Introduction

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Introduction

Since 2001, the world has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of counterterrorism activity, effectively transforming what was once largely a domestic policy issue into one of vast international significance.[1] The September 11th attacks on New York and Washington marked an inflection point in history in many ways, but perhaps their greatest impact was in the practice of counterterrorism. While nearly all governments had acknowledged the reality of terrorist violence and had institutions and laws in place to punish its perpetrators, counterterrorism was considered a residual issue for many governments in the pre-September 11th era, rarely surfacing in public consciousness except in moments of profound national crisis. The US declaration of a 'war on terror' in 2001 changed all of this. It placed counterterrorism as the central priority on the agendas of governments, international organizations and even some businesses and civil society actors. In practice, this meant different things to different actors. For many states, it was immediately obvious that the scope, pace and intensity of the counterterrorism response would dramatically change.[2] But it was also obvious that adopting a reactive approach or primarily relying on law enforcement to handle terrorist threats would no longer be sufficient. A counterterrorism response to a global threat like al Qaeda would have to transcend borders and go beyond the narrow limits that a purely law-enforcement approach implied. In essence, counterterrorism

would have to be effectively globalized to be successful in the post-September 11th era.

This globalization of counterterrorism could be seen first in the demands that the United States made of its allies. As part of its efforts to build a coalition against al Qaeda, the US insisted on international cooperation in information gathering, transfer, extradition and the prosecution of terrorist suspects, and even collusion in controversial policies such as extraordinary rendition and torture.[3] Governments that had previously devoted relatively little attention to counterterrorism found that they needed new legislation and coordinating offices to satisfy the demands of the US for counterterrorism cooperation. With American assistance, many governments rapidly expanded their police and internal security forces and boosted the capacity of their intelligence services to monitor domestic and foreign threats. A number of governments also produced new national legislation which specified substantial criminal penalties for aiding and assisting terrorist activity. Counterterrorism – long a province of law enforcement and intelligence services – became militarized, with some governments folding their long-running secessionist conflicts into the fight against terrorism to draw more American aid.[4] At the international level, the United Nations and leading regional organizations like the European Union developed new task forces and coordinating bodies to harmonize cooperation around counterterrorism issues.[5]

More than fifteen years later, these changes have permanently altered the political landscape. Despite turnover in US administrations and the gradual abandonment of the 'war on terror' language, counterterrorism remains at the centre of the global agenda, with states continuing to develop new policies to come to grips with the threat posed by al Qaeda and its successor, the Islamic State. By most measures, terrorism has not faded as a threat, but rather has become more amorphous, with Islamic State cells waging attacks on civilians in urban areas; 'terror wars' emerging in Syria and elsewhere; and rising ethnic and nationalist extremism in the US, Europe and elsewhere.[6] The processes through which counterterrorism became globalized are now almost complete; many European governments have drifted closer to a paramilitary response to al Qaeda's and the Islamic State's activities, which would have been unthinkable with previous nationalist–separatist terrorist threats. Counterterrorism has also been transformed by technological change, specifically the ability of police and other law-enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance of phone, Internet and other forms of communication. The revelations of former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden show the extent to which counterterrorism has fostered the growth of a deep surveillance state in the United States and many European countries. This surveillance state has not appeared in exactly the same form in all cases, but

even those without sweeping or intrusive powers of surveillance have begun to experiment with electronic eavesdropping and social media monitoring to anticipate real and potential threats. Neither terrorism nor counterterrorism has the same face that it did in the early years of the war on terror, but the threat itself has not receded in importance at the national and international level.

The globalization of counterterrorism policy illustrates an important point: that many governments have tackled counterterrorism in ways very different to that of the United States, the United Kingdom and other European governments. While much has been made of the differences in the 'culture of counterterrorism' between the US and Europe, a much greater array of differences marks the approaches of the US, UK, Europe and other Western countries from those of governments in the non-Western world.[7] Perhaps the most crucial difference concerns the conceptualization of terrorism as a threat. It is well known that terrorism lacks a single agreed-upon definition, and that the academic literature boasts hundreds of different definitions proposed by scholars and governments.[8] Even within the US Government, the various bureaucratic agencies have presented varying definitions of terrorism. After the September 11th attacks, the administration of George W. Bush set aside this conceptual complexity and presented terrorism as something incorrigible, exceptional and fundamentally driven by the cultural and religious antipathies of Islamist groups like al Qaeda to American values. In other words, it presented the problem of terrorism as an intolerable ideological threat, akin to the threat that global communism posed during the Cold War.[9] While the Obama administration attempted to reframe the debate over terrorism by focusing on specific groups (like al Qaeda) rather than Islamist ideology per se, this framing of terrorism as a global threat with an ideological dimension remains a key element of American thinking. It has recently resurfaced with calls by President Donald J. Trump to condemn 'radical Islamic terrorism' and to pursue Islamist terrorists until they and the ideology itself are destroyed.

What many American policymakers failed to notice was how culturally distinct this particular framing of the threat of terrorism was. It is part of the American way of war to cast conflicts in Manichean ideological terms, to assume conspiracies to destroy the American way of life and to justify extreme measures on that basis.[10] But that was not how much of the rest of the world thought about counterterrorism. Throughout the George W. Bush administration (2001–8), a number of European governments objected to the American interpretation of terrorism, highlighting how their domestic experience of terrorism as a tactic deployed by groups on the margins of society did not correspond with the American view of terrorism as something which threatens the fabric of civilization itself. For many European states, terrorism was a

tactical, rather than ideological, threat. This explains some of the political divisions around counterterrorism between the US and Europe that emerged during the debate over the Iraq war. Yet, gradually, some elements of convergence between US and European counterterrorism policy began to appear as bargaining over discrete issues (such as transferring data and extraditing suspects) proceeded over time. By the point that Barack Obama had assumed the presidency in 2009, the US and many European countries had ironed out many of the differences in their respective counterterrorism approaches, thus providing a rough foundation for what might be considered a Western approach to counterterrorism. Although there has been a deterioration in relations between the US and European countries since the election of Donald J. Trump, this foundation has survived and been adapted to a world where nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment is on the rise across the Western world.

But this was not the case for the rest of the world. Even more so than European states, many non-Western states rejected the American portrayal of terrorism as an incorrigible ideology. Some governments in the Middle East and North Africa saw an implied Islamophobia in that American portrayal of the 'evil ideology' of terrorism. Instead, they argued that the Salafi interpretation to Islam underlying al Qaeda's ideology should not be confused with the diversity of thought and practice of millions of Muslims worldwide. Even more, this conceptualization of an 'ideology' of terrorism was foreign to their experience of terrorism. For some governments, al Qaeda's style of spectacular terrorism posed a lesser threat to the security of their populations than insurgent or ethno-nationalist groups that regularly used violence against their populations. Only a relatively small percentage of terrorist groups worldwide embrace the Salafi ideology that motivated al Qaeda and alarmed American officials. Governments like India and Colombia had been dealing with their own violent insurgencies for decades, and saw terrorism as a small but routine part of these long-running conflicts. The death tolls that they faced were from traditional insurgent attacks rather than the spectacular terrorist violence that al Qaeda specialized in. Others in Africa and Asia found the American emphasis on terrorism as a threat to be misplaced relative to other threats they faced from disease, poverty and other ills. Finally, some non-Western governments were also sceptical about the American contention that terrorists are actors with whom no negotiation is possible. This was particularly the case among governments composed of parties once described as terrorists during decolonization struggles, such as the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria. These bitter memories led some leaders to point out that the definition of who was a 'terrorist' was notoriously changeable as the political winds blow.

Although it took some time for the US to acknowledge this fact, the globalization of counterterrorism yielded a harsh lesson: that there was no single conceptualization of terrorism as a threat that would motivate the world to action, but rather a multiplicity of conceptions of terrorism rooted in the historical, political and cultural experiences of those in power. These different conceptualizations of terrorism have shaped how states respond to the emergence of the 'war on terror' across the non-Western world. For example, some governments, like Brazil and South Africa, have underplayed the threat posed by terrorism and denied some US demands or 'slow rolled' them in order to extract more concessions. Others, like China, have reacted opportunistically, taking the war on terror as a chance to enact repressive legislation that restricts the civil liberties of citizens or boosts the capacity of the intelligence and security services. Still others, like Egypt, have linked their own long-running secessionist conflicts to the global struggle against terrorism and used the cover of 'fighting terrorism' to legitimize a series of increasingly repressive measures to destroy their opponents. Finally, some states like Pakistan have used the priority placed by the United States on counterterrorism to their own advantage by exploiting American fears to gain additional aid and military resources. Rather than simply accepting the conceptualization and counterterrorism approach favoured by the United States and its allies, non-Western governments have naturally recast the threat to their own ends. In doing so, many non-Western governments have refused to accept the priority accorded to counterterrorism and denied that states like the US should be able to act across borders without sanction by the United Nations. Some powerful non-Western governments like China and Japan have struggled to find a middle path between respecting other important political and cultural norms (such as non-intervention) with the need to respond to the threat posed by terrorism.[11] As the US discovered when it attempted to strike counterterrorism partnerships with non-Western societies, many governments advance very different visions of counterterrorism practice from what the United States has in mind.

Gaps in the literature

Despite this diversity in conceptualization and responses to terrorism, the academic literature on counterterrorism has been remarkably silent on the response of non-Western governments to the threat of terrorism. The vast majority of empirical studies of counterterrorism have focused on countries in the Western world, such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy.[12] To a lesser degree, there is also case study literature on

countries with long-standing terrorism problems, such as Ireland, Israel and Sri Lanka. What literature exists on counterterrorism in Asia, Africa, South Africa and the Middle East consists largely of studies of regions, with few detailed country case studies available. Many of the available country case studies are conducted through a specific Western lens, evaluating the response of non-Western governments in complying with the demands and priorities of the United States or other Western governments. The typical identifying feature of these studies is that they offer some concluding observations for how such countries may adjust to fight the 'war on terror' in the way that the United States prefers. Only a small number of edited volumes in English have included non-Western cases, generally either to contrast them with predominant Western approaches or to criticize them from the vantage point of the security priorities of Western states.[13]

To some extent, this gap in coverage is due to data availability and poor coverage of global counterterrorism threats in English-language newspapers. As a general matter, terrorism has been under-reported in much of the non-Western and developing world. For example, many of the most important cross-national data sets on terrorism (such as the *Global Terrorism Database*, managed by the University of Maryland's Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) programme) have problems with under-reporting, especially in the developing world during the pre-2001 era.[14] Also, attacks outside the Western world are less likely to attract the label 'terrorism' and instead be called acts of insurgency or criminality. This introduces an inevitable bias into much of the terrorism and counterterrorism literature, and makes researchers more inclined to use data-rich Western cases (for example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque separatist group ETA in Spain) than under-reported non-Western cases. The problem of under-reporting terrorist threats and counterterrorism responses in the non-Western world may be more severe with autocracies, which tend to suppress or fail to record terrorist events and to cloak many of their counterterrorism policies in secrecy.[15] This problem is remarkably persistent despite the vast increase in the number of counterterrorism studies since the September 11th attacks.[16] Even after the arrival of the Internet and automatic translation services made access to information from non-English sources easier, these cases remain systematically understudied in the counterterrorism literature.

Another reason why this gap in the literature persists is that writing about counterterrorism can be dangerous. While democratic societies generally allow free inquiry into counterterrorism policies, some authoritarian governments often do not, especially when writing about terrorism touches on sensitive ethnic, nationalist or religious fault lines. A critique of counterterrorism policy, in some authoritarian countries, is effectively a critique of the military and

intelligence establishment, which may be the most powerful actor in that society. In a few cases, scholars have been subject to censorship or more severe forms of pressure for criticizing the government's response to terrorism; in others, scholars have engaged in a form of self-censorship and do not write about counterterrorism for fear of what may follow. In other cases, there is a strong personal and professional incentive not to be critical of counterterrorism policies or to raise issues about severe or repressive counterterrorism responses in countries where scholars will continually need to seek a visa. This authoritarian censoring of counterterrorism literature is obviously not uniformly present across the non-Western world – for example, academics in liberal democracies like India, Brazil and South Africa would not find writing about terrorism dangerous – but in authoritarian or illiberal democracies among the non-Western states the risks may be considerably higher.[17]

What affects counterterrorism policies?

The purpose of this volume is to offer the first comprehensive account of the varied counterterrorism policies that exist across the non-Western world. As such, it provides a series of structured case studies on how different governments understood and responded to the threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 world. The theoretical argument of this volume is simply that counterterrorism responses are, to greater and lesser degrees, mediated and influenced by four factors: (1) historical experience of war, occupation and colonialism; (2) local politics and the distribution of power among domestic stakeholders; (3) internal religious divisions or debates among key sectarian communities; and (4) cultural traditions and experience. This book sees each of these factors as an input into counterterrorism policy and hypothesizes that the response offered by each government will be consistent with and reflective of its country's historical, political, religious and cultural traditions. In other words, these contextual factors will shape the contours of the counterterrorism policy and affect the discourse surrounding it in meaningful, empirically measurable ways.

It is important to stress what is, and is not, argued here. Each of these factors is an input into counterterrorism policy, but not necessarily a determinative one. This book does not hold that counterterrorism policies are wholly socially constructed, or that they are wholly derivative of one or more of these factors. In some cases, the perception of an internal or external threat from a terrorist organization or pressure from other states (like the United States) may be a bigger factor in shaping policy choices than any domestic factor. In other cases, contextual, case-specific factors will act like a thin filter, shaping

how certain types of counterterrorism policies are implemented or presented, but not fundamentally altering the decisions themselves. The bottom line is that the causal weight of these factors will vary across cases. The claim here is relatively modest: either as drivers of policy or as filters for expressing policy choice, these factors can play an important role in explaining non-Western responses to terrorism.

It is also important to stress that the influence of historical, political, religious and cultural factors will be present in different ways across different cases. This volume does not claim that counterterrorism policy is wholly socially constructed or that factors like history and culture are always determinative of the way that counterterrorism policies are conducted in the non-Western world (or the Western world, for that matter). Such an argument would be reductionist and would not do justice to the complex intentions that lay behind most governments' counterterrorism policies. This volume also does not suggest that non-Western states are somehow different in the way that these factors matter, or that historical, political, religious and cultural factors are irrelevant in Western cases. No one could sensibly look at America's response to terrorism without seeing an obvious connection to its own crusading historical mission and cultural 'way of war'.[18] All states construct their counterterrorism approaches based on their own distinct historical, political, cultural and religious foundations. The issue here is merely one of coverage: that, by comparison, the drivers behind non-Western approaches to terrorism have been less studied than Western cases.

Identifying and analysing these factors has a clear policy impact because the perception of the threat shapes the government's response to it. How policymakers see and respond to the threat of terrorism is based on their society's experience of it and these historical, political, cultural and religious drivers. Requests for bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism cooperation will also be filtered through and interpreted on the basis of these drivers. Understanding why some societies prioritize terrorism in different ways, and offer varying levels of cooperation on areas of joint concern, requires understanding how the problem looks from 'inside' the society. Each case study is designed to provide contextual detail, as well as a view from 'inside' the society, for the benefit of those who are not experts of that particular case. The case studies will tie together an analysis of the perception of the threat of terrorism and the counterterrorism response in each country to provide a holistic account of how that society understands terrorism as a social and political problem. Together, the diverse practices showcased in the case studies are designed to challenge the unspoken assumption that the Western practices of counterterrorism are universal by showing how differently non-Western societies have conceptualized, recast and responded to the terrorist threat.

Finally, it is important to stress that this account of the role of culture as an input into counterterrorism is not an orientalist one. As Edward Said pointed out, many representations of the non-Western world are 'othered' – that is, defined by their opposition to the Western world and assumed in a variety of ways to be inferior.[19] Although this volume groups a diverse range of countries as 'non-Western' as a shorthand, it makes no such assumptions. A true orientalist account of counterterrorism would assume that the non-Western world would be anti-rational, inflexible and underdeveloped relative to the Western alternatives. A true orientalist approach to counterterrorism would assume that non-Western policymakers are dragging their heels on responding to terrorism because they are irrational, mendacious or sympathetic to the terrorists themselves. There is simply no evidence that any of this is true. The diversity of practice in counterterrorism does not suggest in any way that non-Western governments are being irrational, inflexible or slow. Similarly, close adherence to a US-recommended formula for counterterrorism does not suggest that Western governments are being more rational and effective. The grouping of 'Western' and 'non-Western' is a shorthand for grouping countries based on the degree of their coverage in the existing literature and does not imply a normative judgement about which is better or worse. Moreover, while this volume posits that culture is an input in shaping counterterrorism practices, there is nothing generalizable about the cultural practices of non-Western states that makes counterterrorism any easier or harder there than it is in the United States or Europe.

Defining the non-Western world

Who belongs in the non-Western world? The boundaries of the 'non-Western' world are obviously not set in stone. To some extent, it is defined by its geographical opposite, the Western world, which is conventionally assumed to include North America and Europe. In this volume, the non-Western world is defined as every region outside those two distinct continents. Given this broad definition of 'non-Western', it is obvious that the non-Western world is not united by any single cultural heritage. The degree of diversity in cultural and political practices across the regions of the non-Western world is immense and no conclusions can be drawn about the counterterrorism practices of the non-Western world as a single political unit. This volume aims to demonstrate the diversity of counterterrorism practices across the non-Western world, not to flatten them down into some caricature of 'non-Western' approaches to terrorism. The non-Western world is also not hermetically sealed from

influences of the Western world; each government in the non-Western world has had to wrestle with an array of political, religious and cultural influences from the West and specific demands from the US and others which have had a decisive impact on its society and government. This was especially true during the colonial era, where European governments often directly occupied non-Western societies and in some cases dramatically reordered their politics and society. Especially in these cases, the tension between the Western and non-Western worlds is inextricably a part of the latter's politics and would naturally bleed over into discussions over their counterterrorism policies. In the end, there is no inevitable 'clash of cultures' between Western and non-Western approaches to counterterrorism; upon closer inspection, the practices of some non-Western governments are deeply influenced by, or even emulative of, Western practice.

Given this broad definition of non-Western world, there is inevitably a degree of subjective judgement in the definitions of regions and case selection. This volume gathers a number of cases and groups them under broadly defined regions. For example, it defines the Middle East and North Africa as a single region and Latin and South America as a single region despite the cultural and political differences among the countries there. Some regions – for example, South Asia – group together two countries (India and Pakistan) with politically salient religious and cultural differences. Other regions, such as Latin and South America, are included even though they could arguably be considered part of the Western world. The book is ordered into regions, but this should not be as read as saying that counterterrorism practices are uniform, or even much alike, within regions. For example, only Russia is included here under the region for Russia and Central Asia, but Central Asian states, long dominated by Russia and marked by a complex relationship with the Government of Russia, would likely deny that their counterterrorism policies are wholly derived from Russian practice.

For space considerations, it was not possible to include an equal number of cases from every region of the world. Choices had to be made about what countries to include as representative of a region. In general, this volume focuses on countries with a significant terrorism problem, but obviously it was not possible to include every case where terrorism had become a serious problem. For example, there is no chapter on Peru, which dealt with terrorism from the Shining Path in the 1970s and 1980s, or South Korea, which has experienced terrorism from North Korea, such as the 1987 bombing of Korean Air Flight 858. Some regions are more comprehensively covered than others. For example, only two South American cases (Brazil and Colombia) are included in the Latin and South America section. Only Russia is covered in the section which ideally should cover Russia and Central Asia. In the Middle East and

North Africa, countries in the midst of armed conflicts – Syria, Iraq and Libya – were excluded because their political situation was too fluid to allow for a separate analysis of how they conceived of counterterrorism apart from the wars that they currently face. In other regions, more prosaic reasons governed why some cases were included. For example, some case selection was limited due to problems finding experts and to space considerations for a volume aiming for a global scope.

It was also necessary to make judgements about the borderline cases for inclusion. Some decisions to include or exclude were made on the basis of the degree of academic and journalistic coverage that the case received. For example, one could arguably locate Israel in the Western world due to the degree of European influence in its founding and elements of its political, religious and cultural heritage, or in the Middle East due to its geographic location. Ultimately, Israel was excluded from the volume because its counterterrorism policies have been extensively covered in the academic literature elsewhere.[20] Similarly, Sri Lanka's long struggle against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been covered extensively elsewhere and a chapter on this case is not included here. By contrast, Russia, also arguably culturally Western and part of Europe, was included because its counterterrorism policies have received less coverage in the English-language academic literature but play an important role in its relationships with the United States, the European Union and its neighbours in Central Asia. On balance, case selection was done with an eye towards covering understudied cases while whenever possible being broadly representative of regions, but this inevitably involved judgement calls and unfortunate omissions.

Key questions

The case studies in this volume are designed to address (1) how terrorism is conceptualized in each society; (2) how case-specific historical, political, cultural and religious factors shape that conceptualization; and, finally, (3) how that conceptualization affects the government's response to terrorism. To ensure comparability, each case study addresses some or all of the following questions:

- How is terrorism understood within that society?
- How does that conceptualization relate to those advanced by the US, UK and other European societies?
- What are seen as the chief security threats facing that society? What priority is accorded to terrorism relative to other security threats?

- What are the sources – historical, political, cultural and religious – that affect how terrorism is viewed and responded to within that society?
- How do these sources affect how the threat of terrorism is conveyed publicly to domestic audiences? How does this contrast with how the threat is presented or conveyed in international fora?
- How do norms or discursive practices within that country shape its conceptualization and practice of counterterrorism?
- How does this conceptualization shape the practice of counterterrorism in that case? How is this manifested in the specific policies of the government with respect to the internal security services, police, intelligence apparatus and legal framework in which terrorism is prosecuted?
- In what ways, if any, do the counterterrorism policies and practices in that society significantly differ from those advanced by the US, UK and other European governments? Has the government actively opposed or criticized the US approach to counterterrorism?
- How has the US-led campaign against terrorist organizations been addressed within that society? Has this campaign forced the government to recast or reformulate its counterterrorism policies, or to change its approach to existing military campaigns against secessionist movements? More broadly, what has been the consequence of this change?
- How has the experience of counterterrorism practice over the last ten years shaped and influenced the conceptualization of terrorism within that society today?

The authors were asked to address the most relevant of these questions with respect to their own case studies. As a result, the case studies will vary considerably in their emphasis and scope. Some of the chapters focus more on the threat of terrorism and less on the response, while others have the opposite emphasis. This is due to the fact that the threat and the response to it are obviously interdependent and cannot be considered in isolation.

Finally, there has been no attempt to impose a single theoretical or empirical viewpoint on the authors. Any such effort would be contrary to the purpose of this volume, which is to illustrate the diversity of approaches in conceptions of and responses to terrorism among non-Western states. The empirical strategies of the chapters also vary. Some case studies present data on incidents of terrorism, while others are less focused on the events than on the discursive construction of the threat. Some chapters focus on the legal definition of and response to terrorism, while others see the problem as political or religious in nature. The volume is deliberately interdisciplinary, with some chapters adopting theoretical approaches common in the study of

terrorism, while others draw inspiration from other fields, such as history, sociology and criminology.

Summary

Each of the case studies of counterterrorism policies presented here casts a new light on the diversity of the conceptualizations of terrorism and shows how these conceptualizations can feed into different policy responses. In her chapter on Russia, Ekaterina Stepanova acknowledges the distinct inputs to the Russian perspective on terrorism, noting that it is based on a contextual reading of the threat and 'the general functionality of the state; type of political and governance system; and degree of social, ethnic and other diversity' (see p. 24). As a country with a hybrid identity, partially tied to the West but also separated from it in many ways, Russia's conception of terrorism has gradually expanded. While it has traditionally been focused on terrorist threats emerging from the wars in the North Caucasus, Russia today sees serious threats from Salafi Islamists and ISIS-inspired groups, as well as right-wing extremists. Accordingly, Russia's counterterrorism approach has evolved from a short-term, reactive approach based on collective punishment to a forward-leaning combination of what Stepanova describes as 'smarter suppression'– that is, targeted strikes to kill enemy operatives – and efforts to divide and rule and buy off local insurgent forces. One crucial conceptual distinction that emerges from this analysis is between counterterrorism (i.e., narrowly construed as the actions taken by the security services to address terrorist threats) and anti-terrorism, which is broader and includes preventive measures taken by the state and civil society organizations to head off terrorist threats. Seen in this light, Russia's strategy of anti-terrorism combines elements of counterinsurgency with a determined effort to contain the problem of Islamist forces and others who might threaten the state. Russia's intervention in Syria in 2015 can indeed be seen as an attempt to sow division in local forces but also contain a growing ISIS-inspired threat which may eventually move to Russian territory.

In some ways, China has some similarities to Russia in its approach, in that its conceptualization of terrorism is drawn heavily from its experience in suppressing the Uyghur independence movement in Xinjiang. But rather than rely heavily on a model of counterterrorism influenced by counterinsurgency practice, China has built a corpus of law designed to identify and criminalize subversive actions which may lead to dissent or terrorism. As Irene Chan has noted in her chapter, this practice has worked in part because the Communist Party of China (CPC) has struck a bargain with the population which offers

security and stability for cooperation on these measures, even if the cost is a more repressive government. This bargain can be seen clearly in China's depiction of terrorism as one of the 'three evil forces', along with separatism and religious extremism, that must be countered by the state.

In Japan, the situation is quite different, but culture continues to play a role and shape the government's counterterrorism policy. As Chiyuki Aoi and Yee-Kuang Heng document, Japan has a long but often unacknowledged experience of terrorism, both domestic and international, which has threatened the harmony and stability of its society. Japan tends to underplay the political rationales of terrorists, treating them as aberrations or circumstantial statements, and therefore denying them their symbolic power. For Japan this is crucial, because refusing to acknowledge them also allows the government and society more generally to deny the existence of social divisions. As the authors argue, Japanese counterterrorism policies are driven by a concern for *meiwaku* – that is, causing trouble for others – which produces some behaviours not seen elsewhere. For example, Japanese Government officials have apologized for the involvement in terrorism by Japanese nationals and have, from time to time, offered themselves in trade for hostages. Unlike those in China, Japan's counterterrorism policies have been informal and rely less on legal measures than on mobilizing the community to head off and redirect potential recruits to terrorist organizations.

In Malaysia, the historical legacy of experience with British colonialism and counterinsurgency in the 1950s has deeply influenced its practice of counterterrorism. This can be seen in the use of pre-emptive legal measures designed to prevent terrorist attacks and rehabilitate those who might be considering them. This allows the law-enforcement authorities to arrest individuals without a warrant, and even to hold them for thirty-eight days until charges can be filed. Malaysia also draws from its history of counterinsurgency to use specialized police units to deal with potential terrorist threats. Conceptually, Malaysia supports moderation in all things – the concept known as *wasatiyyah* – to insist that its citizens balance their commitments to the real world and not err too much on the side of supernatural punishments and rewards. In this way it offers an ideology, as well as a corpus of law and police forces, which is designed to swim against the tide of extremism that so often motivates terrorist organizations. In Indonesia, Evan A. Laksmana and Michael Newell offer a different interpretation of the legacy of colonialism, emphasizing the country's special status as a 'disputed postcolonial state'. They note that Indonesian counterterrorism is deeply tied up with the state's history of dealing with internal security challenges and cannot be separated neatly from that. The New Order regime (1966–98) has produced a central government with a strong authoritarian bent, which sees violent unrest in its periphery as a

serious threat to the legitimacy of its rule. For this reason, Indonesian counterterrorism is intertwined with counterinsurgency, as the government vacillates between repressive (hard) and population-centred (soft) approaches to deal with potential threats.

A similar dynamic exists in the case studies in South Asia. As Rashmi Singh documents, India's long postcolonial experience of terrorism from a wide variety of different ethnic, cultural and religious groups shapes in a fundamental way how the government sees the problem of terrorism. Violent challenges to the state in India 'interact and intersect' with the key markers of identity, such as ethnicity, caste, religion and socio-economic concerns, producing a hybrid threat which combines elements of terrorism and insurgency. In response, the government tries to manipulate some of the violent challengers, while isolating and fighting others at different times. The result is a counterterrorism policy that is at best uneven and contradictory. In Pakistan, the situation is even more complex. As Muhammad Feyyaz discusses, the government's approach towards terrorist groups is particularly ambiguous, as elements within the state's security and intelligence establishment may sustain and protect terrorist groups while destroying others. This is in part due to the legacy of insecurity that emerges from Pakistan's founding as a state – specifically, its fear of India, its fight for Kashmir and the homogenizing tendency of its central government which has produced resentment among ethnic minorities and others along the periphery of the state. These factors, combined with a diffuse security and intelligence establishment and a failure of leadership at points in Pakistan's history, have allowed its problem of domestic terrorist groups to get worse over time.

In Brazil, the situation is quite different. As Jorge M. Lasmar argues, Brazil has a deep problem with political violence – particularly assassinations and other forms of criminal activity – but this is often not seen as 'terrorism' per se. In fact, many Brazilian elites are convinced that the country is not at risk of terrorism because Brazil's foreign policy is pacifist and leans towards not confronting violent non-state actors in its midst. Having successfully insulated the country from the risk of terrorism, the movement towards criminalizing terrorist activities has historically been slow, though recent progress in criminalizing acts in support of terrorism are a sign that things may be changing. Brazil's hesitancy around terrorism is also attributable to the presence of former leftist guerrilla fighters in the government, most of whom are suspicious of the term 'terrorism' and reluctant to get close to the United States. In Colombia, the role of the US also looms large, though for different reasons. Oscar Palma argues that the discourse of terrorism has radically changed over time in Colombia, with terms like 'narcoterrorism' being applied to the activities of different groups of traffickers, guerrillas and paramilitary

organizations over time. In particular, the shift towards describing insurgents as terrorists was part of the post-9/11 approach to terrorism and was particularly influenced by the aid and political support offered by the United States.

In four of the Middle East case studies, the central theme that emerges is that the state itself is a violent actor that often uses repression for its own ends while also negotiating with non-state actors with sporadic violence. For example, as George Joffé notes in Algeria, violent extremism has always been engaged in dialectic with the state itself. Violence is so enmeshed with the nature of state power that it has developed 'the informal status of being the ultimate mechanism of legitimization for the acquisition of material assets and cultural capital' (see p. 274). This is in part derivative from Algeria's painful colonial legacy but also from its long experience in dealing with violent or revolutionary non-state actors on its periphery. In Egypt, Dina Al Raffie notes a similar trend, but argues that the common view of Egypt's counterterrorism approach – that it is uniformly repressive for fear of Islamist groups – simplifies the complex relationship that the government has had with its Islamist challengers. The government selectively punishes some Islamist groups while tolerating others, in part because the bogeyman of an Islamist takeover is useful to the government as a way of retaining and legitimating its own hold on power. Al-Raffie points out that the Egyptian Government also skilfully deploys anti-Semitic conspiracy theories to tarnish jihadist groups and to strengthen its grip on power. This is in defence of what Al Raffie calls Egypt's 'securitocracy', a constellation of elites from the intelligence, military and security agencies that exercise disproportionate control over the state's policies. Similarly, as Bashir Saade shows, in the case of Lebanon, violence is embedded within the nature of the state's politics, with some groups punished for it and others like Hizbullah given semi-official status due to their opposition to Israel. As he demonstrates, Lebanon's approach to counterterrorism cannot be understood outside of the regional dynamics, specifically the degree to which actors like Syria endorse and support violent politics. Even Hizbullah offers its own interpretation of terrorism within Lebanese politics. In Iran, Ali M. Ansari argues that the government has deployed terror against the population, including torture and political assassinations, but has remained uneasy with the 'tidy distinctions' that the West imposes with its definition of the concept. The Iranian Government denies the label of 'terrorism' to its own violent actions and those of its proxies, while eagerly casting US actions in the Middle East as terrorism in their own right.

By contrast, in his case study, Roel Meijer points out that the kingdom of Saudi Arabia defines terrorism in Islamic terms as the 'corruption of the earth', as essentially a personal deviation from good religious behaviour rather than flowing from political, social or economic conditions. In the Saudi conception of terrorism, the behaviour flows from personal ignorance, an imbalance of

the passions, deviation from doctrine and finally political extremism. The Saudi conception of terrorism assumes that Wahhabi Islam and terrorism are mutually exclusive and therefore attacks are the result of a 'miscreant minority'. It is hardly surprising that Saudi Arabia conceives of extremism and deviation from accepted religious practice in individual and personal terms, apart from the government or the wider social and political life of the state. Its focus is then naturally on re-education and rehabilitation of terrorists rather than negotiating and repressing violent non-state actors, as many other governments in the region do.

The final four studies, on African countries, show that even when governments adopt Western conceptions of terrorism this does not lead to a coherent counterterrorism policy. In the Kenya case study, Jeremy Prestholdt points out that the response to terrorism from al Shabaab and other actors has reflected and aggravated communal divisions and tensions within Kenyan society. As a result of adhering close to US positions, Kenya now faces two counterterrorism fronts: one within its own borders and another across the border with Somalia. Similarly, in Nigeria, terrorism from Boko Haram is only one part of the violent conflicts that have divided and wracked the state and undermined its political and economic development. Yet, as Jennifer Giroux and Michael Nwankpa show, it has enabled the Nigerian Government to engage in ever-more repressive measures under the guise of counterterrorism, often with the support of the United States and other powerful actors. In the Uganda case study, Emma Leonard Boyle shows how the Government of Yoweri Museveni skilfully exploited an alliance with the United States for counterterrorism aid as a way of boosting his regional ambitions. While Uganda has always struggled with terrorism, especially from groups like the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), it remains unclear whether the threat to Uganda will diminish as a result of his aggressive actions and courting of the West. In contrast, in South Africa, Hussein Solomon points out that the government has been in deep denial about the scale of the threat that it faces from terrorism, believing, as Brazil does, that its politically correct foreign policy would immunize it against more serious threats. This has clearly not been the case, and groups like Hizbullah and al Qaeda have been able to exploit South Africa as neutral ground for planning attacks. The result of this denial has been policy incoherence between the various government agencies responsible for dealing with the threat.

Conclusion

Together, these chapters show that non-Western accounts of terrorism are diverse and hardly monolithic. This volume uncovers no single 'non-Western'

response to terrorism. Rather, it shows the true diversity in the conceptions and responses to terrorism that have become evident since the 'war on terror' began. Seen together, the case studies that follow present an alternative perspective to the rigid, ideological depiction of the threat of terrorism typically offered by the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western states. They also show that the concept of terrorism and the ensuing counterterrorism response are both heavily contested across the non-Western world. While the concept of terrorism may have first arisen in the West, these case studies show that it has been translated and reshaped in different ways based on the historical, political, cultural and religious conditions of other societies. Counterterrorism may have been globalized, but it has not arrived in every society in the same guise or with the same assumptions. Understanding this crucial fact, and developing a sensitivity to how other states may 'see' terrorism, is crucial to developing the kind of robust international cooperation needed to address this growing threat.

Notes

1 This statement means something very different from the conventional notion that a backlash against globalization has spread terrorism and requires a new kind of response. This argument is best expressed by Benjamin Barber, 'Jihad vs. McWorld,' *Atlantic*, March 1992, available at: www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1992/03/jihad-vs-mcworld/303882/ (accessed 7 June 2018); Audrey Kurth Cronin, 'Behind the curve: Globalization and international terrorism,' *International Security* 27:3 (2002–3): 30–58; and Fathali Moghaddem, *How Globalization Spurs Terrorism: The Lopsided Benefits of 'One World' and How That Fuels Violence* (London: Praeger, 2008).

2 On counterterrorism generally, see Alex P. Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (London: Routledge, 2013); Ronald Crelinsten, *Counterterrorism* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009); and Daniel Byman, *The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad* (New York: Wiley, 2007).

3 Jane Mayer, *The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals* (New York: Anchor, 2009). On managing US demands, see Michael J. Boyle, 'The war on terror in American grand strategy,' *International Affairs* 84:2 (2008): 191–209.

4 On the militarization of counterterrorism, see Michael J. Boyle, 'Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?' *International Affairs* 86:2 (2010): 333–53.

5 See Jane Boulden and Thomas Weiss, *Terrorism and the UN: Before and after September 11th* (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2004); Daniel Keohane, 'The absent friend: EU foreign policy and counterterrorism,' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46:1 (2008): 126–46; Javier Argomaniz, 'Post 9/11 institutionalization of European Union counterterrorism: Emergence, acceleration and inertia,' *European Security* 18:2 (2009): 151–72.

6 The term 'terror war' comes from Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism vs. Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
7 See Wyn Rees and Richard J. Aldrich, 'Contending cultures of counterterrorism: Transatlantic divergence or convergence?' *International Affairs* 81:5 (2005): 905–23, and Jon Stevenson, 'How Europe and America defend themselves,' *Foreign Affairs* 82:2 (2003): 75–90.
8 See particularly Schmid, *Handbook of Terrorism Research*.
9 See particularly Boyle, 'War on Terror.'
10 See particularly Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1977); Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation: America's Foreign Policy from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage, 2007); William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009); Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (New York: Vintage, 2008).
11 This is nicely summarized in Asia in Jonathan T. Chow, 'ASEAN counterterrorism cooperation since 9/11,' *Asian Survey* 45:2 (2005): 302–21.
12 See particularly Alex P. Schmid and Ronald Crelinsen, *Western Responses to Terrorism* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), and Yonah Alexander, *Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006).
13 For an example, see Alexander, *Counterterrorism Strategies*.
14 Michael Jensen, 'Discussion point: The benefits and drawbacks of methodological advancements in data collection and coding: Insights from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD),' GTD website, 25 November 2013, available at: www.start.umd.edu/news/discussion-point-benefits-and-drawbacks-methodological-advancements-data-collection-and-coding (accessed 6 March 2017).
15 See Konstantinos Drakos and Andreas Gofas, 'The devil you know but are afraid to face: Underreporting bias and its distorting effect on the study of terrorism,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50:5 (2006): 714–35; Erica Chenoweth, 'Terrorism and democracy,' *Annual Review of Political Science* 16 (2013): 355–78.
16 On this, see Schmid, *Handbook of Terrorism Research*.
17 One author pulled out of this project under threat of violence. Another pulled out due to a fear of being denied a visa for future research.
18 On America's way of war, see Weigley, *American Way of War*.
19 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979).
20 See particularly Daniel Byman, *A High Price: The Triumph and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).