Introduction

On 19 October 1918, French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau visited Lille and its environs. The capital of the department of the Nord and its sister towns Roubaix and Tourcoing had been liberated by the British army two days previously, after four years of German occupation. In Tourcoing, Clemenceau addressed the local population and remarked:

> Nothing will be forgotten.
>
> Now, all of you, be with France […] which has made you into veritable combatants, whilst you were under the German boot.
>
> You have led the battle no less than the soldiers themselves have done. You have set a good example, and when one day the history of this war is written, it would be incomplete if it did not mention with honour the resistance of the great towns of Northern France, like Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing.[1]

This promise of remembrance and an official narrative of resistance under occupation will sound familiar to historians of France in the Second World War. Indeed, the words 'resistance' and 'occupation' almost always evoke this latter conflict, especially among the French. Since the 1970s, the history of this dominant experience of occupation has shifted from a particular focus on resistance to attempts to document and explain the full spectrum of French behaviours and ideologies, notably collaboration, complicity in the Holocaust, and 'accommodation'.[2] This book is similarly concerned with providing an insight into different forms of French conduct under occupation. It seeks to consider the complex reality of occupied life in the Nord in 1914–18, but especially the way in which the occupied *Nordistes* (henceforth referred to as *occupés*) perceived and understood their experience. The aim is to enrich our understanding of an often-neglected aspect of the history of France

and of the First World War by examining the beliefs and behaviours of those forced to respond to the daily presence of the national enemy. To better understand the purpose of this book, it is necessary to return to the opening salvo of the Prime Minister's October 1918 proclamation.

'Nothing will be forgotten'

Clemenceau's statement proved false. The occupation of northern France in the First World War faded rapidly from public-collective and historical memory, in France and beyond. Indeed, the Prime Minister's conflation of the experience of the occupied population with that of French soldiers in part reflected one logic behind this forgetting. French memory of the First World War was characterised by the primacy of the soldiers' experience: combatants were seen as victims of violence, whereas the violence suffered by unarmed civilian populations was ignored.[3] As Annette Becker argued, the memory of the combatants' suffering was 'hypertrophied', whereas a 'hyperamnesia' surrounded the civilian experience, especially that of the occupied populations.[4] Indeed, most war monuments constructed in the occupied region in the interwar period were similar to *monuments aux morts*. For Becker, these evoked the 'normality of suffering' and communicated the message that the inhabitants of the occupied territory had suffered and died for the *Patrie*, just like all other French people.[5] This suffering was thus commemorated, as elsewhere, by honouring military sacrifices. By flattening differences in this way, the unique experience of occupation – a problematic reminder of the inability of France and its Allies to liberate occupied territory for four years – was slotted into and overshadowed by the wider national narrative of the conflict. This is the prevailing explanation of this 'forgetfulness', although on the local scale the reality was more complicated, as will be demonstrated. Nevertheless, the subsequent experience of occupation of the Second World War, and its dominance in French memory since, further reduced the flickering, fading memory of the occupation of 1914–18 to the weakest embers.

History books tell a similar story. This is not the place for an in-depth account of the historiography of the occupation, which can be found elsewhere;[6] however, a brief explanation helps to underline this book's contribution to the evolving literature. Although numerous local histories of the occupation of northern France were published in the interwar period, many were not entirely scholarly,[7] and the topic was largely ignored for decades after 1945. Just as most monuments evoked

the suffering of soldiers, most histories of the First World War tended to focus on military history until the shift to social history from the 1960s. This was followed by an emphasis on cultural history from the 1980s, seen as part of a 'memory boom' surrounding the First World War, which was particularly interested in the forgotten experience of civilians.[8] This development included the revival of historical interest in the occupation of 1914–18, spearheaded by French historians since the 1990s.[9] Yet the topic still remains relatively marginalised, especially in the anglophone world, where rigorous studies devoted entirely to this experience are rare.[10] This book seeks not only to fill this gap but also to present a novel take on the occupation. The result is a localised study offering new conceptual and analytical categories with potentially wider applications.

From 'war cultures' to the 'culture of the occupied'

Of particular importance to this approach is a historiographical notion prevalent among French historians of the First World War associated with the *Historial de la Grande Guerre* in Péronne – the idea of 'war culture(s)', first proposed in the singular by Annette Becker and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau.[11] It describes the system of representations of the conflict forged by contemporaries, a 'broad-based system through which belligerent populations made sense of the war and persuaded themselves to continue fighting it'.[12] This notion eventually became linked to discussions of brutalisation, violence and, above all, consent. The argument is that the understanding and representations at the heart of war cultures helped belligerent populations, especially the French, endure combat and other wartime suffering.

This has proved divisive in France, with scholars attached to the Collectif de Recherche International et de Débat sur la Guerre de 1914–1918 (CRID) vehemently opposing the scholarly use and indeed historical existence of a 'war culture', questioning the entire cultural approach and often calling for a social or sociological methodology. They are especially critical of the attendant ideas of brutalisation and consent, and tend to focus on various forms of constraint to explain French endurance. Admittedly, there is more to the disagreements than a simple consent–constraint dichotomy.[13] The debate has ebbed and flowed, but it is still alive in the 2010s, including the first study of the occupation by a member of the CRID.[14] However, the controversy mainly concerns the topic of combatants in the war – for the civilian sphere, 'the notion of war culture seems relatively well accepted'.[15]

Although this book is a work of both social and cultural history, it is especially concerned with the occupied population's beliefs and behaviours. As such, it draws heavily on the 'Péronne' school. It takes inspiration from the idea of war cultures and proposes the existence of a 'culture of the occupied' or 'occupied culture' – what I originally termed the '*culture de l'occupé*'.[16] This was a system of representations and of understanding the experience of occupation, a moral-patriotic framework informing the population's response to the German presence. It was particularly concerned with what was considered acceptable and unacceptable behaviour during the occupation. This culture was related to bourgeois social mores and centred around a notion of respectability, although it was held by more than the bourgeoisie alone. Evidence for such a mental framework, a shared understanding of behavioural norms under occupation, is found in a variety of sources – in letters, diary entries, songs, poems, police reports, municipal records and more. This culture was rather Manichean in nature, with its adherents quick to criticise or hold in disdain those perceived as breaking its norms; it tended to classify behaviours as good or bad and left little room for moral-patriotic grey zones. However, this book focuses on both this monochrome vision held by many occupied people and the messier reality of occupied life – and it will strive to distinguish between the two, when possible.

The 'culture of the occupied' differs from 'war cultures' in a variety of ways. First and most evidently, it was largely spontaneous and developed independently of French war culture(s), given the isolation of the occupied zone (discussed below). Second, it has stronger links to pre-war cultures or norms, such as social mores and respectability. CRID scholars such as Rémy Cazals, Nicolas Offenstadt and André Loez have previously criticised cultural historians of the conflict for arguing that a new culture was born rapidly and marked a sharp break with pre-war norms.[17] The 'culture of the occupied' does not represent such a dramatic break. While the experience of living in the presence of the enemy was evidently the central driver behind this culture and was the issue with which it was most concerned, pre-war norms were also important. Catholic ideals, understandings of sexual relations, or the role of local notables all informed the experience of occupation. Thus it was born of a mixture of pre-war norms and daily reality during the war.

Further, I do not claim that the (singular) occupied culture was the only culture under the occupation, although it is the one most visible in the traces left in archival and other sources. Such traces are not unproblematic, and it is worth outlining here the methodological approach I take in this

regard, before returning to the overall conceptual approach. Often lacunae appear in the archival record, due to the whims of contemporary archivists or the ravages of time. For example, British military police files covering northern France were poorly conserved, and virtually all appear to have been destroyed by a failure to repair the roof of a leaky hut sometime after 1918.[18] Other files were destroyed or lost during the final German retreat of 1918 and the events of the Second World War. Even during the occupation, keeping records was difficult due to German regulations restricting correspondence and criminalising the 'possession of writings hostile to the German army' or notes concerning the German military, making diary-keeping a potentially seditious act.[19] Sources that can be located sometimes lack information on the authors or provide no date. There are also many questions surrounding authorial motives, especially pertinent when considering notions of resistance, misconduct and criminality, and post-war representations of these. However, once aware of such issues, the historian can react accordingly, being explicit about sources that pose problems, and ultimately drawing on a rich, varied source base.

As such, this book makes use of evidence from numerous French and British archives, both national and local, and one American one. Sources vary from the official to the unofficial, from French correspondence and police reports, to occupation diaries, as well as German letters, posters or propaganda publications. Published memoirs and other works are also used, albeit more sparingly. The focus is explicitly on the perspective of occupied *Nordistes* rather than the German occupiers. Indeed, in general there is very little scholarship concerning the German experience as occupiers in 1914–18, a problem Larissa Wegner sought to rectify in her Ph.D. thesis.[20] Therefore, most sources used here are in French, the local *patois* and English.

The authors of the sources used are often (but not exclusively) middle class, although I have endeavoured to use documents also relating the experience of the wider population. This evidently informs the notion of a 'culture of the occupied'. Of course, historians tend to look through the eyes of the powerful; thus there may have also been a different occupied culture among the 'popular classes' or others, less focused on respectability than that which dominates this book. Indeed, often those held in disdain by the adherents of the culture did not themselves buy into it. Thus, while the culture put forward here seems cohesive, it merely provides one tool through which we can better understand this occupation and does not explain all occupation behaviours, motivations or world views. Indeed, as Élise Julien stated regarding standard

war culture, the use of the singular does not mean that geographical chronological, or other variations were absent.[21] Yet I do propose that the singular culture outlined in this book was a key part of the experience of many, if not all, occupied *Nordistes*.

Although criticisms of the cultural approach focus predominantly on discussions concerning combatants, and although my proposed culture of the occupied is separate from other war cultures, some similar arguments could be levelled against the central thesis of this book. The most damning of these is the critique of 'culturalism' as a 'logical error to the degree that it systematically relates observed behavior to an unobservable culture, which in turn is always postulated on the basis of observed behavior. Culturalism thereby explains the way people act by… the way they act'.[22] This book aims to avoid such a circular argument partly by focusing as much as possible on the words of the occupied population while also examining wider behaviours for which no justifications were presented. Much of the occupied culture is indeed observable in the sources, and there are explicit instances of occupied individuals explaining their behaviour in relation to wider norms and perceptions that were at the heart of this culture. Beliefs and mentalities often guided behaviour, or helped influence responses to and understandings of this.

Some may criticise the very use of the world 'culture' here, and it is true that it could perhaps be replaced by a less loaded or problematic term such as 'mentality of the occupied', or even a consideration of the beliefs and actions of the occupied without situating these within wider system. However, I believe that there was a widely held system of representations and understandings underpinning the experience of occupation, and that this can be understood as a culture – albeit one different from 'war culture' per se. This book seeks to provide a compelling case for this, and to outline a wide range of behaviours and beliefs set against a complex reality.

This is not the first work of history to consider French behaviours under the 1914–18 occupation. In particular, Annette Becker, Philippe Nivet and Philippe Salson have examined this topic,[23] and new research is ongoing.[24] Becker also offers an explicitly cultural reading of the occupation in her work. Yet even if it is similarly cultural, my approach differs somewhat: for Becker, suffering and patriotism represented the central experience of the occupation.[25] This book considers patriotism as but one admittedly important end of a larger spectrum of responses to the occupation, forming part of a wider analytical framework placing greater

emphasis on less evidently patriotic behaviours, including criminality and what I term 'misconduct' – dealt with in the lengthier first part of this book. I also concentrate more explicitly on the understandings of the time, separating them as best as possible from my own judgement – I aim to both outline the occupied culture and to study it from a critical distance. Thus, the key contribution of this work is its explicit focus on behaviours and perceptions, and the attempt to provide an explanatory framework and new vocabulary to discuss these.

This study examines the occupied culture through a variety of key themes: notions of misconduct, disunity, criminality and resistance, ending with the way in which the occupation and especially the behaviours examined were remembered. These subjects provide an insight into the multifarious French responses to occupation, exposing both the 'underbelly' and the more 'positive' sides of the experience. The idea propagated, directly or indirectly, by certain French writers since 1918 of widespread patriotism and resistance as the most common response to the German presence will thus be called into question.[26] I will demonstrate that there was much resistance, which did not always fit neatly into established categories, but also many other ways in which the French adapted to occupation, often influenced by the notion of respectability – including precursors to collaboration and accommodation, here seen as closely related.

For such a study, as previously noted, the shadow of *the* occupation of 1940–44 looms large, especially regarding the language used to categorise behaviours. It is necessary and useful to engage with the large literature on this subject, yet using this language uncritically or unthinkingly is problematic and risks anachronism. Some scholars lack clarity or precision in the use of such ideas and terms,[27] although others criticise any approach drawing on the historiography of the Second World War.[28] I believe that we should not throw out the baby with the bathwater. To this end, this book reinterprets and replaces some of the analytical categories traditionally used to explain behaviours and attitudes in 1940–44. It draws on but refines them in light of the context of 1914–18, arriving at a new conceptual vocabulary – such as 'misconduct' instead of 'collaboration', or multiple sub-forms of resistance. Of course, this requires a certain degree of conceptual elasticity, but I believe that the suggested notions provide a useful way of categorising and understanding the experience of occupation in the Nord in the First World War. It will be up to the reader to judge the book's success in this regard.

A final note is necessary regarding the approach of this book: while the focus is on the entire occupied section of the Nord, there is an occasional preponderance of examples concerning Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing because this was the most populous part of this department and therefore, unsurprisingly, the one for which records are richest.[29] This allows for particularly detailed examinations of the conglomeration, especially in the chapter on criminality. Yet why focus exclusively on the Nord anyway?

The specificity of the Nord before the war

By November 1914, the Germans partially occupied nine French departments and fully occupied one (see Figure 1), representing about

Figure 1 Map of the occupied Nord, August 1917.
Map data © 2017 Google and image created with © Scribble Maps.

3.7 per cent of French territory and 8.2 per cent of France's population.[30] The Nord was therefore just one of many occupied areas, and only 70 per cent of its territory was occupied. Yet it was the most populous occupied department, with a wartime population of 1,176,000, according to German census data.[31] The population of all of occupied France in late 1914 was just over 2.12 million.[32] As such, the experience of the Nord was the experience of the majority of occupied French people. The results of the study are therefore instructive and representative, while also remaining part of a local experience.

However, there are more reasons than this demographic argument for examining the Nord. The department has intriguing regional specificities, particularly important within the context of foreign military occupation. The Nord was at its heart a borderland, with the northwesterly coastal frontier of the North Sea set against the Belgian border running along the entire eastern limits of the department. It had been a 'corridor for invasion' since the Middle Ages,[33] and was especially contested between France and the Spanish-Austrian Netherlands. Only after the 1820 treaty of Courtrai did the Franco-Belgian border start to crystallise, although even then it remained relatively fluid, with local inhabitants crossing it at will.[34] The department therefore had a large Belgian population – 230,000 in 1900, as well as many day workers, and in 1911, 91 per cent of foreigners in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais were Belgian.[35]

The department was distinctly urban: by 1914, 71 per cent of the population lived in urban areas, compared to a national average of 56 per cent. Indeed, in 1911 French Flanders was the most densely populated area in France, with 967.5 inhabitants per square kilometre. That same year, the industrial triangle of Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing had a population of over 600,000 – which would have been the second largest French agglomeration outside of Paris, had the municipalities been unified. This large, urban population was the result of increased industrialisation since the mid nineteenth century.[36] Heavy industry, mainly the production of cast iron and steelwork, was important and was fuelled by the department's coal mines and those of neighbouring Pas-de-Calais.[37] Heavy industry employed over 15,000 people in the Nord; 10,000 of whom worked in Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing. It was a large operation: in 1913, the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region produced 17.9 per cent of France's cast iron, and 31.4 per cent of its steel.[38]

Yet the backbone of *Nordiste* industry was textile manufacturing. Nearly 40 per cent of French cotton, 85–90 per cent of linen, 40 per cent

of wool and 30 per cent of cloth was produced here. Roubaix was the world leader in cloth production.[39] The textile industry employed about 225,000 people, many of whom were women working in semi-skilled jobs. Often factories were run by paternalistic men hailing from large industrial families comprising a new form of notability, with leading factory owners playing a role in local politics, such as Charles Delesalle, Mayor of Lille during the occupation.[40]

Agriculture was another boon to the department. As Lynne Taylor noted, its flat plains represented 'one of the richest agricultural areas of France' and had been 'intensely cultivated for centuries. The soil is good, and cereals, tubers such as potatoes, beets and turnip, fodder crops and industrial crops, such as flax, chicory, tobacco and sugar beets' were all grown here.[41] In 1913, 'the most important/largest sugar refinery [*la sucrerie la plus importante*] in the world' was located in Escaudoeuvres, near Cambrai.[42] The Nord-Pas-de-Calais also had the highest wheat productivity of Europe, especially in Cambrésis in the Nord. Such intensive agriculture allowed for densely populated rural areas to exist. In total, the region of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais provided 8 per cent of France's wheat production, 12 per cent of apples, and 30 per cent of sugar, despite the fact that the land constituted just 2.2 per cent of French territory and its inhabitants only 7 per cent of the population.[43]

Highly urbanised areas experienced great social inequality: the 'ruling classes' possessed the vast majority of the economic fortune, rendering the middle classes rather weak and the 'popular classes' very poor.[44] This was exacerbated by housing for workers that had been rapidly created, was cramped and provided a very poor sanitary environment. The lot of the working classes was made even harder when faced with below-average levels of education: the number of men having experienced education beyond the age of thirteen was 7.7 per cent, the number of women 6 per cent, compared to a national average of 10.4 per cent and 8.5 per cent respectively.[45]

The working class represented about 60 per cent of the population of cities like Lille, which shaped the political culture. Social inequality encouraged workers to support socialism, which worried the 'well-off'.[46] Belgian socialism greatly influenced the workers of the Nord. Syndicalist groups bloomed, and those taking a socialist bent had over 100,000 members.[47] Indeed, the Nord was a 'hotbed for socialist and syndicalist activities, particularly in the densely populated, working-class Lille urban area'.[48] Roubaix *député* Jules Guesde and his ideology dominated the socialist movement, although leftists were divided until

the creation of the Section Française de l'Intérnationale Ouvrière (SFIO) in 1905, after which date the Fédération du Nord was the second largest in the party, with 11,000 adherents. Socialist victories in Roubaix in 1892 and Lille in 1896 demonstrated the 'threat' of socialism and were subsequently met with a ' "liberal" reconquest' in Roubaix in 1901 by Eugène Motte and in Lille in 1904 by Charles Delesalle. By 1914, the SFIO had fourteen deputies in the region, especially around Lille and Valenciennes – progress was slow, despite seemingly widespread support, but nevertheless 'The Nord undeniably constituted one of the bastions of French socialism.'[49]

However, certain segments of the bourgeoisie and peasants were concerned with the defence of property – leading to centralism in rural areas such as Cambrésis.[50] The Radicals, on the other hand, comprised an important political force: the Mayors of Tourcoing, Roubaix and Cambrai in the early twentieth century were all Radicals, although this label was notoriously slippery. They were seen as arbiters of the left–right dispute, hailing from complex origins and representing the moderate left. Concerned with maintaining a certain status quo, they nevertheless remained anti-clerical and *laïque*, willing to ally with socialists or centrists but never with Catholics.[51] The Catholic, conservative right had a 'remarkable audience' in the Nord, although its support fell slightly from 1900. Support was stronger in rural areas, but this always remained greater than its actual parliamentary influence.[52] Whatever their political leaning, members of the political class tended to be bourgeois: merchants, shopkeepers, entrepreneurs, industrialists and landlords. By combining economic and political influence, they essentially became the new 'notables' of the department.

The Nord therefore had a curious mix of socialist sentiment and fairly widespread Catholic piety. As a rule, Catholicism flourished in rural areas but did less well in the cities, although Lille remained 'a religious capital and one of the most dynamic poles of French Catholicism'.[53] Many in the Nord had been unhappy with the 1905 separation of Church and State, with some religious communities consequently migrating to Belgium to seek refuge.[54] After 1905, there was a shift leftwards among certain constituencies towards accepting some aspects of anti-clericalism, but Catholics remained divided over the best course of action: some supported the ideas of *l'abbé* Lemire, a *député*-priest willing to integrate as best as possible into the Third Republic; others remained monarchist and virulently anti-Republican.[55] Between 1905 and 1914, there had been numerous clashes, both metaphorical and physical, between Catholics

and the state (or supporters of its anti-clerical policies). Religious organisations were important, with youth movements attracting about 10,000 members in the Nord by 1913, especially in Flanders, Tourcoing and Cambrésis. Female Catholic leagues attracted massive numbers: in Cambrai in 1912, the Ligue Patriotique des Françaises gathered together 73,823 women.[56] Despite increasingly common anti-clericalism, the Nord therefore remained surprisingly Catholic given its demographic constituency. Yet whether Catholic or not, most *Nordistes* remained loyal to France, if not necessarily the Republic, which would have implications for their approach to occupation.

Among the francophone population there existed a regional *patois*, a variation of the Picard dialect, named *Ch'ti* after its speakers' pronunciation of soft 's' and 'c' sounds. Like some other French *patois*, it was primarily spoken by the lower classes, playing a central role in the popular poems and songs of the region.[57] There were a few literary works, most notably the poems and *chansons populaires* of Auguste Labbe (alias César Latulupe), who founded a society in 1906 charged with protecting the *patois* of Lille.[58] This was part of a strong local identity and culture, born of the specificities outlined here. *Nordistes* seized any opportunity for public gatherings and celebrations, whether watching puppet shows conducted in the local dialect, carnival processions of the wooden *géants du Nord* (giants of the North) or engaging in Catholic celebrations of Joan of Arc.[59] Part of this also involved a strong worker culture, meaning that many passed their spare time in the numerous estaminets (bars/cafés) and *débits de boissons* (public houses). In Lille in 1910, there were no fewer than 3,900 estaminets. Outside of drinking holes, workers turned to music for leisure: the Fédération des musiques du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais had 50,000 members in 1912. Pigeon-fancying provided a popular outdoor activity, with at least 20,000 *colombophiles* subscribed to the regional federation in 1908.[60] This was therefore a border area whose inhabitants had a strong sense of belonging to both *le petit pays* and *le grand pays*. These regional specificities, cultures and identities had the potential to react in interesting and different ways to the German presence. They would inform both the daily reality of military occupation and the way in which the population understood this.

The occupation: beginning and development

From the outbreak of war until September 1914, German troops marched through Belgium and northern France as per the Moltke–Schlieffen

Plan. The invasion was stopped in its tracks by the battle of the Marne on 5–12 September, but the front still shifted until October–November. This period was characterised across northern France and Belgium by ruthless German policies and atrocities, both real and imagined, including rape, pillage, mass executions and the use of civilians as human shields.[61] One of the most infamous German acts in the Nord involved the destruction of the village of Orchies on 26 September 1914 after German soldiers alleged that they had been fired on by armed civilians. The 5,000 inhabitants were evacuated, although some had returned by 1916, living in harsh conditions.[62] Orchies remained the benchmark for German violence, and in October 1914 – a month after its destruction – a German poster in Roubaix reminded the French to obey German orders or suffer the same 'terrible fate'.[63] Other invasion atrocities were widely reported in the Allied press, such as the shooting of at least seven 'patriotic' priests in Cambrai, or German 'terrorism' in Douai.[64] This violence was publicised and investigated during the war by Allied powers.[65] John Horne and Alan Kramer have demonstrated that such atrocities, dismissed as overblown propaganda after the war, were in fact widespread, and based on the false German belief that the population was comprised of *francs-tireurs* waging a guerrilla war, as in 1870–71.[66] Yet the Germans were not alone in drawing on the previous conflict: some *Nordistes* in summer 1914 personally remembered the invasion of 1870 and the subsequent Prussian/German occupation until 1873. Others drew on collective memory of these events, and it was common for locals to use the word 'Prussian' (with attendant derogatory, militaristic connotations) to describe German soldiers in 1914–18 and beyond.[67] Indeed, both the invasion and occupation of the First World War had some parallels with events in 1870–73, such as the taking of civilian hostages to ensure good behaviour.[68] Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, the memory of 1870–73 became overshadowed by the terror and violence of summer 1914, which scarred French mentalities for years to come. As late as 1917, individuals repatriated from occupied France (henceforth referred to as '*rapatriés*') still spoke of the brutality of the invasion when questioned by French secret-service personnel.[69] This lasting fear that the occupiers might (re)turn to violence had implications for behaviours under the occupation, as will be seen.

The war of movement was chaotic. The initial German race to Paris created a period of limbo. Lille was declared an 'open city' on 1 August 1914, meaning that despite the presence of a fortress and garrison, the city would not be defended. This caused considerable dispute among

Préfet du Nord Félix Trépont, who supported the defence of Lille, and the city's mayor, Charles Delesalle, who favoured the 'open city' option to save civilian lives.[70] On 24 August 1914, the French military left, along with some members of the civilian administration – a move that some denounced as abandonment.[71] From this date until the beginning of October, Lille was neither held by the Allies, nor the Germans. The inhabitants had their first encounter with the Germans when a scouting party entered the town on 2 September and occupied the *hôtel de ville*. During this brief incursion, the first of many clashes between French and German authorities occurred when one Lieutenant von Hoffel physically assaulted the Préfet, who had ordered men of military age to leave Lille for the French front.[72]

Lille was retaken by French soldiers on 3 October. For the next ten days, clashes took place between French and German troops within the city's limits as the Germans laid siege. On 13 October 1914, after 1,500 houses and 882 other buildings had been destroyed by artillery fire, the defending French forces capitulated.[73] By this point, 70 per cent of the Nord was in German hands. After the invasion 'came the extended static period, the occupation proper'.[74] Trench warfare ensured that the front would remain relatively stable for four years, meaning that these areas remained under German dominance until October–November 1918.

The Germans administered the Nord in a similar manner to other occupied French departments, all of which were considered as front-line areas (*Etappen*), as opposed to the *Generalgouvernement* pseudo-civilian rule existing in most of Belgium (and the *Nordiste* town of Maubeuge).[75] Occupied France was thus under military rule. A general administrative framework existed: next to each commanding general of one of the seven army groups in occupied France was an *Etappeninspektor*, charged with liaising between the interior and the fighting troops, providing the latter with food, accommodation and transport. Below him was an *Etappenkommandant*, a high-ranking officer representing the highest authority to which French people could appeal, and whose powers were likened to that of a 'little king'.[76] Each Kommandant and his Kommandantur controlled from one to forty French communes and possessed wide-ranging personnel, with its own administrative staff initially composed of soldiers, but later of German civilians, including female secretaries. The Kommandant rarely lasted for the duration of the occupation, reassigned to different sectors or fronts. Economic committees (*Beutesammelstellen*) working alongside the *Etappeninspektor* had the goal of best procuring the resources of the

occupied territory, mainly through requisitions – these were replaced from 1916 by *Wirtschaftskompanien*. Three police forces existed: the German gendarmes, sometimes including *Landsturm* (reserve troops made up of old men); a military police formed of soldiers exempt from front-line service; and the secret police, involved in counter-espionage.[77] Civilians frequently had to lodge troops on their way to the front, feeding them and doing their laundry.[78] As such, there were two types of German soldier in the occupied region: members of the army of occupation and soldiers from the fighting army, temporarily encountering the French whether en route to the front, or on leave from the front.

The French administration was sidelined at all but municipal level. No departmental assemblies met during the occupation. The Germans nominated *sous-préfets* such as those of Avesnes and Cambrai, and mayors like that of Étrœungt. While Préfet Félix Trépont was still present – until his deportation in February 1915 and replacement with the Sous-Préfet d'Avesnes (Maurice Anjubault) – his role was purely consultative. The Germans dealt with the mayors and municipal councillors of French communes, using them as middlemen to fulfil German orders and to communicate such demands to locals. In many ways, this meant that municipalities found themselves 'between a rock and a hard place'.[79] The French police and judicial system was still permitted to operate, but their powers had been greatly curbed (see Chapter 5), and ultimately the Germans remained dominant in all spheres of life.

The occupied region was cut off from the rest of the world – Herbert Hoover described occupied France and Belgium as a 'vast concentration camp'.[80] The Germans 'needed the occupied population' and did their 'best to keep them there', such as erecting a 30-kilometre-long electric fence along the Belgian–Dutch border and posting sentries along the Franco-Belgian border.[81] Correspondence between communes was forbidden for all but civil servants, and contact with the outside world was illegal and difficult beyond the introduction of short Red Cross postcards.[82] Public circulation was limited to specific times unless a pass could be presented, and permission was required to move between communes – which few outside of French authorities were granted.[83] French civilians were ordered to kill their carrier pigeons to prevent communication with the Allies, a measure particularly resented by *colombophiles*.[84] The French press was forbidden, apart from publications approved and edited by the Germans, such as the occupation-wide *Gazette des Ardennes*, or the local *Bulletin de Lille*, *Bulletin de Roubaix* and *Écho de Maubeuge*.[85] Freedom of expression was thus curbed, especially anti-German sentiment. Such

policies led to a feeling of acute isolation among *Nordistes* and the population of the entire occupied area.[86]

Almost every aspect of life was regulated by the Germans via manifold rules, from public-hygiene measures[87] to the imposition of German time (an hour ahead of French time), which was enforced with spot checks.[88] Some have seen this and other policies – such as banning the French history syllabus in some schools, the replacement of street names with German ones or the raising of German flags in public places – as representative of a 'Germanisation'.[89] I am unconvinced. Such policies were more short-term markers of dominance – reflective of the overwhelming official German attitude that appeared to involve disdain and cultural superiority[90] – and never constituted a concerted effort to eradicate Frenchness. The occupation was a means to an end, not an end in itself.

Whatever the logic behind them, rules and regulations flooded the occupied zone. The distinction between public and private spheres was weakened, particularly by policies requiring locals to keep doors to houses open at night in case of bombardment, and the obligation to affix a regularly updated list of occupants to the front entrance of all properties.[91] The possession of a photographic identity card was compulsory in Lille from September 1915, slightly later elsewhere.[92] Thousands of posters informed the population of these rules (see Figure 2), as well as the punishments for any infractions – often inevitable.[93] Englishman J. P. Whitaker's account of life in occupied Roubaix stated: 'I do not believe that anyone took a vicious delight in disobeying these commands, but they were so many and so varied that if one were not very careful indeed one was sure to find oneself at cross-purposes with the authorities.'[94] Punishment involved fines, imprisonment or even death, depending on the infraction. The extent and nature of punishment can be seen in the condemnations published in the *Bulletin de Lille*. From 1914 until July 1918, 658 people were condemned to a total of 246 years, eleven months and eight days of 'simple imprisonment' (*détention simple*); 115 people to a total of three years, five months and one day of 'average imprisonment' (*détention moyenne*); and thirty-four people to a total of 267 years and seven months of forced labour. Fines were frequent: eighty-five people were sentenced to 87,118 marks of 'simple fines'; while seventy-eight people faced thirty-seven years, four months and twenty-four days' imprisonment with a fine of 1,000 francs, plus a fine of 161,920 marks and five years, eight months and twenty-five days' imprisonment. Twenty-one were condemned to death, and three to thirty years' imprisonment (*réclusion*).[95] In addition, there were numerous less formal punishments.

AVIS IMPORTANT

Tous les HABITANTS des communes appartenant à l'Étape de Tourcoing sont

OBLIGÉS

DE LIRE LES PUBLICATIONS

de la Commandanture qui sont apposées à la Mairie et sur le tableau d'affichage installé sur la Grande-Place.

Le fait de ne pas avoir lu ces publications ne sera pas admis comme excuse valable.

Tourcoing, le 15 Novembre 1915.

Etappen-Kommandantur
Frhr. von TESSIN,
Major et Kommandant.

Figure 2 German poster, Tourcoing, 15 November 1915: '**IMPORTANT NOTICE**: All the INHABITANTS of the *Étape* of Tourcoing are **OBLIGED** TO READ THE PUBLICATIONS of the Kommandantur displayed at the Mairie and on the noticeboard installed in the main square. The fact of not having read these notices will not be permitted as a valid excuse.' This regulation hints that some locals, truthfully or otherwise, claimed ignorance of German regulations. Presumably those who did not read German posters, not having read *this* poster, remained ignorant of the new rule until punished.
Archives Départementales du Nord, Lille, France, 9R745.

French economic life effectively came to a standstill during the occupation. This was partly due to restrictions on freedom of movement and communication preventing trade beyond the communal limits. Combined with German prescriptions relating to the import and export of goods and materials, this led to what Georges Gromaire called 'paralysed commerce'.[96] A large percentage of the male workforce was mobilised or fled the invasion, thus the majority of the population of occupied France and the Nord was female.[97] Further, the Germans requisitioned goods and buildings from private individuals, agriculture and industry alike, as well as requisitioning members of the occupied population, who were forced to work for the occupiers.[98] Inhabitants were required to declare a variety of material due for requisitioning,[99] although many did not; the Germans knew this so carried out widespread searches, punishing individuals found to be in breach of the regulations, and blurring the distinction between pillage and genuine requisitions.[100] Locals at the time, and various French people afterwards, described German acts as 'systematic pillage', an attempt to destroy the economy of the occupied region both to win the war and to hinder post-war development.[101] The effects of these policies on the wartime economy were clear: unemployment was widespread, with large towns of the Nord awarding unemployment aid to up to 43.02 per cent of the population,[102] leading to a lack of income that could be pumped back into the local economy.

Finances were strained further by the fact that the population was required to pay numerous taxes on an individual and municipal/communal level. Some counted as 'war contributions' to pay for the upkeep of occupation troops, legal under Article 49 of the 1907 Hague Convention.[103] Others were fines levied on communes for the alleged bad behaviour of inhabitants, the French administration or even simply because of Allied attacks elsewhere. This was the case when Valenciennes and Roubaix were fined in response to the Allied bombing of Alexandria and Haïfa in June 1915.[104] The sums demanded were enormous – for instance, by the end of the war the administration of Croix had paid taxes of 1.1 million francs, war contributions of around 8.34 million francs and fines of 2,030 francs.[105] Taxes and contributions forced municipal councillors and clergymen to appeal to wealthy compatriots to help fill the gaps in the administration's coffers.[106] Individual taxes included the infamous dog tax, failure to pay resulting in the destruction of the dog.[107]

The Germans also requisitioned gold and francs, and introduced paper money. These notes were issued grudgingly by the communes because of their illegality – French law only permitted the creation of

such currency with the approval of central government. They effectively constituted 'IOUs', listing sums that would be repaid after the cessation of hostilities.[108] Such money could not be used to pay German taxes and fines, furthering the depletion of existing gold or franc stocks. The circulation of essentially worthless paper money undermined economic stability and confidence, exacerbating the widespread penury of the occupied population.

Food was a primary concern for locals, representing the strongest recurring theme in occupation diaries.[109] A near-famine developed as the occupation went on, due to German requisitions of foodstuffs and appropriation of agricultural land, extracting local resources to serve the German war effort, as well as aforementioned restrictions on movement and trade. As food became rarer, inflation grew rapidly, aggravating the situation. The population's health subsequently declined: diseases such as scurvy, diphtheria, typhoid and scarlet fever became common.[110] Malnutrition was widespread, which some suggest stopped women menstruating[111] – thus for some, biological realities changed during the occupation. Local administrations, the French, Allied and neutral governments and eventually even the Germans recognised the danger for the occupied population. As such, from April 1915, neutral aid organisations intervened to feed the occupied French and Belgian population: Herbert Hoover's Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB), and its French subsidiary, the Comité d'Alimentation du Nord de la France (CANF), both sometimes referred to as *Hispano-américain* and later *Hispano-néerlandais* relief efforts.[112] Tens of thousands (or more) would have died were it not for these aid organisations,[113] although it was only with much deliberation that Britain allowed CRB-CANF transport ships to pass through the naval blockade.[114] Even with this aid, many experienced malnutrition, general poor physical health caused by privation of gas and coal, and mental-health problems caused by the stress of occupation, the constant sound of shelling at the front and the risk of bombardment.[115]

Added to these sufferings was the threat of deportation. The line between evacuation and deportation was blurred, with the Germans engaging in the forcible removal of populations on a frequent basis during 1916 and early 1917. The occupiers moved about 20,000 civilians – men, women and children – from Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing to the Ardennes in Easter 1916, allegedly 'to reduce the misery' of the population which had been exacerbated by 'the attitude of England'.[116] These were the most infamous deportations, and because of the presence of

women they became known as the 'kidnapping of young women' across the occupied area.[117] (There is some debate as to whether the primarily female nature of deportation was a reality or perception, although that such a perception should exist is significant.) There was international outcry at German actions,[118] which may explain the apparent winding-down of large deportations after January 1917 – although forced labour continued in one form or another.[119]

However, population movement still occurred until the end of the war in two other forms. The first involved forced and voluntary repatriations from the occupied area to unoccupied France. Evacuees were transported through Switzerland to Évian or Annecy, where they were interviewed by the French military Service des Renseignements (intelligence service) and became refugees within their own country. In total, about 500,000 people were evacuated from the occupied area during the war, including 10 per cent of the Nord's population.[120] One claim for the logic behind this is that the Germans removed 'useless mouths' and kept the potentially productive human material.[121]

The second form was hostage-taking. The Germans took certain individuals hostage to assure the fulfilment of German demands or to dissuade locals from engaging in hostile acts. Sometimes the French were permitted to nominate hostages, sometimes the Germans chose them; often hostages were local notables and had to spend at least a night in a prison.[122] However, occasionally the occupiers took larger numbers of hostages and sent them to camps outside of France, such as in Lithuania or, for most *Nordiste* hostages, Holzminden in Germany. There, these 'civilian prisoners' faced further restrictions and suffering, but most returned home after a certain period of internment.[123]

The occupation of the Nord and northern France more generally from 1914 until 1918 was therefore above all understood as an experience of suffering. Hardship generally increased after 1916 as German rule tightened in response to the military losses of that year (at the battles of the Somme and Verdun) and to the heightened effects of the Allied naval blockade. It has been suggested that harsher German measures, such as the use of deportation and more frequent use of forced labourers, may have been a way of winning over hungry Germans, proving that all necessary measures were being used to secure the German war effort and, especially, food supply.[124] If this is the case, then the policies of occupation from 1916 in some sense represent what Horne has called 'remobilization',[125] an attempt by the *Kaiserreich* to bolster support for the war and reinvigorate Germany's own war culture. These policies may also

have reflected a growing desperation; this is nominally perceived to be the explanation of German policies during the liberation period, involving scorched-earth tactics and the forced evacuation of French civilians from the shifting front.[126] Kramer argues that the exploitation of occupied territories and the attendant destruction of property, industrial and agricultural capital arose from strategic, political and economic calculations.[127] Isabel V. Hull believes that the explanation lies within wider German (Prussian) military culture, which had developed a totalising logic since the Franco-Prussian War, crystallised in the conflict with the Herero.[128]

Although occupation was an unpleasant experience for French civilians throughout the entire four years, it was never as violent as those of the Eastern Front.[129] Nevertheless, in the Nord as elsewhere, total war led to total occupation, to adapt Peter Holquist's summary of the First World War's effects on Russia.[130] Economic woes, hunger, penury, restrictions on liberty of movement and expression, forced labour, deportation, the presence of hundreds of thousands of German troops nearby – in short, a 'total' occupation – suggest a space containing extremely limited choices and courses of action for locals. Yet, as Taylor has pointed out for the Nord-Pas-de-Calais in the Second World War, while the Germans desired to be so, they were not in fact omnipotent.[131] Choices and actions were restricted and subsequently took on greater symbolism, but there still remained a surprising and interesting range of responses to the occupation. Such reactions were guided by the culture of the occupied, a different form of wider war culture inevitably coloured by daily contact with the enemy. It is to these choices, perspectives, understandings – this culture – that this book now turns.

Notes

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2 See, for example, Philippe Burrin, *La France à l'heure allemande, 1940–1944* (Paris: Seuil, 1995), pp. 181–361; Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–44* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 601–32.

3 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, *1914–1918: Understanding the Great War*, trans. Catherine Temerson (London: Profile, 2002), p. 45.

4 Annette Becker, *Les Cicatrices rouges 14–18: France et Belgique occupées* (Paris: Fayard, 2010), p. 14.

5 Annette Becker, *Oubliés de la Grande Guerre: Humanitaire et culture de guerre* (Paris: Éditions Noêsis, 1998), p. 365.

6 James E. Connolly, 'Fresh eyes, dead topic? Writing the history of the occupation of Northern France in World War One', in Ludivine Broch and Alison Carrol (eds.), *France in an Era of Global War, 1914–45: Occupation, Politics, Empire and Entanglements* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 31–49.

7 See Connolly, 'Fresh eyes, dead topic?' and the Bibliography. The most important of these was Georges Gromaire, *L'Occupation allemande en France (1914–1918)* (Paris: Payot, 1925).

8 Jay Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 6.

9 See, for example, Becker, *Oubliés de la Grande Guerre*; Becker, *Les Cicatrices rouges*; Philippe Nivet, *La France occupée 1914–1918* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2011); Philippe Nivet, *Les Réfugiés français de la Grande Guerre (1914–1920): Les 'Boches du Nord'* (Paris: Econmica, 2004); Philippe Salson, *L'Aisne occupée: Les civils dans la Grande Guerre* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015).

10 For the only English-language books on the topic, see Helen McPhail, *The Long Silence: Civilian Life under the German Occupation of Northern France, 1914–1918* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999); Richard Cobb, *French and Germans, Germans and French: A Personal Interpretation of France under Two Occupations, 1914–1918/1940–1944* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1983); Ben Macintyre, *A Foreign Field: A True Story of Love and Betrayal during the Great War* (London: Harper Collins, 2001); Bernard Wilkin, *Aerial Propaganda and the Wartime Occupation of France, 1914–18* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016). Other works touch upon the occupation as part of wider studies, such as Margaret H. Darrow, *French Women and the First World War: War Stories of the Home Front* (New York: Berg, 2000); Leonard V. Smith, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, *France and the Great War, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Tammy Proctor, *Civilians in a World at War, 1914–1918* (New York: New York University Press, 2010) and *Female Intelligence: Women and Espionage in the First World War* (New York: New York University Press, 2003).

11 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 'Violence et consentement: la "culture de guerre" du première conflit mondial', in Jean-Pierre Rioux and Jean-François Sirinelli (eds.), *Pour une histoire culturelle* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), notably p. 252; Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, *14–18, Retrouver la Guerre* (Paris: Gallimard, 2000).

12 Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, *The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 159; Smith et al., *France and the Great War*, p. xv.

13 François Buton, André Loez, Nicolas Mariot and Philippe Olivera, '1914–1918: understanding the controversy', *Books and Ideas*, 11 June 2009, at www.booksandideas.net/1914–1918-Understanding-the.html (accessed 7 July 2015).

14 See, for example, Nicolas Mariot, *Tous unis dans la tranchée? Les intellectuels rencontrent le people* (Paris: Seuil, 2013); Salson, *L'Aisne occupée*.

15 Élise Julien, 'À propos de l'historiographie française de la première guerre mondiale', *Labyrinthe*, 18:2 (2004), p. 55.

16 James E. Connolly, 'Encountering Germans: The Experience of Occupation in the Nord, 1914–1918', Ph.D. dissertation (King's College London, 2012); Connolly, 'Fresh Eyes, Dead Topic?'

17 Jean-Yves Le Naour, 'Le champ de bataille des historiens', *La Vie des idées*, 10 November 2008, at www.laviedesidees.fr/Le-champ-de-bataille-des.html (acessed 7 July 2015).

18 Thanks to Julian Putkowski for this information.

19 See, for example, Archives Départementales du Nord (ADN), 9R717, German poster, Roubaix and Tourcoing, 12 February 1916.

20 Larissa Wegner, 'Deutsche Kriegsbesetzung in Nordfrankreich, 1914–1918', Ph.D. dissertation (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiberg, 2017). This is also true of studies of 1940–45: Talbot Imley, 'The German side of things: eecent scholarship on the German Occupation of France', *French Historical Studies*, 39:1 (2016), pp. 184–5.

21 Julien, 'À propos de l'historiographie française', p. 62.

22 Buton et al., '1914–1918: understanding the controversy'.

23 Becker, *Oubliés de la Grande Guerre* and *Les Cicatrices rouges*; Nivet, *La France occupée*; Salson, *L'Aisne occupée*.

24 See chapters in James Connolly, Emmanul Debruyne, Elise Julien and Matthias Meirlaen (eds.), *En territoire ennemi: Expériences d'occupation, transferts, héritages (1914–1949)* (Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2018).

25 See Becker, *Les Cicatrices rouges*.

26 See, for example, Jean-Claude Auriol, *Les Ténèbres de l'occupation* (Fontenay-le Comte: Imprimerie Lussaud, 2008); Henri de Forge and Jean Mauclère, *Feuilles françaises dans la tourmente: Les héros de la presse clandestine dans le Nord envahi, 1914–1918* (Paris: Berger Levrault, 1932); Claudine Wallart, *C'était hier, le département du Nord … Le Nord en Guerre – 1914–1918* (Lille: Archives Départementales du Nord, 2008).

27 For uses of 'collaboration' or 'accommodation' in the context of 1914–18, see Becker, *Les Cicatrices rouges*, pp. 15, 249, 296; Nivet, *La France occupée*, pp. 265–78, 293–300.

28 Salson, *L'Aisne occupée*, p. 17.
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30 Nivet, *La France occupée*, p. 9. The departments were the Aisne, Ardennes, Marne, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Meuse, Nord, Oise, Pas-de-Calais, Somme and Vosges.
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33 Lynne Taylor, *Between Resistance and Collaboration: Popular Protest in Northern France, 1940–45* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 7.
34 Timothy Baycroft, 'Changing identities in the Franco-Belgian borderland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries', *French History*, 13:4 (1999), pp. 419–21; Timothy Baycroft, *Culture, Identity and Nationalism: French Flanders in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2004).
35 Félix-Paul Codaccioni, 'La terre, la mer, le ciel', in Yves-Marie Hilaire (ed.), *Histoire du Nord Pas-de-Calais de 1900 à nos jours* (Toulouse: Privat, 1982), pp. 29–32.
36 Félix-Paul Codaccioni, 'Une puissance industrielle arrivée à maturité', in Yves-Marie Hilaire (ed.), *Histoire du Nord Pas-de-Calais de 1900 à nos jours* (Toulouse: Privat, 1982), pp. 65–70, 83–8.
37 Codaccioni, 'Une puissance industrielle', pp. 65–7.
38 Codaccioni, 'Une puissance industrielle', pp. 68–9.
39 Codaccioni, 'Une puissance industrielle', pp. 70 and 74.
40 Codaccioni, 'Une puissance industrielle', pp. 72–3; Robert Vandenbussche, 'La vie des hommes', in Yves-Marie Hilaire (ed.), *Histoire du Nord Pas-de-Calais de 1900 à nos jours* (Toulouse: Privat, 1982), p. 134.
41 Taylor, *Between Resistance and Collaboration*, pp. 7–8.
42 Codaccioni, 'La terre', p. 62.
43 Codaccioni, 'La terre', pp. 61, 64; Codaccioni, 'Une puissance industrielle', p. 79.
44 Félix-Paul Codaccioni, *De l'inégalité sociale dans une grande ville industrielle: Le drame de Lille de 1850 à 1914* (Lille: Editions Universitaires de Lille 3, 1976).
45 Codaccioni, 'Une puissance industrielle', pp. 99–103.
46 Codaccioni, 'Une puissance industrielle', p. 100; Robert Vandenbussche, 'La société politique septentrionale', in Yves-Marie Hilaire (ed.), *Histoire du Nord Pas-de-Calais de 1900 à nos jours* (Toulouse: Privat, 1982), p. 159.
47 Vandenbussche, 'La société politique', pp. 159, 171; Bernard Ménager, 'Une région frontière à l'heure de la paix armée', in Yves-Marie Hilaire

(ed.), *Histoire du Nord Pas-de-Calais de 1900 à nos jours* (Toulouse: Privat, 1982), p. 37.

48 Baycroft, *Culture, Identity and Nationalism*, p. 139.

49 Vandenbuscche, 'La société politique', pp. 162, 168, 170–1.

50 Vandenbuscche, 'La société politique', p. 159.

51 Vandenbuscche, 'La société politique', pp. 165–7.

52 Vandenbuscche, 'La société politique', p. 175.

53 Yves-Marie Hilaire and Robert Vandenbussche, 'Une chrétienté ménacée: religion et "incroyance" ', in Yves-Marie Hilaire (ed.), *Histoire du Nord Pas-de-Calais de 1900 à nos jours* (Toulouse: Privat, 1982), pp. 136–8.

54 Baycroft, 'Changing identities', p. 424.

55 Hilaire and Vandenbussche, 'Une chrétienté ménacée', p. 135.

56 Hilaire and Vandenbussche, 'Une chrétienté ménacée', pp. 146–50, 155, 157.

57 Ménager, 'Une région frontière', p. 35; Madeleine Codaccioni, 'Culture en début de siècle', in Yves-Marie Hilaire (ed.), *Histoire du Nord Pas-de-Calais de 1900 à nos jours* (Toulouse: Privat, 1982), p. 182.

58 Codaccioni, 'Culture en début de siècle', p. 183.

59 Codaccioni, 'Culture en début de siècle', pp. 181–2; Vandenbussche, 'La vie des hommes', pp. 126–31.

60 Vandenbussche, 'La vie des hommes', pp. 125–6.

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63 ADN, 9R716, German poster, Roubaix, 29 October 1914.

64 Special Correspondent, 'A Tragedy of the War', *The Times*, 22 September 1914, p. 8; Correspondent, 'The Fate of Douai', *The Times*, 8 October 1914, p. 7.

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68 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, *1870: La France dans la guerre* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1989), p. 262.

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73 Wallart, *C'était hier*, p. 15.

74 Smith et al., *France and the Great War*, p. 44.

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79 Sébastien Debarge, 'Fourmies occupée pendant la Grande Guerre', *Revue du Nord*, 80:325 (1998), p. 292.

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83 See, for example, ADN, 9R756, German poster, Valenciennes, 7 November 1914.

84 ADN, 9R557, Préfet to Mayors of Nord, 16 October 1914; ADN, 74J225, diary of M. Blin, instituteur en retraite at Auchy-les-Orchies (1914–18), 11 December 1914.

85 Wallart, *C'était hier*, p. 31; Nivet, *La France occupée*, p. 78; L'Abbé Auguste Leman, *Pages actuelles, 1914–1919: Lille sous l'occupation allemande: Les héros du journalisme* (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1919), pp. 4–7; Georges Dubut-Maison, *Journal d'un bourgeois de Maubeuge, avant, pendant le siècle et l'occupation allemande, 1914–1918* (Tourcoing: J. Duvivier, 1923), 21 November 1914, p. 88. For digitised copies of the *Gazette des Ardennes*, see http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/feldztggazarden1914bis1915/0001 (accessed 25 January 2017).

86 Marc Blancpain, *Quand Guillaume II gouvernait* '*de la Somme aux Vosges*' (Paris: Fayard, 1980), p. 120; Trochon, *La Grande Guerre*, p. 3; Nivet, *La France occupée*, pp. 15–34.

87 See, for example, ADN, 9R748, German poster, Tourcoing, 9 January 1918; Marie-Hélène Benoît, 'L'état sanitaire de la population civile du Nord envahi pendant la Première Guerre mondiale: Lille en particulier (1914–1918)', master's dissertation (Lille III, 1997), pp. 109–11.

88 De la Montagne, *La Vie agonisante*, p. 218.

89 Nivet, *La France occupée*, pp. 55–84; Auriol, *Les Ténèbres de l'occupation*, p. 23.

90 See AML, 4H60, translations of the German newspaper *Liller Kriegszeitung* and the edited collection *Lille in Deutscher Hand*. For the original newspaper, see www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/helios/digi/feldzeitungen.html (accessed 20 January 2012).

91 Such a measure was enforced in Lille from September 1915: Annette Becker (ed.), *Journaux de combattants et de civils de la France du Nord dans la Grande Guerre* (Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 1998), diary of Maria Degrutère, 3 September 1915, p. 185.

92 Becker, *Journaux de combattants*, diary of Maria Degrutère, 3 February 1916, pp. 193–4; Michelin's Illustrated Guide to the Battlefields (1914–18), *Lille before and during the War* (London: Michelin, 1919), p. 12; Gromaire, *L'Occupation allemande*, p. 77.

93 For an overview of both German rules and punishments for infractions, see Cliquennois-Pâque, *Lille martyre*; posters in ADN, 9R702–775; AMT, H4A26; McPhail, *The Long Silence*, pp. 91–115; Nivet, *La France occupée*, pp. 125–7; Becker, *Les Cicatrices rouges*, pp. 124–30.

94 J. P. Whitaker, *Under the Heel of the Hun (An Englishman's Two-and-a-Half Years in Roubaix and Lille)* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917), p. 53.

95 AML, 4H68, 'Relevé des condamnations prononcées par la justice allemande, à Lille et figurant au Bulletin de Lille du no. 1 au no. 385bis' (14 Juillet 1918).

96 Gromaire, *L'Occupation allemande*, pp. 80–5.

97 Philippe Nivet, 'Les femmes dans la France occupée (1914–1918)', in Marion Trévisi and Philippe Nivet (eds.), *Les Femmes et la guerre de l'Antiquité à 1918* (Paris: Economica, 2010), p. 275. In Lille, roughly two-thirds of the population were female in February 1916 (101,876 women and 53,984 men): AML, 4H203, 'Résultat du recensement du 9 au 10 février 1916'.

98 Becker, *Les Cicatrices rouges*, pp. 168–90.

99 ADN, 9R745, German poster, Tourcoing, 24 September 1915; McPhail, *The Long Silence*, pp. 91–4; Becker, *Les Cicatrices rouges*, pp. 159–68.

100 See, for example, *Bulletin de Lille*, 13 July 1916; Nivet, *La France occupée*, pp. 85–96.

101 Gromaire, *L'Occupation allemande*, pp. 394–422; M. L. Baclé, *La Destruction systématique par les allemands des usines métallurgiques du Nord et de l'Est de la France pendant l'occupation militaire (1914–1918)* (Paris: Société d'Encouragement pour l'Industrie Nationale, 1920); Pauly, *Occupation allemande*.

102 Christel Ramirez, 'Les villes et les campagnes dans le Nord pendant l'occupation allemande de 1914–1918', master's dissertation (Lille III, 1999), pp. 136–7; ADN, J1933, François Rouesel, 'Pendant la CCI [Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie] de Roubaix durant l'occupation allemande', 'La Caisse du Chômage' (manuscript); Trochon, *La Grande Guerre*, pp. 109–11.

103 AML, 4H134, German poster, Lille, 6 December 1917; Nivet, *La France occupée*, pp. 107–14.

104 ADN, 9R730, Kommandant Hofmann to Mairie de Roubaix, 20 June 1915.

105 ADN, 9R1244, Mayor of Croix to Mayor of Lille, 9 December 1918.

106 See, for example, AML, 4H4, 'Lettre de Mgr l'évêque de Lille demandant à tous les fidèles de sa ville épiscopale de concourir au paiement de la contribution de guerre', 18 November 1914; and poster, Mayor of Lille, 15 November 1914.

107 Eugène Martin-Mamy, *Quatre ans avec les barbares: Lille pendant l'occupation allemande* (Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1919), pp. 108–13. See also Gromaire, *L'Occupation allemande*, pp. 168–9; Becker, *Journaux de combattants*, Degrutère diary, 19 March 1916, p. 196.

108 Gromaire, *L'Occupation allemande*, pp. 174–81; ADN, 9R1245–6, passim; ADN, 9R1241, Mayor of Lille to Préfet, 14 December 1918.

109 See, for example, ADN, 142J4, diary of P. P. Desrumaux on the occupation of Lille, 1914–18; ADN, 74J224, diary of M. Trollin (Directeur de l'École Rollin, Lille), 1914–1918; ADN, 74J225, Blin diary; ADN, J959, diary of Joseph Noyelle (avocat, docteur en droit, Secrétaire du Syndicat des Peigneurs à Roubaix, 1905–1932); ADN, J1933, Rouesel manuscript; ADN, J1950, diary of Pierre Motte (1861–1947, notaire à Lille); Becker, *Journaux de combattants*, Degrutère and David Hirsch diaries.

110 Benoît, 'L'état sanitaire', pp. 39–40.

111 Becker, *Les Cicatrices rouges*, pp. 272–3; Françoise Thébaud, *La Femme au temps de la guerre de 14* (Paris: Stock, 1986), pp. 53–4.

112 Gabrielle Yerta and Marguerite Yerta, *Six Women and the Invasion* (London: Macmillan, 1917), p. 306.

113 Becker, *Les Cicatrices rouges*, p. 140. For more on the wider relief effort and hunger, see pp. 131–58; McPhail, *The Long Silence*, pp. 61–90; Gromaire, *L'Occupation allemande*, pp. 187–206; Nivet, *La France occupée*, pp. 150–77.

114 For Britain's role in and response to the relief effort, see National Archives (NA), CAB24/37, Memorandum, Belgium Relief (December 1917); NA, CAB24/66 and 24/21, letter from Director for Europe of the Commission for Relief in Belgium (22 July 1917); British Parliamentary Archives, 1916 Commons Sitting, Prisoners of War, Relief in Belgium, House of Commons Debates, 10 August 1916, vol. 85, cols. 1201–2; NA, CAB24/34, Summary of Blockade Information, 23–9 November 1917.

115 Nivet, *La France occupée*, pp. 177–85; Benoît, 'L'état sanitaire'.

116 Proclamation, Lille, April 1916, cited in Gromaire, *L'Occupation allemande*, p. 278.

117 Darrow, *French Women*, pp. 118–21; Henri Cochin, Nicolas Bourgeois and André M. de Poncheville, *Le Nord dévasté* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1920), p. 10.

118 See, for example, Jules Basdevant, *Les Déportations du Nord de la France et de la Belgique en vue du travail forcé et le droit international* (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1917); *Le Temps*, *Le Figaro* and *Le Matin*, 29 July 1916; NA, FO 383/138, Foreign Office: Prisoners of War and Aliens Department: General Correspondence from 1906: France: Prisoners (1916) – Maurice de Bunsen to Lord Bertie, 5 October 1916, and Mr Spring Run to Viscount Grey of Falloden at the British Embassy in Washington, 31 July 1916.

119 See Becker, *Les Cicatrices rouges*, pp. 168–90; Basdevant, *Les Déportations du Nord*; Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction*, pp. 44–5; Gromaire, *L'Occupation allemande*, pp. 207–293.

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121 Roland Allender, *1914–1918 dans le Nord: Survivre en pays occupé* (Saint-Cyr-sur-Loire: Alan Sutton, 2006), p. 43; Becker, *Oubliés de la Grande Guerre*, p. 72.

122 See, for example, Becker, *Journaux de combattants*, Hirsch diary, 27 June 1915, p. 240.

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