Introduction

Timothy J. White

The success of the peace process in Northern Ireland has resulted in the publication of a large number of books and articles that highlight a wide variety of factors associated with the signing of the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement, the arduous and lengthy implementation of this Agreement, and the continuing sectarianism in Northern Ireland. The continuing conflict in Northern Ireland, despite the success of the peace process, highlights the role of ethnic and social divisions as a cause of conflict in contemporary global politics.[1] Despite numerous and various studies, no collection of scholarly analysis to date has attempted to assess prominent theories of International Relations (IR) to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the peace process, and the challenges to consolidating peace after an agreement. IR scholars have recently focused on deception, border settlement and peace, the need to disarm combatants, the role of agents and ideas, gender, transnational social movements, the role of religions and religious institutions, the role of regional international organisations, private sector promotion of peace processes, economic aid and peacebuilding, the emergence of complex cooperation, and the need for reconciliation in conflict torn societies. How do the theories associated with these issues apply in the context of Northern Ireland's peace process? This volume explores these primarily middle-range theories of IR in the context of the important case of Northern Ireland.

Instead of focusing on paradigmatic debates, most of the contributors to this volume examine specific theories of IR in the context of what has happened in Northern Ireland. This case provides a unique opportunity to study theories focused on conflict resolution, negotiation, and settlement of a seemingly intractable conflict, but because of the time that has passed since the 1998 Agreement, scholars have also focused on theories related to peacebuilding. One of the unique advantages of studying the Northern Ireland case is that there is clearly a degree of success in terms of conflict resolution based on the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. The challenges to implementing this Agreement and overcoming historic sectarianism provide fertile ground for examining theories of IR that focus on moving beyond the absence of violence to a more fully developed, consolidated, and sustained peace.

The value of case study research in IR

There is a long history of fruitful analysis based on case study research in the field of IR.[2] The chapters in this volume rely on the case study method, made most famous by Alexander George.[3] This method has been further refined and developed by many recent and contemporary proponents including John Gerring.[4] Even Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, known for his rational choice approach, has found case study research useful in the study of IR.[5] Case study research develops theory or seeks to explain an apparent anomaly by the intensive study of a single case or group of cases. This methodology allows one to engage in what George calls 'process-tracing', where the scholar explores why certain events or outcomes occurred. The principal advantage of this methodology is that studies that find statistical relationships based on a large number of cases cannot explain why or how variables or factors are related. The narrative of case study research allows the researcher to explain how factors that are identified in larger sample studies are related.[6] The intensive analysis of the case allows for understanding the process of causation.[7] In the study of conflict, it allows the researcher to contextualise political violence.[8]

Scholars have emphasised the importance of linking case study analysis with theory. While some cite the problem of external validity when focusing on a single case study or a small number of cases, the researchers in this volume are careful not to attempt to over-generalise from the single case of Northern Ireland. Instead, the purpose of the case study research in this volume is to probe the potential explanatory power of different theories of IR. Thus, the chapters in this volume both explain various aspects of the Northern Ireland peace process and either further our understanding of various theories or question their empirical validity. While the findings in several chapters confound extant theoretical analysis (i.e. Gallaher's analysis of the theory of disarmament and decommissioning as part of peace processes and Murphy's analysis of the applicability of multi-level governance theory as it applies to the European Union's role in the Northern Ireland peace process), they provide an incentive for researchers to refine their theories or limit them in such a way as to take into account the findings of this volume.

Why did we choose the case of Northern Ireland? As another group of researchers once argued, compelling cases choose the researcher rather than the researcher selecting the case.[9] By focusing on this case, the authors in this volume are not claiming we chose it because of its representativeness of a group of cases of intractable conflict.[10] Indeed, several chapters in this volume focus on how the Northern Ireland case defies the expectation of existing theory and thus serves as an anomaly to our theoretical understanding of IR. O'Leary and Silke stress that the quality of a case study is based on the expertise of those conducting the research.[11] Most of the researchers in this volume have been engaged in research on Northern Ireland for a long time. Their familiarity and expertise with the case informs their ability to evaluate the theories of IR that are reviewed and assessed in this volume.

Overview of the volume

Each of the subsequent chapters explores various theories of IR in the context of developments in Northern Ireland. In Chapter 1, Paul Dixon examines the relevance of the three principal paradigms of IR – realism, idealism, and constructivism – in explaining what has happened in Northern Ireland. His focus on the role deception played in the peace process builds upon earlier research.[12] He concludes that constructivist assumptions best explain the flexibility, and at times deceit, that various actors displayed in the peace process. Constructivism is a paradigm most associated with the work of Alexander Wendt, and it stresses the role of agents, ideas, and institutions in world politics. By stressing the subjective understanding of concepts and interests, actors' behaviour is based on their own unique identities and is contingent based on changing circumstances.[13] Dixon argues that idealist and realist perspectives on the Northern Ireland peace process are flawed and constructivism provides a more flexible framework for analysing how the peace process was actually advanced. Idealist or liberal IR scholars advocate a civil society approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding and argue that the Good Friday Agreement was elite driven and did not integrate grassroots actors in the peacebuilding process.[14] This has made the process of consolidating and building the peace after the Agreement problematic and unstable. Dixon criticises idealism for underestimating communal antagonisms and, therefore, failing to appreciate the difficult role played by politicians in achieving an agreement. Realists, Dixon contends, were pessimistic about the prospects of reaching an agreement and underestimated the possibility of political change based on the perceived difficulty of overcoming fundamental differences of identity and territorial claims. Realists underestimated the possibilities of political change because they have a static, essentialist view of identity which also underestimates the role of political elites. Dixon demonstrates that a constructivist framework provides a more sophisticated understanding of politics and the possibilities of achieving a peace agreement. Constructivism takes into account the constraints and opportunities facing political actors and the consequent morality and political skills that were used to drive the peace process forward.

Andrew Owsiak explores the role border settlement has played in the Northern Ireland peace process in Chapter 2. Borders are essential to traditional realist conceptions of IR as they delimit the sovereign units: states.[15] Nevertheless, scholars have increasingly reconceptualised borders as soft and permeable.[16] Building upon constructivist assumptions about the border in Northern Irish politics,[17] and based on a series of interviews completed in 2014, Owsiak concludes that moving beyond the border and partition as the principal issue in the Northern Ireland conflict allowed parties to find agreement on a system of local governance. Like many other aspects of the conflict, the role of the border as a territorial and social divide became less important as the peace process developed. Owsiak employs an issue-based approach to conflict which suggests that states handle territorial disputes via more aggressive foreign

policies than disputes over non-territorial issues. This perspective therefore predicts protracted negotiations and violence in Northern Ireland.[18] Employing constructivist assumptions regarding the ability to reconceptualise partition, Owsiak demonstrates that as the peace process progressed, Irish nationalists north and south of the border became more willing to forego demands for unification for the concrete near-term benefits that a negotiated settlement promised, namely power-sharing in the north with north–south coordination of governance based on the second strand of the Good Friday Agreement. Owsiak then employs selectorate theory to explain how various actors managed the contentious territorial issue and the complexity and nuanced approach leaders used to both lead and follow their constituencies.[19]

Another of the critical impediments to the Northern Ireland peace process was the decommissioning of paramilitaries' weapons. As in many ethnic conflicts, different groups in Northern Ireland armed themselves to advance their cause and engaged in a pattern of violence to defeat their enemies. For a stable peace settlement, all groups in the conflict had to achieve enough security such that they could disarm and demobilise. In Chapter 3, Carolyn Gallaher demonstrates that this disarmament process was critical to the eventual success of implementing the Agreement and creating the stability needed for local governance to recommence in Northern Ireland. Research on decommissioning usually falls within a larger literature on disarmament–demobilisation–reintegration (DDR).[20] Although much of the literature on DDR treats it as a single process, some scholars have narrowed in on the process of disarmament (or decommissioning as it was called in Northern Ireland). This work makes several assumptions. First, a process for disarmament is usually an integral part of most peace processes. Though the details may not be worked out before the first ceasefire, they are usually established quickly after armed parties have agreed to make peace. Second, international third parties are crucial to the process. They help keep armed factions 'honest' by ensuring they meet deadlines. They also manage the process of decommissioning and verify that weapons have been rendered inoperative. Third, failure to decommission quickly, or in full faith, is usually a sign that violence between parties will resume. Gallaher argues that decommissioning in Northern Ireland's peace process does not conform to theoretical expectations about the role of decommissioning in conflict resolution. In Northern Ireland, peacemakers avoided establishing a detailed process for decommissioning because many worried such details would thwart a deal. The ambiguity of the decommissioning process after the Agreement and its delay proved problematic in the post-Agreement period. Though the failure to decommission did have political consequences – the power-sharing Assembly at the centre of the Agreement was shuttered for several years – it did not lead to a resumption of violence between parties. Rather, delays in the process contributed to spikes in internal violence. These findings suggest that the Northern Ireland conflict remains, in many ways, an outlier case that fails to conform to categories often used to explain contemporary conflicts and predict their resolution.

Constructivists have stressed the importance of analysing ideas and agency in world politics, and scholars have increasingly recognised that leaders matter in terms of decisions relating to war and peace.[21] Applying constructivist assumptions, P. J. McLoughlin explores the contribution of John Hume to the peace process in Chapter 4 of this volume.[22] Hume's innovative approach to understanding and redefining the conflict in Northern Ireland from a territorial dispute to one of a series of relationships was critical in reaching a peace agreement, as was Hume's own role as a broker eliciting the support of hardline republicans, unionists, and the British, Irish, and US governments. Hume emerged first as a civil rights leader at the very outset of the Troubles in the late 1960s, was a founding member of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in 1970, and was central to the various negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Moreover, Hume played a unique dual role in his career. First, he was a political thinker, or more accurately an articulator, of a new approach to the Northern Ireland problem. Second, Hume was a key negotiator and political broker, most significantly persuading militant republicans to adopt a peaceful political strategy, but also continually engaging with British and more so Irish political elites, and even guiding external actors like the US Government and the EU in their respective inputs to the Northern Ireland peace process. This dual role means that Hume is an ideal figure through which to assess the importance of both ideas and agency in the Northern Ireland peace process. While acknowledging that he and his party operated within a particular and historically formed structure of communal antagonism and political change,[23] McLoughlin shows that the ideas and actions of Hume and the SDLP played a key role in breaking the patterns of conflict that motivated the Northern Ireland Troubles and helping to establish the new system of more consensual communal relations that the region now enjoys.

Scholars have increasingly focused on the role of gender in IR and in particular the role of gender in conflict[24] and peacebuilding.[25] In Chapter 6, Máire Braniff and Sophie Whiting explore the important role gender plays in our understanding of international conflict and in the context of the Northern Ireland peace process. IR scholars have increasingly recognised that women experience insecurity differently from men and participate in conflict resolution and peacebuilding differently as well. Braniff and Whiting's chapter links the latest research on gender and security with developments in Northern Ireland. They contend that the peace process has privileged the masculine, marginalising the role of women. Their findings highlight the historically small role women played as elected representatives in Northern Ireland. When women attempted to assert themselves as actors, forming the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC) in 1996, their failure to become part of the formal political process meant that a decade later the organisation dissolved, a victim of the continuing male dominated structures that shape post-Agreement Northern Ireland.

Devashree Gupta builds on the important work of Keck and Sikkink in examining the role of transnational social movements in IR in Chapter 5.[26] Many

who have historically identified non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as key actors in world politics have identified their role in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.[27] While networks are often studied in the context of bringing social change,[28] Gupta identifies the important role of networks in Northern Ireland built on the involvement of diaspora-based groups in the conflict.[29] Diasporas can help to drive conflict or help to resolve conflict,[30] and Gupta highlights how diaspora groups were both critical in facilitating the Troubles by helping to arm groups in Northern Ireland and later also in pressuring the same groups to participate in the peace process. From the very beginning of the Troubles, groups in Northern Ireland deliberately sought and made use of transnational allies to further their political goals and gain strategic advantages vis-à-vis their opponents. Organisations on both sides of the conflict turned to external allies, including members of diaspora groups, like-minded movements, and groups with ideological affinities for a variety of reasons: accessing resources, expanding and practising their tactical repertoires, and strengthening their claims to legitimacy. While the existence of this transnational dimension of the Troubles is well documented, the differences among cross-border networks – how they were structured, how they functioned, and their impact on the dynamics of the conflict – are less well understood. Drawing on social movement theory, particularly work on transnational advocacy networks, coalition formation, and diffusion, Gupta compares the structure and function of licit and illict cross-border networks that resulted. Gupta reveals the nature of the 'flows' that occurred across these networks, examining the types of information and resources that were transmitted and how groups in Northern Ireland made use of these flows to further their own goals. Additionally, Gupta contrasts the evolution of these networks over time, comparing the impact of both licit and illicit transnational ties from early mobilisation around civil rights, through escalation and violence, and, finally, to the peace process.

Liberal IR scholars have historically stressed the role of NGOs, including churches, in world politics. Recently, scholars have also stressed the normative influence of religious actors as agents in world politics,[31] conceiving of their role from constructivist assumptions. While not the first to study the role of religion in the Northern Ireland peace process,[32] Maria Power in Chapter 7 examines the role of the Catholic Church in the Northern Ireland peace process by analysing not only the theological basis of Catholic attitudes and beliefs about peace but also the manifestations of these teachings as they were applied by bishops in Northern Ireland, especially Cahal Daly in the 1980s. Power demonstrates that faith creates action and explains how an important religious tradition in Northern Ireland promoted peace by recognising and responding to the new kind of wars and political conflicts that have emerged in recent decades. As the nature of conflict changed from a state-centred model (for example, the Second World War) into one which saw civil wars and ethnic conflict becoming the norm (such as the Balkans and Northern Ireland),[33] so too did Catholic responses; both national Churches and Catholic Organisations began to realise that protest and non-violent action was no longer enough to

create a more peaceful world. When Pope John XXIII issued *Pacem in Terris* in 1963, he urged Catholics to work for peace and provided them with a framework for doing so. Catholic bishops thus became directly involved in peace processes by attempting to implement Catholic teaching on peace, which is best summarised by the statement made by Pope Paul VI in 1972: 'if you want peace, work for justice'.[34] Consequently, the Catholic hierarchy in Northern Ireland sought to achieve peace by working for justice, especially for political prisoners and those who suffered discrimination.

Historically, liberal scholars of IR relied on functionalism, federalism, and other theoretical frameworks to explain regional integration and stress the important role of regional organisations in world politics and regional conflicts. More recently, international organisations have been depicted as orchestrating national and local governments and thereby governing through intermediaries.[35] What impact did international organisations have in Northern Ireland? Previous research has established that the EU has had complex and multifarious effects on border conflicts,[36] including Northern Ireland.[37] In Chapter 8, Mary C. Murphy analyses the relevance of the theory of multi-level governance (MLG) to explain the role of the EU in Northern Ireland.[38] Building on Checkel and Katzenstien's conception of the EU as an emerging multi-level polity,[39] Murphy contends that the EU successfully engaged Northern Ireland as a region of a member state without threatening that state's sovereignty or power. The EU was successful because of its accommodation with the British state and the fact that the British state allowed the EU as a mechanism to reconcile communities in Northern Ireland. MLG emphasises the multi-level nature of EU politics and attaches significance to the role played by subnational units and supranational institutions in the policy process. The model also proposes new forms of governance which offers a specific conception of EU politics based on an altered relationship between state and non-state actors, where the latter have become increasingly influential. MLG is often associated with undermining or bypassing the role and power of the central state – a notion which is either politically appealing or politically objectionable to Northern Ireland's divided politicians. The devolution of powers to Northern Ireland's sub-national institutions, following the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, firmly placed Northern Ireland in a category of European regions with advanced decentralised powers. Murphy finds that the MLG model may not fully capture some of the internal constraints, complexities, and divisions which are characteristic of Northern Ireland's recent political experience and which are reflected in its evolving relationship with the EU. Murphy argues that the evidence from Northern Ireland does not support the central MLG argument that state power was undermined by the activities of the EU. She contends that Northern Ireland's place in the United Kingdom was not threatened by the region's more politically charged, formalised, and strengthened relationship with the EU.

Katy Hayward and Eoin Magennis further explore the role of NGOs in assessing business and the private sector in promoting peace in Northern Ireland in

Chapter 9. Analyses of Northern Ireland's peace process tend to concentrate on the public or non-profit sector. The role of the private sector has been more or less ignored. This reflects the fact that Northern Ireland's private sector is notoriously underdeveloped and the tenuous commitment of larger corporations to the region. The lack of scholarly focus may also reflect the traditional gap in comprehension and cooperation between business and the academy, particularly in the field of peace studies. This, however, is changing.[40] Liberal IR assumptions about the spillover effects of economic development have morphed into analysis of the potential for globalisation to improve international connections, thus making the recourse to violence less likely. At a sub-state level, the same liberal premises are present in the concept of 'business-based peacebuilding',[41] which identifies a 'natural' complementarity between the objectives of private sector actors and the maintenance of a stable, sustainable peace. Building on prior research on cross-border business cooperation and the peace process in Northern Ireland,[42] Hayward and Magennis examine the current conditions within which private sector actors make a contribution to peace. First, they consider those aspects of this contribution that have an international dimension, such as the EU Peace funds that were awarded to businesses in the border region or the short-lived role of the US Economic Envoy to Northern Ireland. The incorporation of a deal on corporation tax rates in the Stormont House Agreement signified the increasing nexus between Northern Ireland's peace process and private sector development. Second, the chapter considers the ways in which corporate social responsibility can be connected to peacebuilding.[43] While there is growing willingness among businesses to invest in voluntary activities, there is a wariness about getting involved in local conflict-related issues, not least because many community-based peacebuilding efforts are still 'single identity' and a business's association with one particular community group can pose a risk to profits as well as to diplomacy. Hayward and Magennis conclude with consideration of the role of social enterprise as a means of sustainable community development. Whether or not business has an explicit peacebuilding impulse, it may have a positive effect on the embedding of peace.

Beyond private sector investment, there clearly have been attempts by collaborating governments to promote reconciliation in Northern Ireland through targeted economic assistance. Sandra Buchanan in Chapter 10 explores the role of external economic aid in conflict resolution and in the period since the signing of the Agreement to promote peacebuilding by social and economic means.[44] In moving from violence to peace, most practical (and theoretical) efforts have concentrated on the removal of direct violence only through top-level political engagement, usually over the short term. Academic narratives of the Northern Ireland peace process have been, in the main, no different in their concentrations. However, a number of external funding programmes have focused their efforts on all levels of society in supporting the Northern Ireland peace process over the long term through social and economic development. By focusing on the local, they have attempted to redress the root

cause of conflict in Northern Ireland.[45] Under the guise of the International Fund for Ireland and the EU Peace Programmes (I, II, III), they have been responsible for a huge increase in grassroots-level involvement in the region's conflict transformation process over the last three decades, prompting previously unforeseen levels of citizen empowerment and local ownership of the process. Consequently this has assisted in sustaining the peace process during its most challenging political periods. Despite relatively little in-depth research on their transformational contribution, these programmes provide a suitable context for assessing the efforts of such external funding in supporting Northern Ireland's peace process through social and economic development. Buchanan examines the significance of their work by theoretically contextualising the role of social and economic development in transforming conflict, providing some background information on the organisational makeup and work of the two programmes, exploring their impacts in terms of taking a long-term view of the transformation process and developing and integrating vertical and horizontal capacity through the involvement of all levels of society, before finally exploring some lessons for sharing.

Timothy White's Chapter 11 assesses the utility of cooperation theory to explain the peace process in Northern Ireland. Building upon the research of Robert Axelrod, this theory stresses the interconnectedness of leaders' decision-making and the complexity associated with the emergence of cooperation.[46] This theoretical approach stresses the possibility of actors learning to cooperate with others who have differing or competing interests. Thus, this model emphasises adaptive policy-making rather than purely or simply rational policy-making. Historically, realists have stressed the rationality of actors in world politics, but cooperation theory demonstrates that actors can learn and modify their policy and behaviour based on their interaction with specific actors' past behaviour and future expected behaviour. The shadow of the future provides powerful incentives to consider future cooperation even with an actor who historically has been an enemy or rival. Numerous scholars have attempted to further develop our understanding of the complex nature of cooperation necessary to promote peace in intractable conflicts.[47] White's analysis emphasises that negotiators representing different states and groups in Northern Ireland came to their decisions and policy choices based on the expected reaction of others. The complexity of this interaction came to be appreciated by the actors themselves. While historically seen as a theory to explain cooperation between two states, White demonstrates that the cooperation that led to the signing and implementation of the Agreement required a pattern of coordinated cooperation among numerous actors, including historic rivals. This chapter thus applies a theory of complex cooperation to the Northern Ireland peace process.

The final substantive chapter in the volume, Chapter 12 by Cillian McGrattan, explores the difficulty and importance of achieving reconciliation after the Agreement. McGrattan finds that groups in Northern Ireland need to focus more on taking responsibility for their role in continuing sectarian differences

rather than looking for reconciliation from, or with, others. Previous research has stressed the need for reconciliation, social learning, and dialogue as key mechanisms that allow a transformation of former enemies.[48] For example, memory studies have recently looked to constructivism and studies of international norms in analysing the resilience of collective memory and the politics of apology,[49] while commemoration studies have increasingly explored questions of globalisation and the transfer of internationally recognised tropes in producing memorial cultures.[50] Yet, when this movement – from what could be described as a procedural perspective on establishing peaceful and stable democracy to a more substantive vision – has been applied in Northern Ireland, it has arguably been done in a disparate and potentially segregationist fashion, where reconciliation is something that is often done at a localised or community level without regard to the wider societal implications. The chapter maps the various initiatives and policy proposals that have been developed in Northern Ireland, which have increasingly looked not only to international examples (in particular South Africa), but also the importance of cultivating US involvement (for instance, the chairing of talks by Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan in 2013). The chapter develops an alternative model of reconciliation based on societal responsibility and critically integrated memory. [51]

The Conclusion summarises the major points of the chapters and identifies some common themes that emerge from the analysis provided by the contributors. It summarises the major arguments of the authors in the volume and explains how IR theory is furthered by the attempt to apply the case study method to explore the causal mechanisms associated with different theories.

Common themes

This book as a whole improves our understanding not only of how a peace agreement was reached in Northern Ireland, but also what it did and did not achieve. Several themes emerge from the various contributions to this volume, mostly from constructivist assumptions. First, the evolution of the peace process in Northern Ireland required groups with traditional conceptions of territory, borders, and fixed identities to reconceptualise and redefine these as the peace process progressed. Thus, both Murphy and Owsiak build upon earlier research that assumed that the creation and development of the European Union allowed actors to go beyond historic ethnic and nationalistic claims.[52] Braniff and Whiting contend that the failure to incorporate women both in the politics of the peace-making process and in the post-Agreement period has meant that male-dominated institutions and conceptions of nationalism persist despite efforts to move beyond the sectarian conflict. Second, the process of peacemaking and peacebuilding is complex, lengthy, arduous, and intricate. Dixon, Owsiak, Gallaher, Murphy, and White's chapters emphasise the complexity of different actors' decision-making and the interrelated nature of the political and diplomatic processes and actors in Northern Ireland. Third, McLoughlin and Gupta stress the importance of individuals as agents to the

peace process, such as John Hume. Fourth, peace is an aspirational goal that requires different methods in different circumstances. Gupta's analysis highlights how non-state actors modified their behaviour and became part of the peace process once elites initiated it. As Power, Murphy, and Buchanan find, the Agreement offered actors not central to negotiating the Agreement an opportunity to support and deepen the peace process once an agreement was reached in Northern Ireland. McGrattan stresses that the challenges for peacebuilding after the Agreement are quite different than the impediments to negotiate an agreement in the 1990s. Thus, this volume as a whole offers great insight and analysis into not only what transpired in Northern Ireland but how theories of IR are critical to our understanding of this notable, yet not fully satisfactory, peace.

Notes

1 For the general argument regarding ethnic conflict as a global problem and challenge, see J. Wilkenfeld, *Myth and Reality in International Politics: Meeting Global Challenges through Collective Action* (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 38–65.

2 See A. Bennett, 'Case study methods: Design, use, and comparative advantages', in D. F. Sprinz and Y. Wolinsky-Nahmias (eds), *Models, Numbers and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); D. Dion, 'Evidence and inference in the comparative case study', *Comparative Politics*, 30:2 (1998), 127–45; K. Drozdova, 'Reducing uncertainty: Information analysis for comparative case studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, 58:3 (2014), 633–45; H. Eckstein, 'Case study and theory in Political Science', in F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby (eds), *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975); J. Mahoney and G. Goertz, 'The possibility principle: Choosing negative cases in comparative research', *American Political Science Review*, 98:4 (2004), 653–69; Z. Maoz, 'Case study methodology in International Studies: From storytelling to hypothesis testing', in F. P. Harvey and M. Brecher (eds), *Evaluating Methodology in International Studies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); D. Rueschemeyer, 'Can one or a few cases yield theoretical gains?' in J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); R. Stoecker, 'Evaluating and rethinking the case study', *Sociological Review*, 39:1 (1991), 88–112; D. Vaughan, 'Theory elaboration: The heuristics of case analysis', in C. C. Ragin and H. S. Becker (eds), *What is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); J. Walton, 'Making the theoretical case', in Ragin and Becker (eds), *What is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*; H. C. White, 'Cases are for identity, for explanation, or for control', in Ragin and Becker (eds), *What is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*; R. K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2013).

3 A. George, 'Case studies and theory development: The method of structured, focused comparison', in P. G. Lauren (ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979). George's analysis of case study analysis and theory development is further developed in A. L. George and A. Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

4 For Gerring's analysis of case study research, see J. Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); J, Gerring, 'What is a case and what is it good for?' *American Political Science Review*, 98:2 (2004), 341–54.
5 B. Bueno de Mesquita, 'Domestic politics and international relations', *International Studies Quarterly*, 46:1 (2002), 1–9.
6 For the potential for narrative evidence, see T. Büthe, 'Taking temporality seriously: Modeling history and the use of narratives as evidence', *American Political Science Review*, 96:3 (2002), 481–93.
7 S. R. Brown, 'Intensive analysis in political research', *Political Methodology* 1:1 (1974), 1–25. Case study analysis has also been linked with identifying necessary conditions in developing causal explanations. See G. Goertz and J. S. Levy, 'Causal explanation, necessary conditions, and case studies', in G. Goetz and J. S. Levy (eds), *Explaining War and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals* (London: Routledge, 2007).
8 L. Bosi, N. Ó Dochartaigh, and D. Pisoiu, 'Contextualising political violence', in L. Bosi, N. Ó Dochartaigh, and D. Pisoiu (eds), *Political Violence in Context: Time, Space and Milieu* (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2015).
9 R. H. Bates, A. Greif, M. Levi, J. Rosenthal, and B. R. Weingast, 'Introduction', in R. H. Bates, A. Greif, M. Levi, J. Rosenthal, and B. R. Weingast (eds), *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 13. The importance of the case is based not only on its success but also its relevance for so many other cases of intractable or persistent conflict. For the need to balance relevance with scientific rigour, see M. Desch, 'Technique trumps relevance: The professsionalization of political science and the marginalization of security studies', *Perspectives on Politics*, 13:2 (2015), 377–93.
10 For a methodological justification for this kind of case study analysis, see Gerring's analysis of 'influential' cases. See J. Gerring, 'Case selection for case-study analysis: Qualitative and quantitative techniques', in J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady, and D. Collier (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 656–9.
11 B. O'Leary and A. Silke, 'Understanding and ending persistent conflicts: Bridging research and policy', in M. Heiberg, B. O'Leary, and J. Tirman (eds), *Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), pp. 394–5.
12 See especially J. J. Mearsheimer, *Why Leaders Lie* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Also see R. Jubb and A. F. Kurtulmus, 'No country for honest men: political philosophers and real politics', *Political Studies*, 60:3 (2012), 539–56; S. Baiasu (ed.), *Sincerity in Politics and International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2014). Sometimes, leaders and the public deceive themselves. See A. E. Galeotti, 'Liars or self-deceived? Reflections on political deception', *Political Studies*, 63:4 (2015), 887–902.
13 A. Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics', *International Organization*, 46:2 (1992), 392–425; A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
14 For example, see C. Farrington, 'Models of civil society and their implications for the Northern peace process', in C. Farrington (ed.), *Global Change, Civil Society and the Northern Ireland Peace Process: Implementing the Political Settlement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 113–41; T. J. White, A. P. Owsiak, and M. E.

Clarke, 'Extending peace to the grassroots: The need for reconciliation in Northern Ireland after the Agreement', in *The Lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Process* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013), pp. 240–9.

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