 'T. S. Eliot's Idea of the Clerisy, and Its Discussion by Karl Mannheim and Michael Polanyi in the Context of J. H. Oldham's Moot', *Journal of Classical Sociology*, 6 (2006), 147–76.
- 96 On Oldham: Keith Clements, *Faith on the Frontier: A Life of J. H. Oldham* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1999). On Eliot, e.g.: Roger Kojecky, *T. S. Eliot's Social Criticism* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971); Collini, *Absent Minds*, pp. 316–22; Barry Spurr, 'Anglo-Catholic in Religion': *T. S. Eliot and Christianity* (Cambridge: Lutterworth Press, 2010), esp. pp. 190–1; Christopher McVey, 'Backgrounds to *The Idea of a Christian Society*: Charles Maurras, Christopher Dawson and Jacques Maritain', in Benjamin G. Lockerd (ed.), *T. S. Eliot and Christian Tradition* (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2014), pp. 179–93. On Baillie: Keith Clements, 'John Baillie and "the Moot"', in David Fergusson (ed.), *Christ, Church and Society: Essays on John Baillie and Donald Baillie* (London: T. & T. Clark, 1993), pp. 199–219; Andrew R. Morton, ed., *God's Will in a Time of Crisis: A Colloquium Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the Baillie Commission* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1994). On Mannheim: Wolf Lepenies, *Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 329–33; David Kettler and Volker Meja, *Karl Mannheim and the Crisis of Liberalism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995). On Murry: Frank Alfred Lea, *The Life of John Middleton Murry* (London: Methuen, 1959).
- 97 Collini, for example, gives the impression that Eliot's views were representative of the Moot. The elitist notion of 'cultural leadership' did shape the group's thought; however, it also stressed local activity and public dialogue. Collini, *Absent Minds*, pp. 316–22. Spurr doubts that Eliot valued his participation with the group at all; Spurr, 'Anglo Catholic in Religion', pp. 188–93. I address this issue in Chapter 4.

- 98 Jurjen A. Zeilstra, *European Unity in Ecumenical Thinking 1937–1948* (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1995); Coupland, *Britannia, Europa and Christendom*.
- 99 Gorry, *Cold War Christians*.
- 100 CNL 30L, 22 May 1940, p. 3, citing Luke 22:53. See also John Painter, *1, 2 and 3 John* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2002), pp. 382–3.
- 101 Martin Conway, ‘The Rise and Fall of Western Europe’s Democratic Age, 1945–1973’, *Contemporary European History*, 13:1 (2004), 67–88; Müller, *Contesting Democracy*; Duncan Bell, ‘What Is Liberalism?’, *Political Theory*, 42:6 (2014), 682–715; Moyn, *Christian Human Rights*.
- 102 Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Roger Griffin, ‘The Legitimizing Role of Palingenetic Myth in Ideocracies’, in Uwe Backes and Steffen Kailitz (eds.), *Ideokratien im Vergleich: Legitimation – Kooptation – Repression* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), pp. 279–95.
- 103 Müller, *Contesting Democracy*.