

# Introduction

West Germany played a pivotal role in encouraging the Republic of Ireland's adaptation to a 'European' path. Its influence was both direct and indirect. Quite simply, Ireland was enticed by the tantalising trade opportunities offered by the rude economic good health of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The FRG was the industrial magnet at the heart of the European Economic Community (EEC) from the late 1950s. It promised to counteract Ireland's over-reliance on the relatively underperforming British economy. West Germany's dual importance as one of the largest food importers in the world and its growing position as an exporter of industrial investment lured an economically desperate Ireland towards the EEC.

The prevailing contemporary view is that US Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) played a major role in the Irish leap into industrial and economic modernity. The centrality of American investment to contemporary Irish economic sustainability is incontrovertible, but it is incorrect to superimpose this back on to the 1950s and 1960s. US firms only began to predominate as investors in Ireland after the completion of the Single European Market (SEM) and the inauguration of European Union (EU) in 1992. But before the end of the Cold War, West Germany was the motor of the European economy and access to it was deemed vital for Irish economic diversification. From the mid-1950s, when Ireland was experimenting with a new national development model, the field of foreign investors was diverse. West German firms seeking a business-friendly, low-cost environment and cheap labour competed with US multinationals to occupy the position of the second-largest investor in Ireland (behind Britain). This book contends that Ireland recognised that the post-war German economic miracle (*Wirtschaftswunder*) offered trade openings. Germany acted as a dynamic force in Ireland's modernisation from the mid-1950s. Ireland wanted 'to ride the wave of the future',<sup>1</sup> and the challenge was to adapt. This study of Irish–West German relations offers up a prism through which to reinterpret the shifts in Ireland's international reorientation and adaptation between 1949 and 1973.

The FRG was established in 1949 and recognised by the Western Allies (the United States, Britain and France). In response, the Soviet Union sanctioned the foundation of its Eastern alter ego, the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany). The division of Germany into two competing states, reflecting East–West rivalry in the Cold War, was formalised and the Soviet Union ended the blockade of West Berlin. Simultaneously, during that tumultuous year, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed. It was the collective security equivalent of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) that had been founded in 1948 and tasked with the post-war economic stabilisation and reconstruction of the United States' European friends and allies. Ireland refused to join NATO, though it was a founding member of the OEEC. Separately, in 1949 Ireland declared itself a republic and left the British Commonwealth. 1949, therefore, is a milestone for post-war Ireland, Germany and Europe, and it defined and circumscribed their future possibilities and identities. The year signalled new beginnings for Germany, Europe and Ireland.

By 1949, the post-war humanitarian crisis that had been visited on large swathes of the West German population was solved. German reconstruction had also recommenced strongly. Ludwig Erhard's currency reform, in the form of the Deutsche Mark's<sup>2</sup> replacement of the Reichsmark in 1948, is commonly viewed as laying the groundwork for the German renaissance. In parallel, West European and the transatlantic nations now identified the Soviet Union as the international menace. They began to view a resurgent West Germany as a necessity for their economic and defence security. This realisation laid the basis for a new European economic and security architecture.

A stark contrast opened up between the international paths of West Germany and Ireland during the next decade. Many Germans grasped that uninhibited nationalism had devastated their country and Europe, and they had to learn lessons from the Nazi past. West Germans began to construct a new state and identity. Their country was occupied and overseen by the Western powers, notably the United States. West Germany was a penetrated political system; it was externally regulated and controlled. Its first and long-serving chancellor, Dr Konrad Adenauer, engaged in policies that went a long way to solving traditional West European rivalries. The newly minted West Germany, with its capital in Bonn, embraced international rehabilitation and integration into the democratic fold. West Germany's position as the strategic fulcrum of Cold War Europe, its economic rebirth and the opportunities presented by West European cooperation smoothed its relative normalisation in little more than a decade. Adenauer consciously restrained the FRG's freedom of action by enmeshing it deeply in multilateral structures and institutions. The federalised and democratised West Germany became a founding member of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. It entered NATO in 1955. Next Franco-German cooperation became the underpinning for advanced regional economic

integration. It led to the signing of the treaties of Rome in 1957, which led to the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). In his steady and single-minded fashion Adenauer built up his Western neighbours' trust. Cumulatively, a 'new Europe' based on multi-lateral cooperation, free trade and regional economic integration was under construction. It was founded on Adenauer's pronounced pro-American orientation and his willingness to subsume, or even subordinate, West Germany within an international architecture that divested the country of substantial autonomy. In practice, Bonn transmuted into America's indispensable ally on the Continent that assured Western European cooperation, economic vitality and military security.

In sum, West Germany was converted into a core insider in a space of a decade or so. It was a product of American engineering which sponsored West European trade liberalisation, integration and collective security. A robust 'new Europe' based on multilateralism, interdependence and regionalism was constructed incrementally around West Germany to contain the Soviet Union. West Germany became a showpiece sculpted to meet American economic and security interests. It was renovated into a beacon of transformative possibilities, democracy, affluence and liberal values. West Germany reflected Adenauer's vision, which renounced traditional nationalist rivalries.

Conversely, the Republic of Ireland (after 1949) either failed to recognise or respond positively in a timely fashion to the new forces. This was a product of its location, experiences and national formation. The country had learned different lessons. During the interwar period, the fledgling Irish state had unsuccessfully sought a more international orientation, and to Europeanise by developing relations with major European states, including Weimar Germany. This interwar effort to counterbalance its former ruler and powerful neighbour, Britain, failed. The fragile liberal post First World War order envisioned by Woodrow Wilson completely disintegrated during the Great Depression. Extremism in the form of Fascism and Nazism tore the international order asunder and fuelled a retreat into atavistic nationalism and conflict. Ireland's efforts to break its economic dependence on Britain and end its effective status as a provincial economy came to naught, while its industrial protectionism produced anaemic results. Faced with the dramatic deterioration in the international climate, Ireland and Britain reluctantly recognised each other's political autonomy and accepted their economic and security interdependence in practice: they agreed a pre Second World War settlement (the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1938 and associated verbal assurances that Ireland would not become a base from which to attack Britain in 'a time of war'). The only unresolved aspect of the Irish national project was the persistence of the partition of the island, and Dublin held London responsible for this.

Nonetheless, the 1938 Anglo-Irish bargain held during and after the war. Relations, while not close or symmetrical, worked in spite of the disputed status

of Northern Ireland. Ireland and Britain had forged a pragmatic understanding that satisfied neither diehard Irish republicans nor British imperialists fully. Neutrality during the war confirmed and broadcasted Irish political identity and independence, even though its economy remained coupled to the British one. At best, Ireland 'emerged slowly and hesitantly'<sup>3</sup> after Second World War into 'a new and vastly different world'.<sup>4</sup> It was wary in the light of the failure of the interwar liberal order and defensive in terms of its newly won sovereignty. The Anglo-Irish economic arrangement delivered stability and familiarity against the backdrop of the wider international volatility of the early post-war years. Britain also emerged from the war with its national self-image affirmed and secured; its weakened position was not viewed as requiring a wholesale transformation of its international approach. In sum, the recent experiences of Ireland and Britain appeared to underline the value of their nation-states in contrast to those of Germany and other continental states. The latter were more receptive to innovative forms of international and regional cooperation. Ireland and Britain remained sceptical about discussions from the late 1940s favouring advanced forms of European economic integration and supranational institutions. These were perceived as threats to national sovereignty. The Irish rejection of NATO membership in 1949, based on the claim that the signing of the treaty legitimised partition, together with Ireland's failure to modernise and reduce protectionism, prolonged Ireland's complacent detachment, in the shadow of Britain, from many security and economic changes in Western Europe.

In a sense, by the early and mid-1950s Ireland was an enigma to many Western European observers: it was pro-Western, anti-communist and a free economy, but it was a neutral and an industrial protectionist. Its trade was profoundly regionalised (reliant on Britain). This commerce was contingent on Ireland's maintenance of the Commonwealth preference, by which Ireland was regarded by Britain as analogous to a Commonwealth member state for trade purposes. This dispensation granted it commercial advantages, especially in terms of exporting agricultural commodities duty-free to Britain. However, the relationship offered Ireland few opportunities for modernisation. It subsisted mostly by supplying low-cost and unprocessed food products (notably live cattle) to the British urban-industrial economy. Little had changed in this Anglo-Irish commercial connection since Irish independence in 1922. Ireland's economy remained backward and agricultural; the Anglo-Irish trade arrangement discouraged the development of a sophisticated, value-added, food-processing industry. To all intents, it was a satellite economy. Geographical proximity, the traditional pattern of trade, weak entrepreneurialism and a common language ensured that Ireland's subaltern relationship continued unperturbed after the achievement of political independence. Of course, Irish society was intensely conservative, and powerful social forces regarded economic modernisation and all that it entailed (e.g., urbanisation, industrialisation and secularisation) as a threat to its rural, Catholic

and national values. Irish foreign policy remained dedicated to reinforcing the country's independence from Britain and ending the island's division. The local (i.e., Anglo-Irish) factors animating Irish foreign policy preferences were dimly comprehended or viewed as peripheral to global security concerns by external observers. However, Ireland participated in the Marshall Plan, was a member of the OEEC and the Council of Europe, and gained belated entry into the United Nations (UN) in 1955.<sup>5</sup>

It is against this general backdrop that the book will examine Irish–German relations. Focusing primarily on political, diplomatic and commercial relations, it questions the uncritical tendency to accept the message propagated in the public diplomacy of both states. This argued that the bilateral relationship was special (or uniquely ‘friendly’). Amity and partnership were invariably evoked in official exchanges between Ireland and West Germany after 1949. The literature surveying the relationship traditionally regards the post-war relationship between the two democracies as ‘exceptionally positive’ or close.<sup>6</sup> Such portrayals gained particular credence when Ireland unhesitatingly supported German reunification during 1989 and 1990. A recent German ambassador to Ireland has suggested, ‘This episode in history, is, for German–Irish relations telling: it shows that relations have traditionally been excellent.’ He pointed to ‘a great wealth of cultural and economic exchanges ... stretching as far back as the Middle Ages’ and the common characteristics of the two countries expressed in their membership of the EU, support for international cooperation and development, and the UN.<sup>7</sup> Such claims have substance but they represent a simplification of multifarious contacts and connections. Like any relationship, even a relatively amicable one, the Irish–West German one was prone to strains. Depicting it as a ‘love affair’ is hyperbole. At the very least, the post-war relationship was more multifaceted and nuanced than initial impressions suggest.

Therefore, this book will present a more intricate narrative. Bitter trade disputes beset Irish–German relations throughout the 1950s. During the 1960s some Irish rural localities were unsettled by local resentment against Germans and other foreigners buying land. The Irish Government felt compelled to introduce legislation to restrict land purchases by foreign nationals. The controversy was invigorated by international press speculation about former Nazis and war criminals seeking a safe haven in Ireland. This posed another complication for Irish–German relations. A wave of arson attacks on mainly German properties in 1969 and 1970 prompted questions in the Bundestag. On the other hand, the influential *Irish Times*, which was considered by the FRG Embassy in Dublin as the least friendly of all the Irish dailies towards the FRG, wrote in its editorial in 1962 that West Germany was Ireland’s ‘best friend and ally’ in supporting Ireland’s application to join the EEC. There is evidence to suggest that this was the case. Adenauer argued that the Germans possessed ‘ancient special feelings’ for the people of Ireland.<sup>8</sup> Ireland as a generous humanitarian donor to

Germans after the war was applauded by West Germany. Germany was also a major investor in Irish industrial investment from the mid-1950s.

It is indisputable, nonetheless, that Ireland was a negligible preoccupation for official West Germany and lay outside its core interests. Ireland was distant and for the most part it was regarded as part of the British 'world' or lying within London's sphere of interest. In that respect this book will confirm there was considerable continuity in Germany's official attitudes to independent Ireland from the interwar and wartime periods into the post-war.<sup>9</sup> In spite of Ireland's efforts to differentiate its national identity and statehood from those of Britain, successive German regimes assumed that Ireland remained an organic part of the British economic and security system. Ireland's 'entrapment' within the British sphere would be the decisive factor when Ireland and Britain applied for membership of the EEC. Irish policymakers had no alternative other than to delay the country's application after Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain's EEC application in January 1963. This contradicted their earlier assertions that Ireland would continue with their application if Britain's failed.

This book will analyse approximately 25 years of Irish–West German affairs, allowing a measured examination of the fluctuating relationship. It terminates in 1973, when Ireland joined the European Communities (EC). This book examines the relationship against an evolving international backdrop that included war termination, continental rebuilding, regional integration and the Cold War. Factors such as the nature of both countries' relations with Britain, power asymmetries and dissimilar perspectives on economic, political and defence matters will be investigated. Some differences of policy, such as on trade liberalisation, NATO, the Cold War and Northern Ireland, will be illuminated. Therefore, this book explores a number of interrelated developments that intruded on the official relationship. Its primary contention is that West Germany, as the leading West European continental nation, was the Irish target market on continental Europe. Debates about Irish foreign policy often neglect or fail to appreciate Irish relations with states other than Britain and America. However, Ireland's role in the world has been heavily affected by the nature of Germany and its foreign policies ever since the 1870s, as I have argued in previous work.<sup>10</sup> To adopt a restricted Anglo-American or Anglocentric perspective on modern Irish foreign relations ignores the continental, and especially the German, factor in Irish foreign policy and trade.<sup>11</sup> Likewise the post-1945 focus of Irish foreign policy on Ireland's responses and associations with successive European cooperation ventures conceals the fact that a search for a solution to the 'German Question' drove these ventures.

This book draws extensively on the National Archives of Ireland in Dublin and the Auswärtiges Amt-Politisches Archiv (AA-PA), Berlin. This is the repository of the files of the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt or AA) and its missions abroad. The archive also contains detailed correspondence with other

government arms, including the Economics Ministry, the Chancellery and the President's Office. In addition, the Archives of the Christian Democratic Party at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation at Sankt Augustin were consulted. These contain a useful collection of newspaper and periodical articles relating to Ireland published in the Irish and West German print media. Cumulatively, the German sources complement the official documentation available in the National Archives of Ireland, Dublin. In the latter case, the files of the Department of Foreign Affairs (hereafter referred to as DFA) and the Department of Taoiseach were invaluable, but records from the Department of Industry and Commerce and the Department of Justice were also partially available and they added some key insights. (It is a cause for regret that many government departments and agencies have not released files with the same assiduity as Foreign Affairs and the Department of the Taoiseach. This severely restricts historical research, institutional analysis and historically informed policy analysis.) The private papers of key national figures (e.g., Frank Aiken, Patrick Hillery and Eamon de Valera) deposited in the Archives Department of the University College Dublin also revealed insights and details. The online databases of the Irish Newspaper Archives and the *Irish Times* Archive proved to be exceptional research resources. They enabled the construction of a detailed image of Irish official and popular readings of German developments and Irish–German relations.

The corpus of literature on Irish–German relations has grown from a relatively low base since the early 1990s. Irish–German studies are now a rich vein of multi-disciplinary research, primarily in the field of culture and literature. There is also a secondary field which explores Irish–German business interactions.<sup>12</sup> The inauguration of the Centre for Irish German Studies in the University of Limerick in 1997 illustrates the rise of what might be termed German–Irish cultural studies. Much of the research is led by German departments in Irish universities or by individuals working across several disciplines, mainly in the fold of language, literature, culture and communication studies, in Irish and German universities. Of this field, Claire O'Reilly has noted that 'it is remarkable how many publications have refracted the relationship through the lens of the German perspective of Ireland'.<sup>13</sup> There is undoubtedly a heavy focus on German interpretations and stereotypes of Ireland and Irishness in this general field of language, literature, culture and communication. Most recently, Fergal Lenehan has published *Stereotypes, Ideology and Foreign Correspondents*, which analyses the articles devoted to Ireland in two West German 'prestige' weeklies, *Die Zeit* and *Der Spiegel*, from 1946 to 2010.<sup>14</sup> It is a work of intercultural and transnational studies. Lenehan's focus is on German images and representations of Ireland and Irishness. It is a helpful contribution and some of its findings are confirmed in this book. Although it is revealing about the tropes and discourses in these two German publications, Lenehan's work is narrow in focus and different in motivation to this book. Likewise Lenehan's methodology is different

from the standard methods of international, political, diplomatic and economic history that this book adopts. Moreover, it reveals little about the broader nature of the interstate relationship that is the objective of this book. However, it is a useful complement.

There is a compact body of work concentrating on Irish–German interstate relations, and the international history of this relationship. The historical study of the first five decades of twentieth-century Irish–German relations is a particular site of productive and rich research.<sup>15</sup> Only recently have attentions turned to appreciating Irish relations with the FRG and the GDR after 1949.<sup>16</sup> Historical scholarship first began to explore the significance of relations between independent Ireland and Germany in the 1970s. Cumulatively, the historical work is heavily focused on the ‘European Thirty Years Crisis’ (1914–45) and its edges. This book is the first effort to compile a book-length study of Irish–West German relations from the Irish perspective, beginning with West Germany’s foundation and ending with Ireland’s entry into the EEC. Jérôme aan de Wiel has pioneered the study of East German relations with Ireland over a longer period (from 1949 to 1990), primarily through the lens of the East German intelligence services, the Stasi. Ireland finally agreed to inaugurate diplomatic relations with East Germany in 1980,<sup>17</sup> although it recognised and opened full relations with West Germany quickly after its foundation.

One short book by Cathy Molohan, *Germany and Ireland 1945–55: Two Nations’ Friendship*, ventured to explore post-war Irish–West German relations. It was dominated by the war termination matters (the repatriation of German military internees, German spies, and German diplomats) that cast a long shadow over Irish dealings with the Allies and nascent West Germany. Many works which have dealt with Ireland and Germany’s interactions during Second World War cover some similar ground in their final chapters or codas, but Molohan’s work has major value as it considers the immediate post-war decade on its own merits and in noteworthy depth. It also documents previously unexplored aspects of the relationship such as Irish relief to wartorn Germany. Molohan opened up the field of post-war Irish–German relations as a distinct field worthy of historical exploration. Political, diplomatic, cultural and commercial relations were illuminated. However, the result was an appraisal which largely accepted Irish and German declarations that their relationship was friendly. It lacked a longer-term perspective. Molohan’s book did not explore the tensions that simmered in the relationship after the mid-1950s, since its focus was earlier. The work might also have usefully considered wider European integration questions too. Even though Molohan’s book is a noteworthy contribution, there remains a major opportunity to investigate post-war Irish–German relations over a longer time frame (nearly three decades), taking into account major developments in the Cold War, including the rehabilitation of West Germany, European reconstruction, European



integration (ECSC, EEC), the liberalisation of international trade and collective security (NATO).

This book aims to go at least some of the way to filling these and other gaps. The general historical literature on Ireland's post-war foreign relations is developing but it tends to be heavily EEC, UN or Northern Ireland centred. No full-length monograph exists that critically examines Ireland's post-1945 relations with any European state over such a lengthy period of time using primary evidence. The FRG is a worthy candidate for such a study as it was Ireland's key trading partner in continental Western Europe.

The only approach that can satisfactorily capture enough of the complexity and provide a convincing explanation and understanding of the Irish–German relationship from 1949 to 1973 is the historical narrative. Using the historical narrative approach, I will shed new light on post-war Ireland's shift from an Anglo-Irish focus to a wider European one. This will enable an improved appreciation of the challenges associated with Irish adaptation and modernisation.

### Notes

- 1 H. Gärtner, 'Austria's Relations with Germany: Between Balancing and Bandwagoning', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 9 (1998), p. 67.
- 2 Commonly called Deutschmark in English.
- 3 D. Dinan, 'After the "Emergency": Ireland in the Postwar World, 1945–50', *Éire-Ireland*, 24 (1989), p. 86.
- 4 F. S. L. Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine* (London: Fontana, 1973), p. 558.
- 5 M. O'Driscoll, 'Multilateralism: From Plato's Cave to the European Community, 1945–73', in B. Tonra, M. Kennedy, J. Doyle and N. Dorr (eds), *Irish Foreign Policy* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2012), pp. 36–41.
- 6 N. O'Mahony and C. O'Reilly (eds), *Societies in Transition: Ireland, Germany and Irish-German Relations in Business and Society since 1989* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009).
- 7 C. Pauls, 'Preface: Ireland and Germany – Two Countries Joined by Friendship and Partnership', in O'Mahony and O'Reilly (eds), *Societies in Transition*, p. v.
- 8 NAI, DFA, Embassy Series, Bonn, 18/2/111, Memo of Conversation between Lemass and Adenauer, 22 October 1962.
- 9 For a pre-war analysis of German attitudes, see: M. O'Driscoll, *Ireland, Germany and the Nazis: Politics and Diplomacy, 1919–39*, 2nd edn (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2017), in particular pp. 49, 68–70, 113, 166–9, 216–18, 266–7. Pre-war Germany treated Ireland as a subset of Britain's direct sphere of influence and resisted any appearance of interference in British interests until the late 1930s. This general pattern of German behaviour continued into the post-war period.
- 10 For example, O'Driscoll, *Ireland, Germany and the Nazis*.
- 11 The one major exception to the Anglophone-centred literature is the exemplary work: J. van de Wiel, *The Irish Factor 1899–1919: Ireland's Strategic and Diplomatic Importance for Foreign Powers* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2008).

- 12 Informative and wide-ranging assessments of the state of Irish-German studies include: C. O'Reilly, 'Contextualising Ireland and the Irish in Germany – Reception and Perception', in O'Reilly and O'Regan (eds), *Ireland and the Irish in Germany*, pp. 13–28; F. Lenehan, *Stereotypes, Ideology and Foreign Correspondents: German Media Representations of Ireland, 1946–2010* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016), pp. 2–4.
- 13 C. O'Reilly, 'Contextualising Ireland and the Irish in Germany', p. 14.
- 14 Lenehan, *Stereotypes, Ideology and Foreign Correspondents*.
- 15 C. J. Carter, *The Shamrock and the Swastika: German Espionage in Ireland in World War II* (Palo Alto: Pacific, 1977); M. O'Driscoll, 'The Economic War and Irish Foreign Trade Policy: Irish-German Commerce 1932–9', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 10 (1999), pp. 71–89; M. O'Driscoll, 'Inter-war Irish-German Diplomacy: Continuity, Ambiguity and Appeasement in Irish Foreign Policy', in M. Kennedy and J. M. Skelly (eds), *Irish Foreign Policy, 1919–69: From Independence to Internationalism* (Dublin: Four Courts, 2000), pp. 74–95; R. R. Doerries, *Prelude to the Easter Rising: Sir Roger Casement in Imperial Germany* (London: Frank Cass, 2000); J. Fischer, *Das Deutschlandbild der Iren 1890–1939* (Heidelberg: Winter, 2000); H. Dickel, *Die deutsche Aussenpolitik und die irische Frage von 1932 bis 1944* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1983); J. P. Duggan, *Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1985); M. M. Hull, *Irish Secrets: German Espionage in Ireland, 1939–45* (Dublin: Irish Academic, 2003); M. O'Driscoll, "'To Bring Light Unto the Germans": Irish Recognition-seeking, the Weimar Republic and the British Commonwealth, 1930–2', *European History Quarterly*, 33: 1 (2003), pp. 65–100; J. P. Duggan, *Herr Hempel at the German Legation in Dublin, 1937–45* (Dublin; Portland, OR: Irish Academic, 2003); M. O'Driscoll, *Ireland, Germany and the Nazis: Politics and Diplomacy, 1919–39* (Dublin: Four Courts, 2004); N. Keogh, *Con Cremin: Ireland's Wartime Diplomat* (Douglas Village, Cork: Mercier, 2006); J. aan de Wiel, *The Irish Factor, 1899–1919: Ireland's Strategic and Diplomatic Importance for Foreign Powers* (Dublin and Portland, OR: Irish Academic, 2008); C. Sterzenbach, *Die deutsch-irischen Beziehungen während der Weimarer Republik, 1918–33: Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur* (Münster: LIT, 2009); G. Holfter (ed.), *The Irish Context of Kristallnacht: Refugees and Helpers* (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2014); G. Holfter and H. Dickel, *An Irish Sanctuary: German-speaking Refugees in Ireland 1933–45* (Oldenburg: de Gruyter, 2016); Siobhán O'Connor, *Irish Government Policy and Public Opinion towards German-speaking Refugees, 1933–43* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2017).
- 16 K. Molohan, *Germany and Ireland 1945–55: Two Nations' Friendship* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1999); M. O'Driscoll, 'Hesitant Europeans, Self-Defeating Irredentists and Security Free-Riders? West German Assessments of Irish Foreign Policy during the Early Cold War, 1949–59', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 21 (2010), pp. 91–106; M. O'Driscoll, 'The "Unwanted Suitor": West Germany's Reception, Response and Role in Ireland's EEC Entry Request, 1961–3', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 22 (2011), pp. 1–24; M. O'Driscoll, 'West Germany', in M. O'Driscoll, D. Keogh, and J. aan de Wiel (eds), *Ireland through European Eyes: Western Europe, the EEC and Ireland, 1945–73* (Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 2013), pp. 9–74; M. O'Driscoll, 'Die Stunde Null: Appraising Irish Relief to Postwar Germany', in O'Reilly and O'Regan (eds), *Ireland and the Irish in Germany*, 63–84;

- M. O'Driscoll, 'A "German Invasion"? Irish Rural Radicalism, European Integration, and Irish Modernisation, 1958–73', *International History Review*, 38: 3 (2016), pp. 527–50; M. O'Driscoll, '“We are trying to do our share”: The Construction of Positive Neutrality and Irish Post-War Relief to Europe', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 27 (2016), pp. 21–38.
- 17 J. aan de Wiel, 'The Trouble with Frank Ryan; “corpse diplomacy” between Ireland and East Germany, 1966–1980', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 25 (2014), pp. 203–20; J. aan de Wiel, *East German Intelligence and Ireland, 1949–90: Espionage, Terrorism and Diplomacy* (Manchester: Manchester University, 2015).