

Introduction: what was civilisation?

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In recent years, a steady stream of books on civilisation has slaked the thirst of an enormous public, as it has for some two centuries. These studies normally seek to explain the increasing 'ascendancy', 'superiority', or 'predominance' of the West over the last half millennium and, as often as not, to warn against Western decline or collapse.¹ Yet many scholars are averse to this triumphant account, particularly as it seems to minimise such troubling aspects of history as slavery, imperialism, war, misogyny, and racism. The new global turn in the humanities, furthermore, argues against any understanding of history that cordons the West off from the rest. The very notion of civilisation, as we shall see, often implies a self-serving telos: a purportedly universal standard of progress by which all societies may be judged, but one best embodied in European models. The term civilisation serves more happily when used to designate non-Western social and cultural formations (e.g., Mesopotamian civilisation, Chinese civilisation, Far-Eastern civilisation, or Islamic civilisation), but even here it often suggests some normative standard of achievement and promotes, particularly when employed by those on the Right, a sense of deep and enduring social and cultural divisions.

How different from the nineteenth century, when the word had an almost sacred aura, and when it was perhaps *the* central notion underpinning Europe's understandings of its history and relationship to the rest of the world. Even thinkers who questioned the prestige, superiority, or unity of European civilisation had no doubts about the value of the concept. Perhaps more surprisingly, the idea had great appeal for many non-Western elites whose own cultures fared poorly by the standards of civilisation. Other ideas with which civilisation was commonly discussed – nation, race, religion, gender, modernity, culture, and empire – remain major, uncontested categories of social and cultural analysis, but today there is no agreement on whether civilisation is, or was, a fact or a fiction. If the words civilisation and civilised are still routinely employed in everyday conversation to refer to distinctions of all sorts, their use in scholarship has never been more caught up in polemics.

The essays in this volume examine how the idea of civilisation informed the pictorial arts in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when it scarcely

needed defending. As François Guizot put it in 1828, 'it is evident that there is a European civilisation'. He continued: 'Civilisation is a fact like any other – a fact susceptible, like any other, of being studied, described, narrated.'² Until the end of the century, and indeed up until World War I, this confidence was shared broadly among artists, who played as important a role as anyone else in defining civilisation. The idea informed artistic practice in myriad ways, but most obviously it served as a subject for painting and sculpture. In Europe and America, many of the most ambitious mural cycles of the period traced histories of civilisation or juxtaposed civilisation with barbarism. Even when civilisation was not explicitly their subject, artists worked with the idea. The deference that most nineteenth-century artists paid to the artistic canon, the weight of tradition for them, was part and parcel of their deep respect for Western civilisation. Understandings of European cultural achievement depended on the idea, but so too did understanding of Europe's Others. These might be understood as other civilisations or as civilisation's Other – in other words, as alternate civilisations or as primitive or barbaric. Art history itself was rewritten according to theories of civilisation. Perhaps the idea's prestige and allure is most tellingly revealed by the fact that by the end of the century even some artists outside the West were adapting it to their needs.

Together, the chapters in this volume demonstrate the centrality of civilisation as a way of understanding the course of history and the worth of individual cultures in the nineteenth century. Ideas about civilisation helped to justify such key developments as nation building, imperialism, capitalism, industrialisation, urbanisation, even newly ascendant bourgeois moral and cultural codes, but the fit between the idea and these developments was far from seamless. Thus, these chapters also reveal the contradictions and growing uncertainty surrounding the idea. How, for example, could the 'civilising mission' of colonialism be reconciled with the violent, inhumane outcomes to which it led? Were not capitalism and industrialisation engendering degrading living conditions and disrupting the elegant refinements and comforting traditions of an earlier age? Or were the new entertainments and luxuries of the modern age leading to ever more feeble, decadent populations? Over the course of the century many artists became increasingly ambivalent about civilisation, leading some to long for a primitive world away from the mores and social hierarchies prescribed by civilisation. Civilisation increasingly seemed to come at a price, as something that diminished a culture's vitality or gentility, or an individual's liberty. A more dramatic challenge came with World War I, which made plain the destructive, irrational aspects of modernity. For a great many artists and intellectuals, the war thoroughly disrupted the idea that European civilisation was moving in a wholly desirable direction, and definitively ended the period of largely unbridled enthusiasm for the idea examined here.

For all of its omnipresence in the nineteenth century, the word *civilisation* was a recent invention. Ideas about what makes 'us' different from 'them' are ubiquitous in history, but the word civilisation gathered together a very specific constellation of ideas. It first appeared in the 1750s, almost simultaneously in England and France, when it began to refer to an achieved state of culture, shared broadly in a

society, and the result of progress out of an inferior condition.³ Civilisation could also refer to the process through which this state was achieved. While the English and French uses of the word proved the most influential worldwide, in Germany a very old word, *Kultur*, was sometimes used in the place of civilisation almost as soon as the neologism appeared. In Germany the word *Zivilisation* could carry connotations of artificiality and superficiality, a kind of surface polish or politesse associated in Germany with French aristocratic culture. Thus civilisation normally translates into German as *Kultur*.⁴ The tension surrounding the word in Germany is nonetheless telling, as it demonstrates how easily civilisation's association with refinement and elegance could lead to fears about decadence, effeteness, or decrepitude. By the end of the nineteenth century such fears were expressed across Europe.

Most early formulations of civilisation were markedly universalist: they suggested that civilisation was the result of human agency and proposed stages through which all societies advanced. They often drew on earlier stadial theories of social development put forth by such diverse sources as the Scottish Enlightenment and Montesquieu. At the same time, theories of civilisation almost always explained European superiority as the result of its particularities: eighteenth-century thinkers pointed most frequently to climate, geography, and religion, while race became increasingly important to the nineteenth century. The idea was intimately linked to the notion of progress, and it also gave rise to much speculation about the primordial state that theoretically preceded the beginning of the civilising process. Definitions of the civilised man seemed to demand a comparison to the 'savage' or the 'barbarian'.⁵

Concepts often take shape gradually, long before a word sums them up, and this was certainly the case with civilisation. Art played an important role in this process. For example, in the sixteenth century, engravings of the New World helped to produce the savage against which civilisation would be defined. As Michael Gaudio has shown, engraving's ability to picture the savage was especially effective in this regard because of the medium's association with technological progress and learning, which were themselves measures of civility. Engraving was a prized product and defining feature of Western development, and thus its perceived ability to transform the savage into an object of Western knowledge powerfully reinforced Western feelings of superiority.⁶

Artists also latched onto the stadial theories of social development formulated by Enlightenment thinkers long before these became a standard part of discussions of civilisation per se.⁷ For example, Harriet Guest has demonstrated that William Hodges' paintings of the South Sea Islands from the 1770s and 1780s very much follow the basic terms of civilisation. Even though Hodges did not explicitly invoke the idea of civilisation, he showed different islands at various stages of social and cultural advancement, and identified different sexual practices and gender roles with these stages.⁸ With the general acceptance of the word at the end of the eighteenth century, however, civilisation became a common and explicit idea in artistic practice.

Just as the word civilisation was entering the everyday lexicon in English, James Barry chose to decorate the Great Room of the Royal Society of Arts with

a series of six enormous paintings entitled *The Progress of Human Culture* (Figures 1.1–1.6), which he worked on primarily from 1777 to 1784.⁹ Barry's ambition to become a painter of public murals – an artistic role he esteemed above all others – inspired him to paint the enormous walls of the Society's meeting room for the cost of materials and models. He lived in penury for years in order to complete the monument. It speaks to the growing prestige of the idea of civilisation that Barry chose it for his main theme.

The first three paintings in the cycle depicted the development of Greek society, awakening from a barbaric, animalistic state, progressively adopting agriculture, architecture, the arts, and competition, and finally producing the great intellectual, artistic, and athletic feats of Periclean Athens. Two more murals spoke of the achievements of the specifically commercial society of modern Britain, while a final picture placed 125 great geniuses of history in an Elysium, and juxtaposed this with a terrifying vision of Tartarus. Barry's engagement with theories of civilisation was obvious, as was his engagement with earlier ideas about the stages through which societies progress, but he was driven by other ideas as well. As Daniel Guernsey demonstrates in Chapter 1, Barry worked with an understanding of civilisation inflected by another new idea of the period, philosophical theism. Specifically, Barry suggested that civilisation was not a purely secular development, but was divinely nurtured: human progress entailed rational and religious fulfilment at the same time. As Jean Starobinski has shown, early definitions of civilisation sometimes asserted that religion was its source, but increasingly uses of the term were markedly non-theological and suggested that 'civilisation might well become a secularised substitute for religion'.¹⁰ Barry, in contrast, felt that religion was central to the civilising process.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the history of civilisation was the theme of many of the most prestigious and ambitious decorations of public buildings in North America and Europe. In Paris, extensive mural cycles focusing on civilisation or closely allied subjects were painted by Horace Vernet (the Salon de la Paix in the Bourbon Palace, 1838–47), Eugène Delacroix (the Library of the Bourbon Palace, 1838–47), Théodore Chassériau (Stairway of Honor at the Cour des comptes, 1844–48, now destroyed), Paul Chenavard (the Pantheon, begun in 1848 and never completed), and Henri Lehmann (the Gallery of Festivities in the Hôtel de Ville, 1852–53, now destroyed). In Berlin, at the Neues Museum, a 'history of civilisation' was equally the theme of the six enormous mural paintings completed by Wilhelm von Kaulbach between 1847 and 1866. In Washington, DC, Thomas Crawford chose the 'progress of civilization' as his subject for the pediment located over the Senate entrance on the East Front of the US Capitol building and completed in 1863, and Edwin Blashfield chose the 'evolution of civilization' as the subject of his ceiling painting for the Reading Room of the Library of Congress, completed in 1895. If we were to enumerate the many works of art celebrating Europe's cultural heritage, such as, for example, Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres' *Apotheosis of Homer*, originally painted in 1826 for a ceiling in the Musée Charles X in the Louvre, the list would be long indeed. This is to say nothing of the many

paintings of golden ages and historical highpoints, or those charting the course of empire, or tributes to great men that were essentially meditations on civilisation.

The prominence of civilisation as a theme in the arts corresponded to the growth of the idea in every cultural domain, a growth that was perhaps nowhere more important than in the field of history. Nineteenth-century Europe was marked by an anxious preoccupation with the past and gave rise to a new, professional historiography, an academic discipline, and a vastly more popular audience.¹¹ Civilisation was one of the distinctive, organising principles of the ascendant discipline, and the word appeared in the title of many history books. Indeed, George Stocking's now classic work *Victorian Anthropology* demonstrated the concept's centrality not just to history, but to a whole range of fields that studied human society.¹² A complete survey of the many theories of civilisation that informed nineteenth-century historical writing is outside the scope of this introduction, but we can gain an appreciation of their prominence, and their significance for artists, by examining a set of questions that preoccupied many of the major nineteenth-century thinkers who speculated on the course of history: Did the emergence of civilisation have a shape, rhythm, or logic? Did it have stages? Did it conform to some other pattern, or did it have a pattern at all?

Speculation on these questions drew on many existing theories about how societies develop. I have already noted the importance of the stadial theories of the Enlightenment. Another important model posited that history proceeded in cycles. This was an old idea with innumerable sources, already proposed in antiquity by Polybius, found in the writing of Machiavelli, and used again by Montesquieu, but it was given a particularly compelling form by Giambattista Vico in his *New Science of 1725*. Vico saw in history a series of *corsi* and *ricorsi* that fell into three ages, the divine, the heroic, and the human. This idea had great resonance throughout the nineteenth century, from the mystical, neo-Catholic theories of Pierre-Simon Ballanche formulated in the 1820s, to the racial, nationalistic ideas of Nikolai Danilevskii put forth in the 1870s and 1880s. Cyclical theories remained foundational in the historical work of such major historians as Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee in the early twentieth century.

It comes as little surprise, then, to find such ideas in the work of artists. Thomas Cole's famous series of five paintings, *The Course of Empire* (1833–36), pessimistically warned that American imperial ambitions could lead it through a cycle, already seen in the classical world, that ended in excess and decay. Chenavard's cycle in the Pantheon drew directly on the work of Vico and Ballanche, proposing that history proceeded through a birth, rise, decline, and apocalypse, after which the cycle began again. Chenavard believed that history began with Adam and Eve in 4200 BC, and it would end, he predicted, exactly 8400 years later with the death of mankind in AD 4200.¹³ According to his scheme, history was divided into three (or sometimes he said four) periods, the first ending with the Tower of Babel, and the second with the birth of Christ. This second quarter was the time of humankind's greatest achievements, as it included the culmination of the civilisations of Egypt, the Hebrews, China, Greece, and Rome. The course of history corresponded to

the ages of man: both had a childhood, adolescence and early adulthood, a full maturity, and an old age. Different possibilities were available to people living in different historical periods. During the second quarter of history, when the adolescent becomes an adult, man was governed especially by the heart, and thus by emotion, sensation, and honour. It was in this period when the arts had produced their greatest achievements. The final period of mankind's life cycle belonged to the mind, and thus to science. As Chenavard explained: 'In the last place comes the age of the Head in which scientific principles are substituted for needs and feelings. Then Art disappears, or at least only repeats itself, analyses itself. Everywhere feeling is replaced by an exact knowledge of things.'¹⁴

Chenavard received the commission to decorate the Pantheon in 1848 thanks to his close ties to key government officials in the Second Republic, but he lost it with the fall of the Republic in 1851. He planned sixty-three enormous murals, a portrait frieze, four decorated piers, and four enormous floor mosaics, all depicting the achievements of great men of history. Space does not permit a complete examination of his scheme, but one of the mosaics, which he entitled *The Philosophy of History* (Figure 0.1), or *Social Palingenesis*, is particularly illuminating regarding his ideas, as it illustrates the past, present, and future of mankind. The circular image



0.1

Paul Chenavard, *The Philosophy of History* or *Social Palingenesis*, 1848–51, oil on canvas, 303 × 380 cm, Musée des Beaux-Arts, Lyon.

divides history into four registers. At the top are the deities of various religions of the world, most of which have their origins in the beginnings of time. In the colonnade and on the level below it are the prophets, intellectuals, artists, and leaders of the ancient world, with older figures placed primarily in the upper storey. On the stairs below are more modern greats, with the most recent figures generally occupying the immediate foreground. Chenavard had originally completed his design with a lower level in which he pictured the future of mankind, but he eliminated this section from his designs, perhaps responding to criticism of his fellow republicans, who were generally far more optimistic about the future. According to written descriptions of this portion, there were figures embodying the venality, triviality, and devotion to work that the artist felt would overtake society.¹⁵ Lower still, Chenavard represented future mankind in full decline: humans took on bestial and monstrous forms and fought with one another, while underneath them were sterile, dying figures. At the very bottom was the fire of the final apocalypse, from which a phoenix rose.

Chenavard's vision of the future of mankind was notoriously pessimistic, and a similar fascination with destructive, calamitous, or morally ambiguous episodes in the history of civilisation seems to inform Kaulbach's murals in Berlin. Three of



Wilhelm von Kaulbach, *The Destruction of Jerusalem*, 1846, oil on canvas, 585 × 705 cm, Neue Pinakothek, Munich.

0.2

the six subjects he chose to paint are the destruction of Jerusalem (Figure 0.2), the Battle of the Huns, and the Crusaders at the gates of Jerusalem.¹⁶

On the whole, however, understandings of historical development were far more optimistic. The discoveries of science and technology, industrial growth, the democratisation of politics, the spread of education, and the expansion of European power all fostered triumphant visions of the future. Only toward the end of the century did such things as worries about social alienation, problems accompanying industrialisation, and the ambiguous results of colonialism begin to cloud the horizon. Very much in the sanguine spirit of the preceding century, progress became the watchword of the age.¹⁷ To be sure, there were dissenters. Historicism, nostalgia, and primitivism, among other attitudes, all checked in various ways the period's faith in progress. But until the end of the century, most historians portrayed history moving in a very positive direction over the long run. Prominent thinkers as various as Guizot, Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, Thomas MacCaulay, Herbert Spencer, Giuseppe Mazzini, and many, many others all saw the present as a pinnacle of civilisation and offered theories of historical development that predicted still greater things for the future. Utopian visions proliferated, as in the work of Henri de Saint Simon, Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, Edward Bellamy, and William Morris, to name just a few. In Germany, theories of historical development took on special complexity. Hegel saw history proceeding through a dialectical process in which contradictions generated in one period are potentially overcome or transcended at the next. It was unclear for Hegel exactly where this process led society – he was far more interested in its effect on the human spirit – but in the materialist philosophy of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the dialectic revealed a clear direction in history toward a communist society. The Communist Manifesto further suggested that:

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.¹⁸

Whatever the future course of civilisation, it was for Marx and Engels in the nineteenth century a thoroughly bourgeois concept.

Progressive and utopian versions of history were dominant in the visual arts, sometimes in overly facile ways. Vernet's murals in the Bourbon Palace blithely juxtaposed signs of modernity with classical imagery to celebrate an industrial present sweeping away the past, sometimes with awkward results. For example, one painting, *Steam Putting to Flight the Sea Gods* (Figure 0.3), depicted industrial technology, embodied in a huge, black steamship, literally putting classical deities and animals to flight: the modern almost violently displaces the traditional and the natural.¹⁹



Horace Vernet, *Steam Putting to Flight the Sea Gods*, 1838–47, oil on canvas, Bourbon Palace, Paris.

0.3

Lehmann's murals in the Hôtel de Ville were far more academic, relying completely on classical allegories, but equally triumphant in so far as they portrayed civilisation as a matter of continual progress leading to the present.²⁰ Crawford's pediment for the US Capitol Building, *The Progress of Civilization* (Figure 0.4; detail Figure 4.2), combined a classical personification of America with figures representing occupational and racial types to narrate the American conquest of the continent. Dejected or fleeing Native Americans embody the primitive practices displaced and replaced by civilisation, while a woodcutter, a soldier, a merchant, a teacher with students, and a mechanic embody the forces that lead the nation to conquest and, of course, 'progress'.²¹

Vernet, Lehmann, and Crawford all focused on the civilisational exigencies of the current moment, but other artists dwelt on a future paradise promised by progressive visions of history. As Neil McWilliam has observed, utopian visions were especially popular with artists on the radical Left in France, who often ascribed



0.4 Thomas Crawford, *The Progress of American Civilization*, 1850–57, marble, Capitol Building, Washington, DC.

a central role to the aesthetic in both envisioning and achieving a better future. And yet they most often envisioned their utopias as Arcadian scenes or similarly pastoral paradises, suggesting ‘an implicit unease at the advance of industrial capitalism, spawning a regressive fantasy of prelapsarian innocence and community’.²²

Not all artists embraced the idea that civilisation followed a clear pattern. For example, Delacroix’s murals in the Library of the Palais Bourbon undermined the notion that civilisation followed any discernable trajectory. In Delacroix’s ceiling, civilisation was not a stable achievement, but was instead filled with barbarism that came from both within and without it. Civilisation might blossom or wither away at any given moment. Delacroix was not, however, a precursor to today’s critics of civilisation, who see in the idea an assertion of Western superiority. On the contrary, he placed the great achievements of European civilisation on a pedestal and felt them superior to all others. He was motivated rather by a conservative disdain for his contemporaries’ faith in progress and modernity.²³

Even artists who believed that civilisation followed a clearly ascendant path had to grapple with a conflicting version of history. Theorists of civilisation often argued that the arts represented the highest achievement of a civilisation, an assertion that artists unsurprisingly embraced, but histories of art placed the greatest artistic achievements of Western civilisation in the past, and sometimes in the very distant past.²⁴ Thus, artists struggled to combine a progressive understanding of history with an understanding of tradition that posited past masterpieces as the most perfect embodiments of artistic achievement. In a painting like Ingres’ *Apotheosis of Homer* (Figure 0.5), in which all the greatest artists in the European tradition descend from Homer, art does not really progress at all, but instead keeps alive the best examples from civilisation’s past. Only with the appearance of the avant-garde were artists fully able to embrace progressive notions of art history in which the new superseded the old, and to envision an art that focused on progress itself in the form of modern life.

As this suggests, the idea of civilisation had very direct consequences for art history. Jeanne-Marie Musto’s Chapter 5 explores an early effort to apply the idea to a variety of artistic traditions. In 1842 Franz Kugler used it as an organising principle in his *Handbuch der Kunstgeschichte*, arguably the first global history of art. While Indian art exemplified *Cultur* [sic: *Kultur*] (for him, the most poetic and spiritual form of culture), Chinese art embodied only *Civilisation* [sic: *Zivilisation*] (a more prosaic, less generative type of culture), and Africa produced nothing that



Jean-Antoine-Dominique Ingres, *The Apotheosis of Homer*, 1827, oil on canvas, 386 × 515 cm, Musée du Louvre, Paris.

0.5

qualified as either *Kultur* or *Zivilisation*. Musto explores how Kugler's theories were modified a year later in the work of Karl Schnaase. While both men relied on racist theories of social development, Schnaase further demoted China and elevated Europe, claimed non-European art for the developing field of ethnography, and removed much of Kugler's ambivalence about the possible positive attributes of non-European cultures. Schnaase's approach proved to be the more influential until the twentieth century when re-evaluations of the primitive, to which we shall turn shortly, found their way back into art history.

While artists and art historians were fleshing out a picture of civilisation as a singular historical process, the word was taking on other meanings. By the 1820s it began to refer to any number of ethnographically distinct societies developing along different paths.²⁵ Thus, as opposed to a singular civilisation – and a singular civilising process through which all societies moved with varying rates and degrees of success – there were many different civilisations. Initially, a certain level or degree of achievement, based on European norms, was required to be designated as a civilisation, but as the term was applied to more and more societies, a much greater degree of relativism overtook the term. By the twentieth century the word could be

applied to virtually all societies, much in the way the word culture is used today. To be sure, this new understanding did not inhibit Europeans from judging others by Eurocentric standards, but it at least opened up the possibility of imagining others in ways that challenged, and even negated, European models of civilisation.

European social commentators were particularly fond of applying the notion of civilisation to China and Japan – as indeed they still are today – as these were societies that bore many of the features associated with the term, but which were nonetheless clearly distinct from Europe. Greg Thomas's Chapter 2 demonstrates that Chinese art had a varied reception in Britain when seen through the lens of civilisation: some forms were considered exemplary and advanced, while others were stigmatised as primitive or barbaric. Aesthetic evaluations were linked to larger claims about the merits of China as a civilisation – that is, the perceived worth of its government, religion, technology, military, and commerce. Yet they were also linked to the changing interests of the British Empire itself and its relations with China, and these demanded a devaluation of Chinese civilisation as the nineteenth century progressed.

Emily Eastgate Brink examines a very different scenario in her study of the reception of Japanese illustrated books in Second Empire Paris in Chapter 6. Here, Japan was often seen as a society that had forestalled the same processes of industrialisation and social change that characterised modern France. One of the most important mediums through which French audiences initially encountered Japan was the illustrated book. The naturalistic illustrations and bound volumes of Japanese *e-hon*, or illustrated books, conjured up associations with France's civilised past, and more specifically the empirical, encyclopedic tradition of Diderot and d'Alembert. In particular, the taxonomic, detailed observation of nature found in Hokusai's *Manga* reminded French audiences of refined and learned parts of their own preindustrial past. Thus, in a move that combined elements of exoticism and nostalgia for a seemingly simpler past, the civilised was paradoxically relocated to a society constructed as premodern and far more in touch with the natural world.

Civilisation was also used in Europe to evaluate cultural traditions closer to home. In Chapter 7 Maria Taroutina explores the growing interest in Byzantine art and architecture beginning in the 1840s, and relates aesthetic evaluations of it to civilisational theories. In Britain and France, where Enlightenment thinkers had often used Byzantium to illustrate theories of Oriental despotism and decadence, Byzantine art was viewed as static, primitive, and almost overbearingly sensual. Historians in Russia and Germany, on the other hand, portrayed Byzantium as the guardian of a pure, uncorrupted Christianity, as an important conduit of Greek culture and civilisation, and as a direct cultural ancestor. These varying national views were also driven by competing territorial claims in the Balkans, and the individual nationalist, patriotic, and imperialist aims of the Great Powers. Taroutina's chapter reveals just how malleable and unstable the binary opposition between civilised and barbaric could be, for Byzantium was constructed both as sophisticated and civilised, and as premodern and primitive, depending on which of these images served national agendas better.

Matthew Johnston's Chapter 9, on the reconstruction of pre-Colombian Mesoamerican societies at the world's fairs of 1889 and 1893, examines another fascinating effort to define a distinct type of civilisation and simultaneously to fashion a cultural heritage. US and Mexican scientists physically recreated pre-Columbian structures, such as temple pyramids, as part of their nations' anthropological exhibitions at the fairs. Johnston demonstrates that, in both cases, they sought to integrate a Mesoamerican past with the demands of current national history, much in the same way that classical civilisation underpinned many modern European histories. Johnston suggests that these structures not only reflected the new methods of a professionalised archaeological science, but also revealed the ideological imperatives driving these methods.

The slippage from civilisation (in the singular, as a universal process of social development) to civilisations (in the plural, to denote different types of societies or cultural traditions developing in distinct ways) was just one of many ambiguities that overtook the term over the course of the century. It increasingly became synonymous with refinement, imbricating it more complexly with notions of class, race, and gender. In Melissa Dabakis's Chapter 4 we see that Anglo-American women artists working in Rome in the middle of the nineteenth century viewed the city's inhabitants in terms of civilisation, but in ways that were strongly inflected by ideas of race, class, gender, and colonialism. On the one hand, the belief that advanced civilisation was currently centred within Northern Europe allowed for a condescending attitude toward the seemingly backward South. Anglo-American women adopted many of the conventions of racial and colonial discourse to portray Italian culture as primitive. On the other hand, Anglo-Americans were attracted to Italy as a present-day Arcadia, or mythic cradle of their civilisation, which they imagined as outside the constraints of modernity. In all its various forms of Otherness, Italy paradoxically offered Anglo-American women a partial release from the civilised norms of behaviour imposed on their class and gender in their homelands, allowing them freedoms in their dress, behaviour, and artistic practice that would not have been possible at home.

In Chapter 8 Julie Codell explores another instance where distinctions between civilised and barbaric overlapped with colonial and class differences: the practice of 'going native', or adopting native, non-European dress in Victorian portraiture. 'Going native' was once a term of denigration, but Codell demonstrates that it acquired a very positive valence over the course of the nineteenth century as it gave form to newly authoritative forms of imperial identity, particularly for those who derived their position from knowledge of the non-Western world. Such portraits played with signs of civilised and barbaric, just as they played with markers of race, gender, and other aspects of identity, but this ludic freedom was far more available to those who exercised social and imperial privileges: those with more securely civilised identities could cross the divide over to the primitive far more easily than supposed primitives could lay claim to the markers of civilisation.

Given that definitions of civilisation were almost always stacked in Europe's favour, and that the idea was increasingly employed in justifications of colonialism

and racist theories of social development, it may be surprising to learn that it had great purchase outside of Europe. Several recent historical studies have revealed that non-Western intellectuals from such far-flung places as Turkey, Japan, India, and East Africa attempted to adapt the idea to their purposes.²⁶ As Michael Adas has observed: 'In the pre-World War era, the great majority of Western educated collaborateur and comprador classes in the colonies readily conceded the West's scientific, technological, and material superiority.'²⁷ In Latin America the idea of civilisation was also adapted to novel purposes. Domingo Faustino Sarmiento's work placed the term at the very centre of debates about national identity. Before becoming the seventh president of Argentina, he wrote his enormously influential *Facundo: Civilisation and Barbarism* (1845), which portrayed the identity of Argentina as a struggle between civilisation and barbarism. In this volume, Laura Malosetti Costa's Chapter 3 examines how the notion of national identity as a struggle between civilisation and barbarism informed visual personifications of Argentina and Uruguay. As in European republican imagery after the French Revolution, it was common in Argentina and Uruguay to picture the nation as a woman, but in these countries the nation often appeared threatened by civil wars or in conflict with indigenous peoples. The nation could be pictured as a weeping woman, a captive of Indians, or even a crucified female Christ. Malosetti Costa argues that in this emerging



0.6 Fernand Cormon, *Humanity* (Sketch for the Ceiling of the Museum of Natural History), late-nineteenth century, oil on canvas, 133 × 210 cm, Musée du Petit Palais, Paris

iconographic tradition, weakness, defencelessness, and pain appear as positive values for a new, 'civilised' sensibility, as opposed to the local cultural traditions of 'bravura' and 'courage' associated with gauchos and rural landlords, and thus with barbarism.

At the very moment when the idea of civilisation, along with Western civilisation itself, seemed to be spreading across the globe, its prestige within Western artistic practice was waning. Certainly its constant employment in official art made it less desirable as a theme for a newly emergent avant-garde intent on originality. The theme was still being used for mural decorations at the end of the century, when, for example, Fernand Cormon mixed it with fashionable racial theories in his ceiling for the National Museum of Natural History in Paris, painted between 1893 and 1898 (Figure 0.6). Cormon's painting depicted the 'Aryan' races 'carried along to civilisation', a condition that the 'Semitic, yellow, black, and red races' never fully achieve.²⁸ Even if one did not object to the racism of Cormon's work (which some critics did), his grand rhetoric had become a cliché.²⁹

Still deeper dissatisfactions with civilisation were emerging as the century progressed. Colonialism was widely justified around the globe for its supposed 'civilising mission'.³⁰ Yet, to many, colonialism seemed to bring about the very opposite of civilisation – that is, barbarism. No less a thinker than Alexis de Tocqueville, a strong proponent of colonialism in Algeria, wrote in 1841 of the war there: 'I returned from Africa with the distressing notion that we are now fighting far more barbarously than the Arabs themselves. For the present, it is on their side that one meets civilisation.'³¹ Though hardly one to speak up against colonialism, Delacroix expressed similar sentiments in 1843 when he sarcastically referred to the depredations of the French in Algeria as the work of 'civilised men'.³²

Another challenge to the prestige of civilisation came with the revaluing of the primitive. The impulse to glorify the savage or primitive has perhaps always been present, and the idea of a 'noble savage' significantly predates the term civilisation, but thinking about civilisation seemed inevitably to lead some to embrace its opposite.³³ Still, the notion that some viable alternative to modernity existed in so-called primitive societies only began to have real traction within the avant-garde after mid century. In the 1850s, Baudelaire asserted somewhat facetiously that America and Belgium were barbarous in their modernity, and that 'Perhaps civilisation has taken refuge in some tiny, as yet undiscovered, tribe'.³⁴ Some thirty years later, Vincent Van Gogh attempted to set up an artist colony in the south of France based largely on an imaginative construction of a primitive Japan, and Paul Gauguin set sail for Tahiti, envisioning an artistic practice integrated into indigenous life there.³⁵

Recent research has emphasised how limited and self-serving such primitivist visions were, particularly in the case of Gauguin.³⁶ He was only too willing to avail himself of the prerogatives of the coloniser, and his identification with indigenous peoples in Tahiti, or later the Marquesas Islands, was very partial. Still, something fundamental had changed when artists began to embrace the primitive as a positive and even primary ideal for their art. With Gauguin civilisation stood for distinctly negative ideals. At best he used the term ironically, as when he

observed, 'Prostitution has not ceased on Tahiti since we have heaped upon it the benevolences of our civilisation.'³⁷ Or when he criticised the Westernised aspects of life in Papeete: 'It was Europe – the Europe which I had thought to shake off – and that under the aggravating circumstances of colonial snobbism, and the imitation, grotesque even to the point of caricature, of our customs, fashions, vices, and absurdities of civilisation.'³⁸

The biggest blow to European faith in progress and civilisation surely came with World War I. Four years of incessant violence and mechanised slaughter on an unprecedented scale did much to erode European confidence in its own civilisational authority.³⁹ Adas has argued convincingly that the war played a critical role in undermining assumptions about Western progress and superiority that undergirded the civilising mission. This loss of confidence affected European intellectuals, but more interestingly it affected Asian and African elites who had formerly conceded the necessity of emulating European social models.⁴⁰

Despite the challenges that primitivism and World War I presented, civilisation continued to be a very productive idea throughout the first half of the twentieth century, both in its singular and plural senses. Major intellectuals – Sigmund Freud, Emile Durkheim, Thomas Mann, Oswald Spengler, Lucien Febvre, Marcel Mauss, Will Durant, Robert Merton, R. G. Collingwood, John Dewey, Arnold Toynbee, Bronislaw Malinowski, Lewis Mumford, and Matthew Arnold, to offer an incomplete list – continued to reformulate the idea as they used it to speculate on the purpose and value of social institutions and the direction and pace of social development. In 1926, a volume entitled *What is Civilisation?* gathered together essays by Dhan Gopal Mukerji, W. E. B. Du Bois, Maurice Maeterlinck, and Elizabeth Robins Pennell, among others, with each author adapting the idea to different societies.⁴¹ Another book, *Civilisation: The Word and the Idea*, published the proceedings of a colloquium in 1930 that included Lucien Febvre, Marcel Mauss, and Alfredo Niceforo.⁴² Serious questions arose about its intellectual merits – Franz Boas' assault on the idea in the early decades of the twentieth century deserve special mention – but widespread contestation would not come until the advent of postcolonialism within the academy in the 1970s.

As late as 1969, Sir Kenneth Clark created a television series with an accompanying, best-selling book entitled *Civilization*. Clark admitted in his preface that his title was provocative for what was essentially a survey of European art from the end of antiquity to the end of the nineteenth century, and that he had omitted many other 'great civilisations of the pre-Christian era and the East'.⁴³ Yet he had no doubts about the essential superiority of the world he described. Comparing the head of the *Apollo Belvedere* to an African mask, he asserted, 'the Apollo embodies a higher state of civilisation than the mask'. He then elaborated:

To the Negro imagination it is a world of fear and darkness, ready to inflict horrible punishment for the smallest infringement of a taboo. To the Hellenistic imagination it is a world of light and confidence, in which the gods are like ourselves, only more beautiful, and descend to earth in order to teach men reason and the laws of harmony.⁴⁴

I trust that readers today understand the problem with a generalisation such as ‘the Negro imagination’ as it is used here, and it will no longer be taken for granted that the African mask evokes only ‘fear and darkness’. Today Clark’s book, I speculate, inspires less credulity than bemusement.

But by 1969 Clark’s particular version of civilisation belonged to another age. The point is not to criticise him – that battle was won long ago – but to note how anachronistic the idea has become. The chapters in this volume help us to understand not only how central the idea was to artistic practice in the nineteenth century, but also how and why understandings of civilisation changed so dramatically. The notion of civilisation still stirs deep emotions, ranging from pride to anger, yet its use in the nineteenth century is obscure or distant enough to appear in many ways strange and tendentious. These chapters help us to recover its force, utility, and resonance – as well as its weaknesses and omissions – when it was at its peak.

Notes

- 1 Examples of the genre published in the last five years include: Ricardo Duchesne, *The Uniqueness of Western Civilization* (Leiden: Brill, 2011); John Headley, *The Problem with Multiculturalism: the Uniqueness and Universality of Western Civilization* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2012); Niall Ferguson, *Civilization: The West and the Rest* (New York: Penguin, 2011); Harry Redner, *Beyond Civilization: Society, Culture, and the Individual in the Age of Globalization* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2013); Teofilio Ruiz, *The Terror of History: on the Uncertainties of Life in Western Civilization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). Ferguson’s book, which was a bestseller and served as the basis of PBS and BBC documentary television series, typifies the genre perfectly.
- 2 François Guizot, *The History of Civilization in Europe*, trans. William Hazlitt, ed. Larry Siedentop (London and New York: Penguin, 1997; French version first published in 1828), pp. 10, 11–12. On Guizot’s admiration for civilisation, see Ceri Crossley, *French Historians and Romanticism: Thierry, Guizot, the Saint-Simonians, Quinet, Michelet* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 82–100.
- 3 The earliest known instance is in *Dictionnaire universel françois et latin* (Paris: Vve. Delaune, 1743), but here it was defined as an ‘act of justice or judgment that renders a criminal trial civil’. For its earliest uses referring to an achieved state of culture, see note 5. In this volume, Greg Thomas identifies the earliest known use of the word in English in Chapter 2.
- 4 See Émile Tonnelat, ‘Kultur: histoire du mot, évolution du sens’, in Lucien Febvre *et al.*, *Civilisation. Le mot et l’idée* (Paris: Centre International de Synthèse, 1930), pp. 61–73; Philippe Béneton, *Histoire de mots: culture et civilisation* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1975), p. 37; and Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2000), pp. 8–10, 29–34.
- 5 On the origins and history of the word, see Jean Starobinski, *Blessings in Disguise; or, the Morality of Evil*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 1–31; Lucien Febvre *et al.*, *Civilisation*; Joachim Moras, *Ursprung und Entwicklung des Begriffs der Zivilisation in Frankreich (1756–1830)* (Hamburg, 1930); Reuel Anson Lochore, *History of the Idea of Civilization in France (1830–1870)* (Bonn: L. Rörscheid, 1935); Émile Benveniste, *Problèmes de linguistique générale* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), pp. 336–45; Béneton, *Histoire de mots*; E. de Dampierre, ‘Note sur “culture” et “civilisation”’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3 (1961), pp. 328–40; Brett Bowden, *The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 23–46; Bruce Mazlish, ‘Civilization in a Historical and Global Perspective’, *International Sociology* 16:3 (September 2001), pp. 293–300; Anthony Pagden, ‘The “Defense of Civilization” in Eighteenth-Century

- Social Theory', *History of the Human Sciences* 1:1 (1988), pp. 33–45.
- 6 Michael Gaudio, *Engraving the Savage: The New World and Techniques of Civilization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).
 - 7 For a summary of stadial theories of social development, see Ronald Meek, *Social Science and the Savage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
 - 8 Harriet Guest, *Empire, Barbarism, and Civilisation: James Cook, William Hodges, and the Return to the Pacific* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also Bernard Smith, *European Vision and the South Pacific, 1768–1850: a Study in the History of Art and Ideas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960).
 - 9 Barry used the word civilisation in a letter to the Dilettanti Society of 1793, published in James Barry, *The Works of James Barry, Esq.: Historical Painter...* (London: T. Caddell and W. Davies, 1809), p. 596.
 - 10 Starobinski, *Blessings in Disguise*, p. 3. See also Benveniste, *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, p. 340.
 - 11 On changes in the practice of history during the nineteenth century, see Lionel Gossman, *Between History and Literature* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Stephen Bann, *The Clothing of Clío: A Study of the Representation of History in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Crossley, *French Historians and Romanticism*; Peter Fritzsche, *Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in the Nineteenth Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); and Donald R. Kelley, *Fortunes of History: Historical Inquiry from Herder to Huizinga* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).
 - 12 George Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology* (New York: The Free Press, 1987).
 - 13 On Chenavard murals for the Pantheon, see Joseph Sloan, *Paul Marc Joseph Chenavard: Artist of 1848* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962); *Paul Chenavard: le peintre et le prophète*, exh. cat., ed. Marie-Claude Chaudonneret (Paris: Réunion des Musées Nationaux, 2000); and Daniel Guernsey, *The Artist and the State, 1777–1855* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 149–89.
 - 14 Eugène Vial, 'Les Souvenirs de Paul Chenavard', *La Revue du Lyonnais* 4 (1921), p. 552.
 - 15 Théophile Gautier, 'Le Panthéon—peintures murales' in *L'Art moderne* (Paris, 1856), pp. 1–83.
 - 16 On Kaulbach's series, see Bernhard Maaz, 'An Illustrated Cultural History: The Wall Paintings of Wilhelm von Kaulbach,' in Elke Blauert (ed.), *Neues Museum: Architecture, Collections, History* (Berlin: Staatliche Museen zu Berlin and Preußischer Kulturbesitz, 2012), pp. 132–41; Annemarie Menke-Schwinghammer, *Weltgeschichte als 'Nationalepos.' Wilhelm von Kaulbachs kulturhistorischer Zyklus im Treppenhaus des Neuen Museums in Berlin* (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag für Kunstwissenschaft, 1994); and Monika Wagner, 'Wohin mit der verlorenen Geschichte? Kaulbachs weltgeschichtlicher Bildzyklus im Neuen Museum,' in *Berlins Museen, Geschichte und Zukunft, Zentralinstitut für Kunstgeschichte, Munich* (Munich and Berlin: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 1994), pp. 87–98.
 - 17 White, *Metahistory*, p. 47.
 - 18 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: New American Library, 1988), p. 55.
 - 19 On Vernet's ceiling, see Robert Beetem, 'Horace Vernet's Mural in the Palais Bourbon: Contemporary Imagery, Modern Technology, and Classical Allegory during the July Monarchy', *Art Bulletin* 66:2 (June, 1984), pp. 254–69.
 - 20 Marie-Madeleine Aubrun, *Henri Lehmann, 1814–1882. Catalogue raisonné de l'oeuvre*, vol. 1 (Nantes: Sylvain Chiffolleau, 1984), pp. 197–8.
 - 21 On Crawford's *Progress of Civilization*, see Vivien Green Fryd, *Art and Empire: The Politics of Ethnicity in the U.S. Capitol, 1815–1860* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
 - 22 Neil McWilliam, *Dreams of Happiness: Social Art and the French Left, 1830–1850* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 323.

- 23 I argue this at length in a forthcoming book. See also Michèle Hannoosh, *Painting and the Journal of Eugène Delacroix* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Hannoosh, 'Delacroix and the Ends of Civilizations', in Eik Kahng (ed.), *Delacroix and the Matter of Etching* (Santa Barbara: Santa Barbara Museum of Art, 2013), pp. 77–94.
- 24 For an excellent recent exploration of the respect for tradition in nineteenth-century artistic practice, see Marc Gotlieb, *The Plight of Emulation: Ernest Meissonier and French Salon Painting* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
- 25 Lochore, *History of the Idea of Civilization in France*, pp. 3–19.
- 26 Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Douglas Howland, *Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002); Jonathon Glassman, *War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007); Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, *Talking Back: the Idea of Civilization in the Indian Nationalist Discourse* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Chih-yu Shih, *Civilization, Nation and Modernity in East Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012).
- 27 Michael Adas, 'Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology', *Journal of World History*, 15:1 (March, 2004), p. 37.
- 28 Fernand Cormon, quoted in Antonin Proust, 'La Décoration du Muséum et les peintures de M. Cormon', *Le Figaro illustré* 5, no. 1 (October, 1897), p. 192. Cited from Alistair Wright, *Matisse and the Subject of Modernism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 177.
- 29 For an account of the reception of Cormon's painting, see Wright, *Matisse*, pp. 178–9.
- 30 For a recent world history of the 'civilised world' and its 'mission,' see Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009), pp. 1173–1238.
- 31 Alexis de Tocqueville, *Writings of Empire and Slavery*, ed. and trans. Jennifer Pitts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 70.
- 32 Eugène Delacroix, *Journal*, ed. Michèle Hannoosh, vol. 1 (Paris: José Corti, 2009), p. 284.
- 33 On the ever presence of primitivism, see A.O. Lovejoy and George Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997; originally published 1935). On the noble savage, see Ter Ellingson, *The Myth of the Noble Savage* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
- 34 Quoted from Starobinski, *Blessings in Disguise*, p. 27.
- 35 On Van Gogh's primitivism, see Tsukasa Kōdera, *Vincent van Gogh: Christianity vs. Nature* (Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1990); and Deborah Silverman, *Van Gogh and Gauguin: The Search for Sacred Art* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2000). On Gauguin's primitivism, see the following footnote. On primitivism as a mode of artistic practice beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing to the present day, see Robert Goldwater, *Primitivism in Modern Painting* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986/1966/1938); Frances Connelly, *The Sleep of Reason: Primitivism in Modern European Art and Aesthetics, 1725–1907* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999); Gill Perry, 'Primitivism and the "Modern"' in Charles Harrison, Francis Frascina, and Gill Perry (eds), *Primitivism, Cubism, Abstraction: The Early Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1993), pp. 3–85; Colin Rhodes, *Primitivism and Modern Art* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1994); Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush (eds), *Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the Culture of Modernism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Maria Torgovnick, *Gone Primitive: Savage Intellectuals, Modern Lives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Lynda Jessup (ed.), *Antimodernism and Artistic Experience: Policing the Boundaries of Modernity* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2001); E. H. Gombrich, *The Preference for the Primitive: Episodes in the History of Western Taste and Art* (London: Phaidon, 2002).

A recent historical study by H. Glenn Perry, *Objects of Culture: Ethnology and Ethnographic Museum in Imperial Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002) argues

- persuasively that late nineteenth-century German ethnology and ethnological museums initially flourished because of an interest in universal qualities of humankind and the cosmopolitan ambitions of German cities. Only later did the enterprise come to be dominated by racial and other hierarchies.
- 36 Abigail Solomon-Godeau, 'Going Native', *Art in America* 77 (July, 1989), pp. 119–28, 161; Stephen Eisenman, *Gauguin's Skirt* (Routledge: London, 1999); Elizabeth Childs, 'The Colonial Lens: Gauguin, Primitivism, and Photography in the fin-de-siècle', in Jessup (ed.), *Antimodernism and Artistic Experience*, pp. 50–70; Nancy Perloff, 'Gauguin's French Baggage: Decadence and Colonialism in Tahiti', in Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush (eds), *Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the Culture of Modernism*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 226–69; Alastair Wright, 'Paradise Lost: Gauguin and the Melancholy Logic of Reproduction', in Calvin Brown and Alistair Wright (eds), *Paradise Remembered: Gauguin's Noa Noa Suite*, exh. cat. (Princeton: Princeton University Art Museum, 2010); Frances Connelly, *The Sleep of Reason: Primitivism in Modern European Art and Aesthetics, 1725–1907* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), pp. 55–77.
- 37 Paul Gauguin, *Noa Noa: The Tahitian Journal*, trans. O. F. Theis (New York: Dover Publications, 1985), p. 56.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- 39 Countless sources might be cited here, but a recent book that links World War I to a decline of confidence in humanism, and to ideas such as civilisation and progress is Stefanos Geroulanos, *An Atheism that is not Humanist Emerges in French Thought* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
- 40 Adas, 'Contested Hegemony', 31–63.
- 41 Hendrik Van Loon (ed.), *What is Civilization?* (New York: Duffield & Co., 1926).
- 42 Lucien Febvre *et al.*, *Civilisation*.
- 43 Kenneth Clark, *Civilization: A Personal View* (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1969), p. xvii. It should be noted that, according to Clark, his title *Civilization* was suggested by David Attenborough at a lunch pitching the television show to Clark. Clark says: 'it was this word alone that persuaded me to undertake the work. I had no clear idea what it meant, but I thought it was preferable to barbarism, and fancied that this was the moment to say so.'
- 44 *Ibid.*, p. 2.