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Introducing small state survival as a historical phenomenon

Small states are survival artists. In a states system shaped by power politics and dominated by great powers, the survival and especially the proliferation of small states is a remarkable phenomenon. But what is the actual magnitude of this phenomenon and how can it be explained? In short, what is the ‘big story’ behind small state survival?

Understanding the survival of small states as one consistent historical phenomenon stretching over the past three-and-a-half centuries, the answers developed here are: 1) The overall picture of small state survival is uneven, with periods of general stability interrupted by major fluctuations in overall numbers. 2) Small states’ survival depends first and foremost on the key features of the states system. Larger changes in the number of small states are the result of broader changes in the states system. 3) The story of small state survival is shaped by their dependency on the states system for their security.

Understanding the story of small state survival requires a clear focus on the international states system. This study finds that different variations of the Westphalian states system had very different effects on small state survival. The most hostile environment for the small state was the late nineteenth-century concert system; the most supportive was the bipolar world of the later twentieth century. Surprisingly, the crude balance-of-power system of the eighteenth century proved fairly accommodating of small state survival. Looking to the future, a modest rise in the number of small states can be predicted.

Why study the small state’s struggle to survive?

Singapore’s founder and long-time leader Lee Kuan Yew once answered the question “can we survive?” by pointing to dynamics beyond his

small state: “It depends upon world conditions. It doesn’t depend on us alone. ... So, it depends on whether there is an international environment which says that borders are sacrosanct and there is the rule of law.”¹ The study proceeds along these lines and is focused on the external dynamics to which Lee alluded.

Addressing the same question of survival, but from a historical perspective, fellow Singaporean Kishore Mahbubani admitted that “history is not comforting. Many successful city-states have disappeared from the face of the earth.”² Picking up on his point, this study approaches the issue from a long-range perspective. In order to capture the larger, overall story of small state survival, the historical perspective is critical.

To tell the full story of the small state’s fate in the Westphalian states system, the focus must be on the overall picture. In light of the existence of an abundance of case studies, it became necessary to re-focus the analysis away from the “particular cause” and on to the “general,” overarching cause.³ As a result, this study is not concerned with any particular small state but with the ‘generalized’ small state and its abstracted struggles to survive. And survival is understood here narrowly as the “irreducible minimum”⁴ of statecraft and as the ultimate state interest as preached by Niccolò Machiavelli.⁵

Studies of small state survival are relevant for stateswomen and -men. As Lee and Mahbubani point out, survival remains an acute problem for the small state, especially because it depends, at least in good part, on exogenous factors. Small states cannot take their survival for granted and need to understand where the key dynamics originate.

Small states’ chances of survival are largely shaped by the states system. A better understanding of these dynamics can help shape the international environment in ways more supportive of the small state. The most obvious place to do so today would be at the United Nations (UN) and in International Law. There, the world can be made safer for the small state.

In addition to policy relevance, an investigation into small state survival has scholarly significance. Robert Keohane famously posits: “If Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make him do their fighting for them, they must be studied as carefully as the giant.”⁶ It must not be assumed that small states are simply downsized versions of larger states. In fact, some see the small state as a distinct category of state,⁷ and this underlines Keohane’s demand. The present study strongly suggests that small state survival is governed by different rules from those that govern great powers.

Keohane’s general statement on relevance is flanked by the need to properly capture the phenomenon of the small state’s place in international affairs. The claim that “there are now more small states

than ever”⁸ is not new,⁹ but has so far not been put to the test. This study fills that niche and rejects these claims. The number of small states in existence today is not unprecedented, and the various discourses on small state proliferation need to be adjusted.

The observation of dramatically changing numbers of one type of a unit of a system – here the termination and proliferation of small states – immediately leads to the recognition that this entails vast shifts in the composition of the system. Losing or adding significant numbers of units actually changes the system’s overall anatomy. With respect to the system of states, the mixture of states of various sizes has effects beyond simple numerical relationships, presumably because it changes the state system’s very make-up.

In fact, Hans Morgenthau pointed out that larger changes in a state system’s composition can have effects detrimental to its proper operation. The more great powers grew by absorbing small states, the fewer units were available in the system to maintain the equilibrium. The ongoing losses of small states also meant a shift in the states system, from a system with a multitude of actors of various sizes to an increasingly concentrated system of a handful of great powers and a few remaining small states. In the aggregate, the ongoing disappearance of small states changed the fundamentals of the nineteenth-century states system.

More specifically, the fragmented status of Germany in the past had been critical to the proper operation of the balance of power and the concert system. First, the particularized Germany shaped the traditional framework for Europe’s powers, which were located along the periphery, around a non-integrated center. This implied a weak Germany and two counter-balanced great powers, Prussia and Austria. The situation changed drastically with German unification in 1870–71¹⁰ and the disappearance of all remaining German small states.

Second, in the past a soft underbelly in the middle of Europe had allowed rising states to expand without challenging the territorial integrity of other major states. Additionally, a large number of units had benefitted from concert states’ efforts to fine-tune the equilibrium, making the disappearance of small states detrimental to proper balancing of power, as pointed out by Morgenthau.¹¹

The analysis of the small state’s centuries-old struggle to survive may lead to a renewed appreciation of security as an analytical concept. Studying security from the perspective of the small and weak and in varying international environments promises new insights and lines of inquiry. To begin with, for the small state, proper security can only under the rarest of circumstances be generated by accumulating or even maximizing power.

In this sense, small states fall outside the Realist paradigm. Rather, much of the small state's safety depends on the core features of the states system. Worse yet, the states system has been shaped and remains dominated by great powers, and small states have very limited capabilities to adjust it to their own needs. In sum, for the small state, maximizing power does not generate the levels of security it does for middle and great powers.

For example, being within striking distance of great and middle powers, Singapore cannot rely on its military forces only for protection, making it much more dependent on working power balances, international organizations that manage disputes, and the rule of law. Great powers may benefit from these features, but small states depend on them.¹² The historical record only underlines this insight. The Saxony of the early nineteenth century had a strong army but still lost much of its territory during the negotiations in Vienna in 1815. The reason was the particular constellation of the balance of power which did not give the small state an opening to strengthen its position. Without top-down protection from the states system, its military power proved useless.

All this points to the critical importance of reconsidering the concept of security and its application to the small state. Singapore's Tommy Koh has pointed out that small states may sometimes "punch above their weight."¹³ However, doing this successfully is the exception to the rule. After all is said and done, small states cannot assume they will win against heavyweights consistently.

Where to advance the study of the small state?

This study on small state survival contributes to the existing discourses in the discipline of International Relations and in Small States Studies along four pathways. First, and most obviously, the study's statistical aspect fills two niches. Few scholars have addressed the quantitative dimension of small state proliferation. By far the best numerically informed study is that of Alan Henrikson, but his statistical data are limited to the twentieth century.¹⁴ Existing historical data sets, such as the Correlates of War project, only add the nineteenth century and do not separate out small states from larger powers.¹⁵ The quantitative aspect of the present study fills this vacuum by providing the full picture of annual small state numbers since the inception of the current states system in 1648, at the Peace of Westphalia. A second niche has been identified in overall small state scholarship. Writing in the 1960s, William T. R. Fox could still optimistically state: "More and more the survival of the small states has become the subject of systematic investigations."¹⁶ About four decades later, Andrew Cooper and Timothy Shaw

lament that “the analytic and policy attention towards these states has not matched their proliferation.”¹⁷

Second, the study of the small state suffers from incomplete integration into the theory of International Relations. In response, a definition is developed here which places the small state properly in one mainstream theory: Realism. By doing so and by investigating small state behavior in power-driven states systems, this study generates fresh insights on balancing, bandwagoning, and alliance building – all critical debates within International Relations theory. In addition, it speaks loudly on the concept of security and connects small state safety with the discourses on global governance – both major building blocks for theorizing about international relations.

Third, fresh examinations of the small state in world politics promise to change the narrow focus on middle and great powers all too common in the discipline of International Relations and especially its theory. Many discourses center on great and middle powers, and the patterns of their interactions are then extrapolated for the study of international politics generally. Similarly, most of today’s theory on international relations is built on great power behavior. In contrast, studies of the small state, such as the present one, turn the traditional analytical perspective upside-down. Starting from a new viewpoint, the dynamics of international politics, and in particular the issues of security and survival, are recast in a new light.

Fourth, this study returns to the earlier interest in small states’ traditional security concerns. In a post-Cold War and post-9/11 world of new and rising insecurities and renewed challenges to the traditional order, small states in particular must reconsider their security situation. What had concerned the Melians in Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War appears to return to contemporary international affairs: small states are threatened by great powers’ military might.¹⁸ Singapore’s concerns have been mentioned above. Taiwan’s security remains tenuous. And for the Baltic States, Russia’s aggressive moves westward in the early twenty-first century began changing their regional security environment.

In this context, the present project re-connects with a rich but dated literature on small state security. The initial revival of Small States Studies in the early Cold War was much concerned with small state security,¹⁹ but was soon superseded by foci on domestic issues and internal shortcomings that were posing unique challenges to small states in an era of globalization.²⁰ An alternative perspective perceived small states as disadvantaged in today’s complex and interconnected world and thus deserving of support from the community of states.²¹ Despite the variety of approaches, little research fully integrates the systemic perspective

and explores system-level dynamics and their importance for small state survival and proliferation. And it is on this point that the present study intends to advance the agenda.

Climbing on giants' shoulders

This study builds on strong scholarship. Annette Baker Fox, Michael Handel, David Vital, and Robert Rothstein advanced the agenda on small state survival early on.²² Fox's research centered on how "governments of small and military weak states can resist the strong pressure of great powers."²³ Her colleagues had related agendas and focused on how small states could prepare themselves better to withstand coercion and aggression or how their leaders could find ways and means to enhance state security. For all of them, small states' security vulnerabilities stemmed from their internal weaknesses and therefore needed cures that could be generated by the state itself.

This is where the present study plots a different course. The destination is the same – understanding how small states survive – but the route taken looks at the states system, rather than the state or its leaders. In the discipline of International Relations' parlance, this study works at the systemic level of analysis.

The systemic level is considered the "key explanatory factor"²⁴ for two reasons. First, it is hypothesized that the larger trends in small state death, survival, and proliferation are driven by structures and dynamics at the system level. Second, the *magnitude* of changes and the *uniformity* of trends with respect to small state survival over the course of history strongly suggest the dominance of general, system-wide dynamics. Figure 1 shows the overall developments in the number of small states for the past three-and-a-half centuries. Nearly 400 small states were lost in less than 250 years and later 80 small states emerged in less than 50 years. To explain these changes and developments at the sub-systemic level assumes an extremely high level of parallel developments in dozens of small states at about the same time. This is considered analytically unsatisfactory here and therefore rejected.

Instead, this study picks up on previous work that sees the states system as "decisive in setting the structure within which small states have to act,"²⁵ and thus placing limits on their political options.²⁶ This general line of inquiry is adopted here. More specifically, this study follows in the footsteps of investigations that focus more clearly on the system's impact on small state security,²⁷ and especially the work of Robert Rothstein and Michael Handel. Rothstein pointed to the importance of the states system in the relationship between a small state and




Figure 1 Numbers of small and larger states, 1648–2016

a great power.²⁸ His insight is transferred to the present study where it directs the orientation of the inquiry towards system-level dynamics.

Looking at the states system opens the door to understanding the states system as the key determinant of small state security and insecurity. Herbert Butterfield describes the balance-of-power system as a protective and enabling mechanism: “[T]he balance not only guaranteed the existence of small states, but assured them of a certain degree of autonomy, a power of independent action. It guaranteed their independence at its most crucial point, namely, in the realm of foreign policy.”²⁹ Michael Handel makes essentially the same point when he talks about small (conceptualized as weak) states’ “relative security”: “It is ... possible to distinguish between cycles of security or insecurity, influence or impotence of the weak states in the international system. The position and relative security of any weak state must be gauged in terms of the specific international system in which it is operating.”³⁰

These lines of investigation, as they were initially developed by Rothstein, Butterfield, and Handel, are picked up in this study. They will be the starting point for an investigation that goes further and deeper by looking at the specifics of the various incarnations of the modern states system and how these system-level features translated into different degrees of small state security.

With this analytical orientation, this study finds itself also in agreement with Morgenthau, who states that “[s]mall nations have always owed their independence either to the balance of power ..., or to the preponderance of one protecting power ..., or to their lack of attractiveness for imperialistic aspirations.”³¹

The statistics of small state survival: a first cut

Figure 1 shows the phenomenon under investigation here, the history of small state termination, survival, and proliferation over almost 370 years. The graph shows very different periods of development over time. The story of small state survival did not play out as one single trend. Periods of loss are followed by times of recovery. The changes up- and downward are remarkable in themselves; as Fox points out: “The continued existence and, indeed, startling increase in the number of small states may seem paradoxical in the age of superpowers and the drastically altered ration of military strength between them and the rest of the world.”³²

Things become even more “paradoxical” if the ubiquity of war in earlier times is considered. In fact, given the anarchic nature of international politics since the middle of the seventeenth century and the general weakness of small states, one may reasonably assume that most losses of small states

are the result of wars. Some correlations can indeed be found, the most prominent being the Napoleonic Wars and the dramatic decline in the number of small states during this period. Looking at the bigger picture, however, open military aggression seems not to be the primary cause of small state death. Many small states have died peacefully, although not necessarily voluntarily. Moreover, the reverse case is hard to find: periods of small state increase do not neatly tally with peaceful times.³³

The “paradox” between small state survival on the one hand and their weakness *vis-à-vis* middle, great, and superpowers finds its explanation when the particulars of the states system are considered as the key explanatory variable. Stability and steady trends as well as shifts and changes in the number of small states, as shown in Figure 1, have their explanation at the system level, where the balance-of-power era was succeeded by the concert system, which was in turn replaced by systems of collective security and global governance.

Setting up an analytical and theoretical framework

A couple of assumptions were made at the outset of this project. First, survival is understood here in the true Machiavellian sense of preventing the complete annihilation of a state,³⁴ or “state death.”³⁵ The rate of survival is captured statistically by comparing the total annual number of small states. In this way, the rise and fall in total numbers describes the overall picture of success or failure of small state survival. Second, security is critical to survival. The more secure a state can be, the higher its chances of survival. Third, the small state is considered a distinct category of state and as such it can be counted.³⁶ Fourth, all states exist in a system of states that can be traced back to the mid seventeenth century. Still today, the “Westphalian principles are, at this writing, the sole generally recognized basis of what exists of a world order.”³⁷ Fifth, the almost 370 years of Westphalian world order witnessed “big bangs”:³⁸ “critical turning points” when the old order was changed, but not completely discarded.³⁹ They will be used as short-hand markers for the change of one states system to the next. Sixth, the chances for small states to survive are determined by the various levels of security the system generates. A more supportive system leads to fewer losses of small states or additions of small states, and a less supportive system creates higher rates of small state death.

This study views international relations since at least the mid seventeenth century to be driven by concerns over state power. Consequently, the study deals with power, weakness, and power politics. To do so properly, a theoretical framework was needed that puts power and power

balancing front and center. And since the focus here is on the system, its structure, and its restraints on power, the framework must prioritize the system level of analysis. For these reasons, a composite theoretical framework that integrates the Realist, Structural Realist, and English School paradigms was developed.

Power and power politics are important concepts in the academic discipline of International Relations theory, and particularly in Realist thinking. Following Edward Vose Gulick, the term power politics “characteriz[es] the totality of the struggle among states which are compelled to rely upon their own strength for security and survival. ‘Power politics’ implies no set aim or policy; it embraces all methods, equilibrist or expansionist alike.”⁴⁰

Since antiquity, Realist thinking has focused on power. It is seen as critical for state security and the national interest.⁴¹ States amass power in a fundamentally anarchic environment, and the system of states is structured by the uneven distribution of power among states.⁴² In such a world, the major powers are critical, as Kenneth Waltz insists. The configuration between the great powers determines the system’s overall structure, and the great powers set the system’s polarity.⁴³

The states system’s structure is further shaped by features that modify it and impact the application of power. In classical and modern Realism, raw power politics is modified first and foremost by power balancing. Morgenthau refers to balancing and additional features as “limitations of national power.”⁴⁴ In addition to the balance of power, he suggests ethics, world opinion, and International Law act as key “limitations.”⁴⁵

The English School describes these modifiers as societal norms. Hedley Bull refers to them as “values.”⁴⁶ He highlights, consistent with Morgenthau, the balance of power and International Law but also suggests diplomacy and problematizes war.⁴⁷ F. H. Hinsley uses the label “restraints;”⁴⁸ Leslie Gelb refers to “international constraints on the strong.”⁴⁹

Realism and English School theory overlap in various areas, such as the observation that unbridled power politics does not occur because the basically anarchic system is modified in order to “keep aspirations for power in socially tolerable bounds”⁵⁰ and find meaningful order in an “anarchical society.”⁵¹ Whether conceived of as limitations of power or communal norms and values, these features co-determine, together with the power-based structure, the actual nature of the states system.⁵² More recently, Richard Little added that “social, ideational and material factors” are tasked with “ameliorating the effects” of otherwise unhampered great power interaction.⁵³

Building on this scholarship, the states system is defined here by its core structure and its key modifiers. As the Westphalian states system

developed, it went through various stages which featured different balances between the system's overall structure and the most important modifiers of the era. This study uses Bull's and Morgenthau's ordering features and limitations as a starting point⁵⁴ but goes beyond them where necessary. After all, different time periods witnessed the erosion of some limitations and rise of other modifiers.

In order to develop a truly comprehensive picture of small state survival, an examination of the states system in its entirety, that is to say across time and space, is required. The contemporary states system is a variation of the Westphalian states system of the seventeenth century. Thus the data available to study the small state in its systemic environment reach back about three-and-a-half centuries, to the end of the Thirty Years' War. Studying small state survival over the entire time span provides a richer and, arguably, more accurate picture.

Admittedly, that states system emerged only over time,⁵⁵ but the year 1648, when the Thirty Years' War was formally ended with the Peace of Westphalia, is a reasonable starting point. The treaty's extensive provisions are evidence of a consciously designed states system. Similar markers are the Congress of Vienna of 1814–15 and the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919. These years saw the conclusion of major efforts to reconfigure the states system and are thus solid markers for long-range historical analysis.

Today's states system did not emerge in 1945, as Raymond Aron maintains;⁵⁶ nor did the European states system end that year, as Paul Schroeder argues.⁵⁷ Rather, the system continued but changed from an exclusively European, to a Europe-centered, and finally to a global system over the course of its existence.⁵⁸ The system expanded geographically but maintained its core features and operating principles. In this sense, it remained one system.⁵⁹ Put differently, the emergence of a truly global states system in the twentieth century was not achieved by the establishment of a new system but by the expansion of the existing states system in membership and geographic reach.

To be sure, states existed outside the Westphalian system before European colonialism transferred European international relations abroad. As Morgenthau indicates: "The expansion of the European state system into the other continents by means of colonial empires, from the beginning of the sixteenth to the end of the nineteenth century, broke down the barrier that had separated the different systems of international relations."⁶⁰ However, only after a period of "isolation or subordination"⁶¹ was overcome and colonies transitioned into sovereign states did they become part of the states system as properly functioning units. Consequently, they are considered and counted here only after they had

overcome colonial rule. To be sure, there are some exceptions. China, for example, had been a state long before Europe made peace in the mid seventeenth century, and Siam was able to avoid European colonization and protect its statehood. Overall, however, the current states system has its roots in the Westphalian system. Over time, it evolved from a European to a global system. Efforts to trace small state survival back in time thus lead back to Europe without necessarily becoming biased and Eurocentric.

The European system's evolution can be divided into three major eras. These 'long centuries' will be used to organize the investigation of small state survival which follows. They are also important for the analysis of the small state's fate because each of these eras featured a different variation of the Westphalian system of sovereign states. The history of the contemporary states system is sub-divided into the era of the *laissez-faire* balance of power (1648 to the 1790s), the era of the concert system (1815 to 1914), and an extended twentieth-century era of power politics paired with collective security and global governance (1919 to the early twenty-first century).⁶²

The road map

The study develops in three stages. This introductory chapter will be followed by a combined definitional and statistical chapter. Next, three world historical periods and their respective states systems will be examined. These chapters form the heart of the study. Their key findings will be highlighted in a concluding chapter which extends the debate by offering an outlook on small state survival in the foreseeable future.

This introduction has already begun to construct the analytical framework. It will be expanded in the following chapter, where the discussion turns to the definition of the small state. This is critical for two reasons. First, the sub-field of Small States Studies has not settled on a consensus definition. Different scholars have suggested different ways of describing the small state and explaining its behavior. These discourses need to be considered in order to evaluate strengths and weaknesses. Most critically, an examination of the literature showed that no properly developed definition of the small state existed that fit precisely the requirements of this project. Second, the research project required descriptive statistics to confirm or contradict a theory-driven claim. This in turn necessitated the collection of historical data on small states worldwide and for the last three-and-a-half centuries. Such quantitative research required a definition of the small state that was precise enough to count and code states and flexible enough to work across time and space.

With the small state defined as a negligible unit of a power-based international states system, a data set of small and non-small states

was put together. The data are presented in the second half of chapter 2. The complete data set including the code sheet is available online at www.smallstate.info. Instead of reproducing the entire raw data here, the statistical exploration will rely heavily on graphics to visualize the key observations and on descriptive statistics.

The purpose of the quantitative section is to showcase the particular phenomenon of small state survival, highlight its particularity, and support the claim that small state survival is linked causally to the states system. The total annual number of small states is presented, and the larger development, the rise and fall in the number of small states from year to year, is taken as an indicator for small state abolishment, survival, or proliferation. The data show that different historical eras can indeed be matched to particular trends in small state survival.

Each of the next three chapters examines a major era of the international system of states. Chapter 3 investigates the era of the classic balance of power which began after the end of the Thirty Years' War in 1648 and ended during the French Revolutionary Wars and the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte. The fourth chapter looks at the concert system that was created in 1814–15 and vanished in the lead-up to the First World War. The fifth chapter examines the twentieth- and early twenty-first-century states system's features and record, starting in 1919 and ending nearly a century later.

Each of these chapters is sub-divided into three parts. The first part develops an initial plausibility case for the claim that the era's particular states system was relevant to small state survival. The system's key features will be examined closely in order to evaluate if and how much they may favor or disfavor the small state. From that emerges a picture of a states system's particular character with respect to the small state and its survival. The traditional balance of power of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it will be shown, was rather conducive to small state survival, more so than the concert system of the succeeding era. However, neither was a match for the supportive and protective nature of the twentieth-century system when it came to small states and their chances of survival.

The second parts of chapters 3, 4, and 5 are brief but customized recapitulations of the numerical data presented in chapter 2. The purpose is to show the actual survival or proliferation trend during this era and to demonstrate how the proclaimed nature of the state system with regard to small state survival is reflected in the rise and fall of the actual numbers of small states.

The third and final part of these three chapters examines the historical record. The history of international relations, first and foremost the history of international politics, is examined for three main reasons.

First, the overall claim of small states' structural security dependency will be further strengthened by describing when and how small states failed to survive or managed to pull through and proliferate. Second, the specificities of each era's survival story can be properly explored. Third, the causal link between the states system's key features and small states' chances of survival can be investigated in detail.

The study will conclude with an analytical summary and outlook. The purpose of the former is to bring together the key findings of the previous chapters and build up the broader claim that the states system, regardless of type and era, pre-sets the chances for small states to survive or proliferate. The reason for the latter is to extend the current trend lines and consider the fate of the small state in the foreseeable future. With a number of candidates waiting in the wings, it is reasonable to assume that the number of small states will see a moderate rise over the next few decades.

Notes

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- 8 Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw, "The Diplomacies of Small States at the Start of the Twenty-first Century: How Vulnerable? How Resilient?" in *The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1.
- 9 Juan Enriquez, "Too Many Flags?" *Foreign Policy* 116, Fall (1999).
- 10 Christopher Clark, *Preußen, Aufstieg und Niedergang, 1600–1947* (München: Pantheon, 2008), 631–4; Imanuel Geiss, *Die deutsche Frage 1806–1990* (Mannheim: B.I.-Taschenbuchverlag, 1992), 27–77.
- 11 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 332–335. In this section, Morgenthau wavers between attributing the "inflexibility of the new balance of

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- 12 Mahbubani, *Can Singapore Survive?*, 13–16.
 - 13 Tommy Koh, “Foreign Affairs,” in *Singapore: The Year in Review*, 1996, ed. Gillian Koh (Singapore: IPS/Times Academic Press, 1997), 68.
 - 14 Alan K. Henrikson, *Small States in World Politics: The International Political Position and Diplomatic Influence of the World’s Growing Number of Smaller Countries*. Paper prepared for the Joint Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Task Force Conference on Small States, St. Lucia, 17–19 February 1999; Enriquez, “Too Many Flags?”
 - 15 “The Correlates of War Project,” www.correlatesofwar.org/.
 - 16 Quoted in Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, vii.
 - 17 Cooper and Shaw, “The Diplomacies of Small States,” 1.
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